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This research draws from literature on political ecology, payment for ecosystem services (PES), 
REDD+, market-based perspectives on environmental conservation, decolonization, Indigenous 
Environmental Knowledge (IEK), and environmental governance to understand the impacts of a 
state-led, institutionalized PES program, Socio Bosque, on Kichwa Indigenous communities in 
Chimborazo, Ecuador.  The effects of PES programs are debated with some literature arguing that 
PES programs positively impact local livelihoods and environmental governance and conservation, 
while others point out the negative impacts of PES programs. An understanding of the effects of 
PES programs will be gained by analyzing Indigenous participation and inclusion in the institutional, 
distributional and epistemic aspects of Socio Bosque.  Decolonial methodologies and community 
engaged scholarship shaped the field research which used qualitative methods of interviews with 
community leaders, community members, and government officials and focus groups in Kichwa 
communities, which allowed for unique opportunities for storytelling and combined these methods 
with an analysis of government documents.  These methodologies provide insight into local 
understandings of and relationships with Pachamama (Mother Nature) and allow for a comparison of 
these understandings with the epistemic underpinnings of state-led, market-based environmental 
governance strategies. The empirical evidence suggests that instead of improving Indigenous 
peoples’ well-being, Socio Bosque actively erases Indigenous cosmovisiones and drastically changes 
traditional land use and resource management practices.  Furthermore, PES programs in Indigenous 
communities operate within a wider social, political, economic, and cultural context that has 
historically devalued Indigenous cosmovisiones and land use. The implication is that national, state-led 
programs and policies aimed at improving Indigenous communities’ well being and contributing to 
global climate change goals have reproduced and reinforced unequal power relations between 
Indigenous communities and the state.  However, in spite of the clear negative impacts of PES 
programs, Indigenous communities do not conserve the environment and participate in PES 
programs because they are passively dominated or “awakened” by outside ideologies or forces, but 
they actively participate in a hegemonic ideology of environmental governance and resource 
management that, on the surface, seems to run counter to their own values and ways of living. This 
research shows that Indigenous communities have found ways to implement their own agendas 
within the framework of PES programs as a means of sustaining livelihoods and maintaining ties to 
land, place, and space, as well as continuing traditional connections to the communal, the natural, 
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The Paris Agreement seeks to strengthen the global response to climate change.  Staying within the 
1.5-degree target set out in the agreement will require reforestation, forest protection and other 
forms of land and resource conservation polices (IPCC, 2018; 2019; IPBES, 2019).  Payment for 
ecosystem services (PES) programs are seen by governments, international environmental 
organizations and local communities as a means to achieve global climate change goals by protecting 
ecosystems, improving livelihoods, and combating climate change.  Underpinning the PES model is 
an assumption that paying for ecological services will provide an incentive to local communities to 
conserve local ecosystems that provide global ecological value.  Indigenous communities are seen as 
key partners in PES programs, such as the United Nations’ REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation and Forest Degradation) program, due to the large amount of forest and grassland 
they inhabit (Campbell et al., 2008; EDF, 2015).  As a result, in 2010 REDD+ adopted the Cancun 
Safeguards as measures to protect Indigenous communities and provide platforms for meaningful 
inclusion and participation of Indigenous peoples in global environmental governance programs 
(UNFCCC, 2019).  The Cancun Safeguards outline the importance of meaningful inclusion of 
Indigenous peoples in policy and program decisions about land use and resource governance on 
their land, as well as the need to understand the effects PES programs have on Indigenous 
communities. 
 
In adopting a perspective on PES that analyses the meaningful inclusion and participation of 
Indigenous communities in its programs, this research seeks to generate novel insights into 
environmental governance literature and to develop an understanding of the politics of PES 
programs in Indigenous communities.  In the chapters that follow, this research contrasts the 
underlying assumptions about nature, livelihoods, and environmental conservation inherent in PES 
programs with those of the Kichwa Indigenous people of the province of Chimborazo, Ecuador.  
Drawing on research carried out in five different Kichwa communities in Chimborazo, Ecuador over 
a period of seven months, this research uses a combination of quantitative and qualitative 
methodologies to explore the institutional, distributional, and epistemic dimensions of implementing 
a state-led PES program in the Andean highlands of Chimborazo. In doing so, this research 
responds to recent calls for a more critical analysis of the local effects of the institutionalization of 







The empirical focus of this research is Socio Bosque (Forest Partnership), a national PES policy that 
was introduced in Ecuador in 2008 to sequester carbon, reduce deforestation, conserve diverse 
ecosystems, and provide financial assistance to resource-dependent communities. The program 
offers incentive payments to individuals and communities in exchange for the conservation of their 
land and has received international praise within REDD+ circles and international conservation 
institutions (Vander Velde, 2015).  Indigenous communities are the largest landholders participating 
in the program, conserving 88% of the total hectares available through Socio Bosque.  High levels of 
Indigenous participation in PES programs like Socio Bosque indicate a need to understand how these 
programs affect Indigenous communities’ livelihoods, land use, and resource management practices. 
 
Ecuador offers both a unique and exemplary case within Latin America.  Six of the top ten countries 
with the most tree species are in Latin America, with Ecuador number eight (OECD, 2019).  
However, the rich biodiversity of the region is being threated by deforestation and ecosystem 
degradation.  Deforestation rates in South America are second only to Africa (2.96 million hectares 
to 4.41 million hectares), but the region has cut its deforestation rate in half since the early 90s 
(FAO, 2020).  Ecuador is representative of this trend with net deforestation declining from an 
annual average of 92,742 hectares (1990-2000) to 77,748 hectares (2000-2008) to the country’s 
current rate of 54,304 hectares (2008-2016) (MAE, 2017).  However, these statistics can be 
misleading since forest plantations are considered regeneration and contribute to improving the 
“gross” deforestation rates, and forest plantations have nearly tripled in the last 30 years with 
government policies, such as the 2013 Plan Nacional de Forestación y Reforestación (National Forestation 
and Reforestation Plan), contributing to this increase.  In 2018, Ecuador registered a deforestation 
of 12.8 million hectares of primary forest which is below the high rates of 14.5 million hectares 
registered in the 90s, but still a high reduction of primary forests (El Universo, 2019a).  What is more 
alarming for Ecuador is that the country is estimated to have lost 20% of its primary Amazon 
rainforest, a rate nearly three times higher than that of Brazil (0.7% to 0.2%) which is one of the 






Ecuador, and, more specifically, the province of Chimborazo where this study is situated, is also 
home to the unique páramo ecosystem which runs through the Andes mountain chain.  The Andean 
páramos are experiencing severe degradation due to increased resource extraction, deforestation, and 
agricultural and livestock activities (IUCN, 2014) and Ecuador is representative of the destructive 
nature of these practices where an “ongoing and unrestrained process” of degradation is taking place 
(Hofstede et al., 2002a: 1; Vásconez et al., 2011). In many cases, the global poor are found in forest-
dependant communities and, oftentimes, Indigenous peoples, as is the case of the páramos of 
Chimborazo.  In Latin America, approximately eight million of the region’s poor depend on forests 
for their livelihoods, representing 82 percent of the region’s poor (OECD, 2019).  The Ecuadorian 
páramos represent a regional case where human impacts are the main contributors to degradation 
(Vásconez et al., 2011) and can provide insight into the effectiveness of PES programs in combating 
the environmental degradation of these unique ecosystems.   
 
Ecuador provides a unique case to study the programs and policies being implemented in a country 
that has enshrined the rights of nature and Indigenous concepts, such as sumak kawsay, into its 
constitution and institutional framework.  In the particular case of ecosystem governance, Ecuador 
is unique to the region with its focus on contributing to REDD+ goals and creating a national PES 
program, Socio Bosque.  In contrast, the FAO’s Global Resource Assessment (2020) states that only 
seventeen percent of Latin American forests have long-term, sustainable forest management plans, 
compared to 25 percent in Africa, suggesting the need for improved environmental governance and 
management in the region. PES programs are growing within the region and Socio Bosque represents 
one of the ten largest national PES programs worldwide, further indicating the importance of the 
Ecuadorian case (OECD, 2019). 
 
The research unfolds as follows. The next chapter provides a brief contextual understanding of the 
historical, socio-political climate in Ecuador, as well as a brief explanation of key concepts and ideas 
that have helped to frame environmental governance in Ecuador and, more specifically, within 
Indigenous communities of Chimborazo.  The third chapter lays the theoretical groundwork for the 
dissertation, reviewing the evidence and arguments in favour of using PES programs for achieving 





understanding the politics of inclusion and participation of Indigenous communities in PES 
programs within the Andean context. The fourth chapter outlines the methods utilized in the study 
before moving to chapters five, six and seven which contain an analysis of the empirical field 
research in the highland province of Chimborazo, documenting the institutional, distributional, and 
epistemic dimensions of the Socio Bosque program and the inclusion and participation of Indigenous 
communities in the program.  There is a clear need to understand what meaningful inclusion and 
participation of Indigenous communities in PES programs look like from the perspective of those 
who have been historically marginalized from political and economic participation and decision-
making processes, most importantly Indigenous peoples.  Therefore, the words of local community 
members form an integral part of the empirical analysis to provide the perspective of the Kichwa 
Indigenous communities of Chimborazo who are participating in Socio Bosque.  Finally, chapter seven 
provides general conclusions, contributions to the literature made by this work, and the practical 
applications of the evidence presented. 
 
1.1 Objectives 
This research investigates the impacts of PES programs on Indigenous communities in Ecuador.  It 
draws from literature on political ecology, PES, REDD+, market-based perspectives on 
environmental conservation, decolonization, Indigenous Environmental Knowledge (IEK), and 
environmental governance to help understand the impacts of state-led, institutionalized PES 
programs on Indigenous communities.  This understanding will be gained by analyzing Indigenous 
participation and inclusion in the institutional, distributional and epistemic aspects of PES programs. 
Furthermore, this research will help to understand the ability and willingness of Indigenous 
communities to participate in state-led, global environmental governance programs when, at times, 
these programs seem to run counter to Indigenous values and beliefs about nature, land, and place. 
In order to achieve the aims outlined above, the following objectives will guide the research:  
1. to document local, Indigenous perspectives on the effects of PES programs in Indigenous 
territories 
2. to explain the rules and norms embedded in the institutionalization of Socio Bosque  






4. to understand how PES perspectives on nature and Indigenous knowledge and relationships 
with nature affect interactions between Indigenous communities and the Ecuadorian state.  
 
1.2 Research Questions 
To help achieve the aims and objectives, the research will be guided by the following central 
research question:  Why do Indigenous communities choose to participate in PES programs that, on 
the surface, seem to be detrimental to their current livelihoods, land use, and resource management 
practices? 
Each empirical chapter will have its own guiding question(s) and they are as follows: 
1. Institutional 
a. To what extent do institutionalized PES programs, such as Socio Bosque, open up new, 
participatory spaces for Indigenous communities? 
b. What barriers do the norms and rules of Socio Bosque create for Indigenous 
communities? 
c. To what extent do norms and rules underpin PES programs and shape the 
behaviours of Indigenous communities? 
d. In what ways do institutionalized environmental governance programs like Socio 
Bosque create territorial restructuring of land and local relations 
2. Distributional  
a. How does the distribution of incentive payments within Indigenous communities in 
Chimborazo affect local environmental governance and conservation efforts? 
b. How have the 5 communities of this research spent their incentive payments and, as 
a result, what conclusions can be drawn about community priorities? 
c. How are the incentive payments representative of distribution within Socio Bosque at 
the national level and other individual cases? 
3. Epistemic 
a. What meaning and value do Kichwa communities assign to nature and natural 
resources, how does this meaning and value inform land use and resource 






b. How do the ways in which international environmental conservation efforts and 
state-led institutions define and describe ecosystems affect and interact with local, 
Indigenous, place-based understandings of nature? 
i. What policy changes have been implemented as a result of government 
definitions of ecosystems and how have these changes affected land use and 
resource management in Kichwa communities in Chimborazo? 
 
1.3 Scope 
The research is limited in its scope since field work was carried out in only five Kichwa communities 
of Chimborazo, Ecuador, representing less than 1% of the total contracts signed (community and 
individual) in the Socio Bosque program, but close to 3% of the total community contracts.  However, 
the empirical data gathered from these communities provides rich insight into the local complexities 
of implementing PES programs in Indigenous communities, specifically Kichwa communities.  As a 
result, broader assumptions and conclusions can be derived about PES and Socio Bosque at large.  In 
order to understand meaningful participation of Indigenous peoples in PES programs, this research 
will explore the following aspects of the Socio Bosque program in Ecuador: 
1. the institutionalization of Socio Bosque in Ecuador 
2. the distribution of incentive payments in five Kichwa communities of Chimborazo, Ecuador 




In what follows, I will make the case that PES programs in Indigenous communities operate within 
a wider social, political, economic, cultural context that has historically devalued Indigenous 
cosmovisiones and practices.  In the local contexts of the communities in this research, dominant 
historical institutions have left an indelible mark on the social norms and practices that frame 
interactions between the state and Indigenous communities, creating unequal power relations.  
Therefore, instead of improving Indigenous peoples’ well-being, Socio Bosque has marginalized 





decisions on environmental governance and land use to one of representation and not meaningful 
participation.  The implication is that national, state-led program and policies aimed at improving 
Indigenous communities’ wellbeing and contributing to global climate change goals have reproduced 
and reinforced unequal power relations between Indigenous communities and the state, making 
Indigenous peoples more vulnerable to the negative effects of climate change.  However, in spite of 
the clear negative impacts of PES programs, Indigenous communities are not passively dominated 
or “awakened” by outside ideologies or forces.  They have found ways to implement their own 
agendas within the framework of PES projects as a means of sustaining livelihoods and maintaining 
ties to land, place and space, as well as continuing traditional connections to the communal, the 







































This chapter will provide the reader with an understanding of the historical, socio-economic, 
political, and cultural context within which the research and the Socio Bosque program are situated.  
The purpose of this chapter is to explain how environmental governance in Ecuador takes place 
within a politics of dichotomy where state policies and programs run counter to Indigenous 
livelihoods and cosmovisiones, and where various state-led environmental governance policies 
contradict state-led policies of plurinacionalidad, social inclusion, and participation.  More specifically, 
the chapter will discuss the following: first, the politics around the inclusion of Indigenous concepts 
into mainstream political and social discourse in Ecuador through the use of concepts such as 
ecosystem services, cosmovisiones, sumak kawsay/buen vivir, Pachamama, and the rights of nature; 
second, the recent (since 2006) plurinational, participatory, and inclusive turn, at least in rhetoric, 
within Ecuadorian politics and the implications for environmental governance in Ecuador; and, 
third, the history of the implementation and institutionalization of the Socio Bosque  program and its 
connection to the UN’s REDD+ program.   
 
2.1 Socio-political Participation in the Revolución Ciudadana 
With the election of Rafael Correa in 2006, Ecuador emerged from a decade that saw seven 
presidents in a ten-year period.  While other political parties and leaders, such as Lucio Gutierrez's 
Partido Sociedad Patriótica (Patriotic Society Party), promised inclusion and participation of Indigenous 
peoples, their governments soon resulted in the co-option of the Indigenous platform (Jameson, 
2011; Clark and Becker, 2007). Correa's Revolución Ciudadana promised a new era of a plurinational 
state that proposed “deep ruptures of colonial, oligarchic, and, of course, neoliberal structures” 
(Acosta, 2019: 85).  According to Acosta (2010), the plurinational state  
“requires assuming and processing cultural codes, practices and the stories of 
Indigenous peoples and nationalities, as well as other peoples: Afro-
Ecuadorians and montubios. It demands above all to incorporate them as actors 
-together with the rest of society- in the collective decision-making process” 
(7).   
Correa’s government developed a large institutional apparatus for the bureaucratization of citizen 
participation and social control through the creation of state institutions like the CPCCS (Consejo de 
Participación Ciudadana y Control Social/Council of Citizen Participation and Social Control).  The 2008 
Constitution provides the guidelines for participation, making civil society the protagonists in 





institutions (Article 95).  The same article states that participation is a civil right and provides 
principles that will orient participation, such as equality, autonomy, public deliberation, respect of 
differences, popular control, solidarity, and interculturality.   
 
Correa’s Alianza PAIS political party also represented a turn to more socially progressive and 
inclusive policies under the guise of a plurinational and intercultural state.  Article 1 of the 2008 
Constitution defines the Ecuadorian state as “a constitutional state of rights and justice, a social, 
democratic, sovereign, independent, unitarian, intercultural, plurinational and secular State”.  The 
idea of a plurinational state is rooted in the fight of Indigenous peoples and their umbrella 
organizations, such as CONAIE (Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador) that were 
instrumental in influencing the 2008 Constitution (Becker, 2011).  In 1994, CONAIE’s political 
project proposed a “new plurinational nation” (CONAIE, 1994).  According to CONAIE, the 
plurinational state guarantees the full and permanent collective and individual participation of all 
nationalities in decision-making and in the exercise of political power (CONAIE, 2012).  As a result, 
participation of all peoples in all aspects of social, political, and economic life is a central theme of 
the 2008 Constitution.  However, the implementation of a plurinational constitution in practical 
policies was much more difficult for the Correa regime, finding itself at opposition with Indigenous 
peoples and organizations and accusing them of being “infantile indigenists” (Becker, 2013; 
González and Javier., 2013).  Correa’s state-led, socialist policies began to exclude Indigenous groups 
and marginalize their worldviews which, as Ramiro Ávila Santamaría correctly observes, “without 
the voice of Indigenous peoples we do nothing but continue the colonizing process of diverse 
[voices] and strengthen an economic system that oppresses, excludes, and causes pain” (2013: 80)1.  
One of the ways in which Indigenous peoples were marginalized under the Revolución Ciudadana was 
through the use of Indigenous concepts that were incorporated into mainstream political and social 
discourse but were defined by the state. 
 
2.2 Sumak kawsay and buen vivir: A Changing Role of the State 
 





While the state was the principal force behind development initiatives in the 1960s and 70s, by the 
1980s and 1990s the state had largely disappeared from rural Indigenous communities and private 
institutions and non-government organizations (NGOs) had taken up the state’s role that was scaled 
back due to neoliberal structural adjustment policies.  During this time, land reform was replaced 
with “integral rural development” which was “characterized by the end of the reformist cycle, the 
proliferation of NGOs (and their associated models of development) as the state and its public 
policy institutions withdrew, a tendency to frame agendas and priorities in ethnic terms, and parallel 
increases in land re-concentration and exclusion gaps” (Bretón, 2008: 569).  Until the 2000s, 
Ecuador experienced variations of development programs and policies that were based on NGO 
and international interventions with minimal state support in rural Indigenous communities.  The 
election of Rafael Correa in 2006 and the subsequent constitutional reform changed the trajectory of 
the state’s role in development.  Once again, the state was placed at the centre of social, economic 
and political reform. 
“The state, then, is placed back in the center of institutional reform to recover for 
itself a set of strategic capabilities that ensure adequate coordination between 
politics, economy, and society. Thus, the proposal of institutional reform of the 
State seeks the recovery of the margins of state maneuverability that is produced 
under efficient, transparent, decentralized, deconcentrated, and participatory 
management schemes in order to provide the greatest functional coherency and  
democratic legitimacy possible.” (SENPLADES, 2012: 5). 
 
El Estado, entonces, vuelve a ser colocado en el centro de la reforma institucional para recuperar 
para sí un conjunto de capacidades estratégicas que aseguren una adecuada coordinación entre 
política, economía y sociedad. Así, la propuesta de reforma institucional del Estado busca que la 
recuperación de los márgenes de maniobra estatal se produzca bajo esquemas de gestión eficientes, 
transparentes, descentralizados, desconcentrados y participativos, a fin de dotarle de la mayor 
coherencia funcional y legitimidad democrática posible a sus intervenciones. 
Bringing the state back as the provider of social and economic well-being meant that public funds, 
bolstered by a burgeoning oil sector, would move production and capital circulation forward and the 
state would govern the economy (Unda, 2013).  While many critiques have been leveled against 
Correa’s state-led development (González et al., 2013), large investments in education and 
infrastructure were made.  However, Correa’s successor, Lenín Moreno, has rolled back state 
interventions and presence, returning to the neoliberal approach fueled by IMF loans, which led to 






In spite of the recent changes within the Ecuadorian state, a pillar of the 2008 constitution was 
inclusivity and participation.  As an offshoot of participation, for the first time in Ecuadorian history 
the 2008 Constitution incorporated Indigenous concepts rooted in Indigenous cosmovisiones.  
Concepts such as sumak kawsay, Pachamama, and the rights of nature became an integral part of the 
new Constitution due to the struggle of Indigenous communities and intellectuals, both indigenous 
and mestizo.  The following section will provide an overview of sumak kawsay, a phrase that became 
an integral part of Ecuador’s most recent Constitution.  The 2008 Constitution has received praise in 
various circles, such as those advocating Indigenous rights, the rights of nature, and socially and 
environmentally sustainable development, as “the most ecologically progressive constitution in the 
world” (Lalander and Merimaa, 2018).  The Constitution incorporates the Kichwa concepts of sumak 
kawsay and Pachamama in the following ways:  
We decide to build a new form of peaceful coexistence, in diversity and 
harmony with nature, to achieve living well, el Sumak kawsay (Constitución de la 
República del Ecuador, 2008: Preámbulo). 
Decidimos construir una nueva forma de convivencia ciudadana, en diversidad y armonía con 
la naturaleza, para alcanzar el buen vivir, el sumak kawsay 
Celebrating nature, Pacha Mama, of which we are part and which is vital to our 
existence (Preámbulo) 
Celebrando a la naturaleza, la Pacha Mama, de la que somos parte y que es vital para 
nuestra existencia 
The right of people to live in a healthy and ecologically balanced environment 
that guarantees sustainability and good living, Sumak kawsay, is recognized 
(Second Section, Second Chapter, Clean Environment: Art. 14). 
Se reconoce el derecho de la población a vivir en un ambiente sano y ecológicamente 
equilibrado, que garantice la sostenibilidad y el buen vivir, sumak kawsay. 
The development system is an organized combination, sustainable and 
dynamic economic, political, socio-cultural, environmental systems that 
guarantee the fulfilment of the good life, Sumak kawsay (Development 





El régimen de desarrollo es el conjunto organizado, sostenible y dinámico de los sistemas 
económicos, políticos, socio-culturales y ambientales, que garantizan la realización del buen 
vivir, del sumak kawsay. 
Promote the generation and production of knowledge, encourage scientific and 
technological research, and enhance ancestral knowledge, in order to 
contribute to the realization of good living, to sumak kawsay. (Eighth Section, 
Science, Technology, Innovation and Ancestral Knowledge: Art. 387).  
Promover la generación y producción de conocimiento, fomentar la investigación científica y 
tecnológica, y potenciar los saberes ancestrales, para así contribuir a la realización del buen 
vivir, al sumak kawsay. 
Nature or Pacha Mama, where life is reproduced and lived, has the right to have 
its existence and the maintenance and regeneration of its vital cycles, structure, 
functions and evolutionary processes fully respected. (Chapter 7, Rights of 
Nature: Art. 71) 
La naturaleza o Pacha Mama, donde se reproduce y realiza la vida, tiene derecho a que se 
respete integralmente su existencia y el mantenimiento y regeneración de sus ciclos vitales, 
estructura, funciones y procesos evolutivos. 
Although the concepts of Sumak kawsay and Pachamama form part of the Constitution, the definition 
and practical application of these concepts at the state level remains ambiguous, particularly that of 
sumak kawsay since Pachamama is used interchangeably with nature/Mother Nature in the 
Constitution.  In the following section I will provide a brief overview of how Sumak kawsay is 
defined by the state, Indigenous leaders, and scholars and outline various critiques of the ultimate 
state-led definition. 
 
Sumak kawsay has been loosely translated as buen vivir in Spanish or “living well” or “good living” in 
English.  However, scholars have pointed out that because of its complexity, there is no accurate 
translation of sumak kawsay into another language and, as such, the concept cannot be defined in 
simple terms because it is continually under construction and is being lived out in a wide variety of 
contexts and cultures (Estermann, 2015; Acosta, 2013a; Gudynas, 2011). In the Ecuadorian context, 
the national government, along with various academics and Indigenous political and economic elite 
members that formed part of the early stages of the Alianza PAIS political party, are responsible for 





important players in the construction of the concept of buen vivir, a concept based on sumak kawsay 
(Acosta, 2009, 2013a).  Therefore, it is important to understand the effects of the state’s definition 
and subsequent institutionalization of the Indigenous concept of sumak kawsay which provides the 
framework for environmental governance policies and programs.  
 
According to different scholars, the definition of sumak kawsay has evolved within three distinct 
epistemic communities or “networks of knowledge-based communities” which are indigenous-
culturalist, post-developmentalist, and socialist-statist or neo-developmentalist (Cuestas-Caza, 2019; 
Hidalgo-Capitán and Cubillo-Guevara, 2017).  Each epistemic community interprets and defends its 
own version of sumak kawsay. The works of Hidalgo-Capitán and Cubillo-Guevara and Cuestas-Caza 
argue that the socialist-statist definition has, for the most part, shaped the institutionalization of 
sumak kawsay in Ecuador, renamed buen vivir, through the planning and legislation of State-led 
policies and programs intended to achieve “the good life” (2017; 2019).  Proponents of the socialist 
and statist version of buen vivir understand the concept as an extension of socialism rooted in neo-
Marxist thinking of intellectuals closely linked to the government (MPD, 2007; SENPLADES, 2009 
and 2011; García-Linera, 2010; Ramírez, 2010; Páez, 2010; Patiño, 2010; Santos, 2010; Pomar, 2010).  
In the particular case of Ecuador, the state-led buen vivir became quickly associated with the 
governing party, Alianza PAIS, and its 21st Century Socialism (Ramírez, 2010; Patiño, 2010; 
Harnecker, 2010). This view of buen vivir argues for an increased role of the state in implementing 
policies to achieve development (SENPLADES, 2011). As a result, the state becomes that main 
political agent and sole interpreter of the definition and implementation of buen vivir. Hidalgo-
Capitán and Cubillo-Guevara argue that this has marginalized and excluded social movements, such 
as the Indigenous and ecologist movements that were instrumental in bringing buen vivir to the 
forefront of political debate (Hidalgo-Capitán, 2017: 28).  
 
Rafael Correa, President of Ecuador from 2007 – 2017 and leader of the Alianza PAIS political party 
that was instrumental in bringing buen vivir into mainstream political and development discourse in 
Ecuador, embodies the Ecuadorian state’s vision of buen vivir when he said the following: 
“What 21st Century Socialism is we began to call Buen vivir Socialism, but they 





characteristics of traditional socialism, for example social justice…[and] 
supremacy of the human being over capital” (teleSur, 2013)  
 
“Lo que es el socialismo del siglo 21 empezamos a llamar el socialismo del buen vivir, pero son 
la misma cosa.  Para definirlo, básicamente guarda las mismas características del socialismo 
tradicional, por ejemplo, la justicia social  [y] supremacía del ser humano sobre el capital.” 
 
“That is how Socialismo del buen vivir’s arose, whose central axis is the social and 
solidary person.  [It] is nurtured by socialism of many types, including the 
classical or scientific, but also the agrarian socialism of Emiliano Zapata and 
the Andean socialism of the Peruvian Jose Carlos Mariategui, the social 
doctrine of the church and the theology of liberation, and the long history of 
emancipatory struggles of our peoples” (Correa, 2017)  
Así surgió el Socialismo del buen vivir, cuyo eje central es el individuo social y solidario.  El 
Socialismo del buen vivir se nutre de la combinación reflexiva de muchos socialismos, incluido 
el clásico o científico, pero también el socialismo agrarista de Emiliano Zapata, el socialismo 
andino del peruano José Carlos Mariátegui, la Doctrina Social de la Iglesia y la Teología de 
la Liberación, y de la larga historia de luchas emancipadoras de nuestros pueblos 
These quotes provide a clear understanding of Correa’s view, and that of his followers, on buen vivir.  
For Correa and his political affiliates, buen vivir is intrinsically related to socialism in its varying forms. 
More specifically, the 2013 Plan Nacional para el Buen vivir states socialismo del buen vivir’s (socialism of 
good living) ultimate goal is “to defend and strengthen society, work and life in all its forms” by 
questioning “the dominant pattern of hegemonic accumulation (neoliberal models of production, 
growth and distribution)”, and it “demands a deep democracy and the constant involvement of its 
citizens in the country’s public affairs” (SENPLADES, 2013: 22).   
 
The socialist-statist’s incorporation of ancestral knowledge into its conceptualization of buen vivir, 
which is an integral part of the indigenous-culturalist view of sumak kawsay, is superficial, causing 
State-led actors to appropriate and institutionalize the Indigenous concept as a political project. This 
appropriation is achieved through various legal and political instruments, such as the 2008 
Constitution and national development plans (Simbaña, 2012).  The Ecuadorian state’s definition of 
buen vivir argues for an increased role of the state in implementing policies to achieve development 
and redistribute wealth (SENPLADES, 2011; Serrano and Guijarro, 2012). With the state as the 
central actor in the implementation of policies to achieve buen vivir, the government seeks to 
nationalize development planning and environmental governance through various programs, such as 





links Socio Bosque with buen vivir by stating that Socio Bosque ’s principal objective is “to integrate 
incentive initiatives into a single national program, seeking an integral intervention in the territory 
and promoting an improvement in the living conditions of the inhabitants in adherence with Buen 
vivir” (Ministerial Agreement 131).  State environmental governance projects like Socio Bosque are 
clearly linked to the government’s achievement of buen vivir and, as such, are guided by the social, 
economic and political discourses surrounding the concept. 
 
As the above discussion indicates, the politics of buen vivir has provided an opportunity for 
Indigenous participation and inclusion in larger social, economic, and political debates and 
frameworks in Ecuador.  However, incorporating buen vivir into policies and programs has been 
driven by a hegemonic definition of the concept that can be linked to the statist-socialist perspective 
of development. Various Indigenous scholars and activists critique the state definition of sumak 
kawsay and provide an understanding of the indigenous perspective of sumak kawsay.  The concept is 
rooted in the indigenous epistemology and cosmovision that proposes a “different type of society 
based on reciprocity, conviviality, sustainability, complementarity, the dematerialization of life, and 
the break from the uni-linearity of progress and development immanent in the hegemonic, 
Occidental vision” (Bretón et al., 2014: 9).  Ecuadorian scholar and indigenous politician Luis Macas 
describes sumak kawsay in the following way: 
“[Sumak kawsay] is the essence of the system of communal life and it is explained 
in the daily practices of our communities.  It is the vital, civilizing matrix of our 
peoples, which is still valid despite the violent interruption of colonialism and 
aggression of the capitalist model…Sumak means fullness, greatness, justice, and 
the superior.  Kawsay is life in a permanent, dynamic and changing fulfilment.  It is 
interaction of all existence in motion and life understood from the integral.  It is the 
essence of all being. Therefore, Kawsay is to ‘be being’.  Sumak kawsay is the 
fullness of life.  It is the result of the interaction of human and natural existence. It 
is the permanent construction of all life processes in which the following are 
expressed: harmony, internal and external balance of the entire community life, not 
only human aspects but also natural.” (Macas, Sumak kawsay) 
“[Sumak kawsay] es la esencia del sistema de vida comunitaria y se explica en el ejercicioy 
práctica cotidiana de nuestras comunidades, es lo vital de la matriz civilizatoria de nuestros 
Pueblos, que aún tiene vigencia, a pesar de la interrupción violenta de la colonialidad y la agresión 
del modelo capitalista…Sumak, significa plenitud, grandeza, lo justo, completamente, lo superior. 
Kawsay, es vida en realización permanente, dinámica y cambiante. Es interacción de la totalidad 





tanto, Kawsay es, estar siendo. El Sumak Kawsay, es la vida en plenitud, es el resultado de la 
interacción, de la existencia humana y natural. Es decir, que el Sumak Kawsay es el estado de 
plenitud detoda la comunidad vital. Es la construcción permanente de todos los procesos vitales, en 
las que se manifiesta: la armonía, el equilibrio, interno y externo de toda la comunidad no solo 
humana, pero también natural” 
Macas argues that by translating the concept from Kichwa to the common Spanish term buen vivir 
(living well), the term sumak kawsay loses its true meaning.  For Macas, these two terms are 
incompatible in both the semantic and thinking forms.  By translating sumak kawsay to buen vivir, the 
true meaning of the term is diminished.  Macas posits that sumak kawsay is  
“an institution and an experience that springs from the heart of the system of 
community life...the concept of Good Living, from the Western view corresponds 
to the thought of the current system and fits into your [Western] model, applicable 
to improve this system. We believe that the Sumak kawsay and the Good Life are 
two completely opposing views.” (Macas, Sumak kawsay). 
“una institución, una vivencia que nace de las entrañas del sistema de vida comunitario y solo es 
aplicable en este sistema. El concepto del Buen Vivir, desde la visión occidental corresponde al 
pensamiento del sistema vigente y se inscribe en su modelo, aplicable a mejorar este sistema. Por lo 
que consideramos, que el Sumak Kawsay y el Buen Vivir, son dos concepciones totalmente 
contrapuestas” 
In Kichwa, buen vivir is translated as alli kawsay, which refers to the good or desirable.  For 
Guandinango and Carrillo(2012), sumak kawsay is a process in construction which, at times, is 
romanticized as an alternative to the individualistic and economistic development that is void of 
values, such as reciprocity and communal commitment.  Therefore, Guandinango and Carrillo 
prefer to speak in terms of alli kawsay which “reflects the daily experiential practice of the Kichwa 
peoples; is an inherited understanding from generation to generation, with historical and social 
bases; begins with the runa (human being), ayllus (families) and llaktas (communities), and in turn, the 
positive way to solve their needs; energizes the community and participatory economy and 
strengthens the social fabric of a territory” (2012: 12).  During my time in the field, the concept of 
sumak kawsay came up in numerous interviews and focus groups.  Below are some of the local 
definitions recorded during my time in the field, showing that sumak kawsay is a complex term that is 





“Sumak kawsay has nothing to do with things, but with family.  We have 
received you here and you willingly receive us. We are talking about a 
closeness.” (Mamita interviewed in Community 3, 2018-03-26) 
“Sumak kawsay no tiene que ver con cosas…familia…te hemos recibido acá y tú nos recibes 
con voluntad.  Estamos hablando de un acercamiento.” 
 
“Living well, freedom, having enough native food, breathing fresh air, 
community life, sharing mingas (communal work), sessions, festivals, and 
community food.” (Tayta interviewed in Community 4, 2018-03-12) 
“Vivir bien, libertad, tener alimentos nativos, suficiente, respiración de aire puro, la vida de 
la comunidad – compartir las mingas, sesiones, las fiestas, comida comunitaria.” 
 
“Sumak kawsay is God in the heart of every man and woman.” (Mamita interviewed in 
Community 4, 2018-03-12) 
“Sumak kawsay es Dios en el corazón de cada hombre y mujer” 
 
“Freedom so we do not live like before. To educate our children. We are not 
exploited like before. We consume what we sow from our fields…To have and 
to care for the páramo….All of that is good living” (Mamita interviewed in 
Community 4, 2018-03-12) 
“Libertad para no vivir como más antes.  Educar a nuestros hijos.  No somos explotados 
como antes.  Consumir lo que nosotros sembramos de nuestro campo…Tener el páramo y 
cuidarlo.  Todo eso es buen vivir.”  
 
“Anyone can give a definition to the word sumak kawsay, but in reality and in 
practice we are not reaching the good life. To have sumak kawsay, we must first 
have the guarantee of conserving water. Second, we must cease to contaminate 
Pachamama with pesticides and agrochemicals. Third, there must be food 
security and family economic development. Taking all these points, we have to 
be in good health. If we have good health, we can guarantee good living.” 
(Tayta interviewed in non-Socio Bosque community, 2019-08-13). 
“Cualquiera puede dar una definición de la palabra sumak kawsay, pero en la realidad y en 
la práctica no estamos llegando al buen vivir. Para tener el sumak kawsay, primero tenemos 
que tener la garantía de conservar los páramos por el agua. Segundo, dejando de contaminar 
la Pachamama, seguimos utilizando agroquímicos y agrotóxicos. En tercer lugar, debe haber 
la seguridad alimentaria y desenvolvimiento económico familiar. Cogiendo de todos estos 






“Before, everything was organically planted with animal manure (cow, sheep, 
donkey). We did not spend money buying the compost and that was sumak 
kawsay.  Nowadays, everything is with chemicals or it [the soil] does not want 
to produce. We are enriching only the large corporations and intermediaries.  
For this reason, I think it is urgent we take care of the earth” (Tayta 
interviewed in non-Socio Bosque community, 2019-7-10) 
“Antes todo se sembraba orgánicamente con el estiércol de los animales (vaca, ovejas, burrito) 
no gastábamos comprando el abono eso era el sumak kawsay. Hoy en día todo es con 
químicos ni así no quiere producir.  Mejor estamos enriqueciendo solo a los grandes 
empresarios e intermediarios, hasta para la preparación de la tierra utilizamos tractor 
agrícola. Por esta razón pienso que nos urge cuidar la tierra” 
 
“If we talk about sumak kawsay, there should be no discrimination. There must 
be equality for men and women, Indigenous and mestizo. But there is racial 
discrimination, ideological discrimination, and religious and political 
discrimination. We are so divided in a small county, if we continue like this, we 
will never achieve sumak kawsay.” (Tayta interviewed in non-Socio Bosque 
community, 2019-07-10) 
“Si hablamos del sumak kawsay, no debe haber discriminación. Tiene que existir la 
igualdad para hombres y mujeres, indígenas y mestizos. Pero existe discriminación racial, 
discriminación ideológica y discriminación religioso y político. Estamos tan fraccionados en un 
pequeño cantón, si seguimos así nunca lograremos el sumak kawsay.” 
 
“To really live sumak kawsay we first have to thank God. Second, respect 
Pachamama and talk with her.” (Tayta interviewed in non-Socio Bosque 
community, 2019-07-26). 
“Para vivir realmente el sumak kawsay primero tenemos que agradecer a Dios, en segundo 
lugar, respetar la naturaliza y conversar con ella.” 
 
“Sumak kawsay is living from Pachamama…it is to achieve harmony in a 
relationship of respect for man towards Pachamama because Pachamama is 
always offering us its benefits, that is sumak kawsay. The economic issue is not 
so much from the Capitalist-Westernist model. Rather, from the Andean 
world, how we live is thanks to Pachamama with the resources it offers us: soil, 
land, air, and life itself. So, for us sumak kawsay is to achieve balance and 
harmony between the human being and nature. Much has been said and done 
in the name of sumak kawsay, [and] many have become rich and have 
politicized sumak kawsay. That is why we say alli kawsay is man-nature harmony 
and mutual respect.” (Tayta interviewed in non-Socio Bosque community, 
2019-07-10) 
“El sumak kawsay es justamente vivir de la Pachamama…es lograr la armonía en una 





brindando sus bondades para nosotros eso es el sumak kawasay. No es tanto el tema 
económico desde el modelo Capitalista – Occidentalista. Mas bien desde el mundo andino 
como vivimos es gracias a la Pachamama con los recursos que nos ofrece: suelo, tierra, aire 
tema vida en sí. Entonces para nosotros el Sumak Kawasay es lograr el equilibrio y la 
armonía entre el ser humano y la naturaliza. Que es para nosotros vivir dignamente bien, 
aunque ya está muy chillado diciendo el Sumak Kawsay y que han aprovechado mucho en 
nombre del Sumak Kawsay, muchos se han hecho ricos y han politizado el Sumak Kawsay. 
Por eso nosotros decimos el Alli Kawsay es la armonía hombre – naturaliza y el respeto 
mutuo.” 
 
“Sumak kawsay really exists when we live harmoniously with our family and 
within our community. If we live fighting with each other, good living is no 
longer. In the same way, we must live respecting the animals and be close to 
Pachamama at all times.” (Mamita interviewed in non-Socio Bosque community, 
2019-08-14) 
“El Sumak Kawsay realmente existe es cuando vivimos armónicamente con nuestra familia y 
dentro de nuestra comunidad. Si vivimos peleando los unos con los otros ya no el buen vivir. 
Igual debemos vivir respetando a los animales y junto a la Pachamama en todo momento.” 
 
2.3 Rights of Nature  
One of the ways in which sumak kawsay/buen vivir was institutionalized as a concept within the 
Ecuadorian state was through granting rights to nature in the 2008 Constitution.  Proponents of the 
rights of nature argue that providing nature with rights draws from Indigenous cosmovisiones and 
supposed harmonious relationships with nature.  The Ecuadorian Constitution was the first to 
enshrine the rights of nature globally.  However, there is debate among scholars about the 
significance of granting nature rights in the Ecuadorian Constitution, which uses the concept of 
Pachamama interchangeably with that of nature.  According to Gudynas, this interchange places 
traditional knowledge represented in the concept of Pachamama on the same hierarchical level as 
European knowledge that has subordinated Indigenous thinking since colonial times (Gudynas, 
2016).  The incorporation of Indigenous concepts into the mainstream political discourse and 
legislation in Ecuador can be classified as beneficial discourse that when “incorporated within the 
mainstream discourses that surround us they can start to have an impact on the stories-we-live-by” 
(Stibbe, 2015: 33).  The inclusion of the rights of nature into the Ecuadorian Constitution and public 
policy realm represents a paradigmatic shift in thinking about the environment from a purely 





other words, nature passes from being an object to a subject of rights that possesses intrinsic value 
that is separate from the utility value placed on nature by humans (Gudynas, 2010: 5).  
 
However, a number of scholars are critical of the incorporation of Indigenous discourse into 
mainstream political thought and practice in Ecuador and some argue that it can be 
counterproductive and harmful (Recasens, 2014; Sanchez-Pargo, 2011; Mignolo; 2011; Gudynas, 
2009). Some authors dispute the rights of nature as an expression of buen vivir by arguing that rights 
are always “personal qualities and only exist when they are exercised by a person” (Sanchez Parga, 
2011: 39) and, therefore, the rights given to nature are withdrawn from human beings, making 
nature a personal subject and, as a result, nature becomes “denaturalized” and human beings 
“depersonalized” (Sanchez Parga, 2011: 39; Recasens, 2014).  Thus, by including rights of nature in 
the Constitution, a competing set of rights, those of nature and those of human beings is brought to 
the forefront.   
 
Whether or not nature should have rights is not a new debate.  Roderick Nash (1989) provides a 
detailed account of the history of the debate showing that Greek and Roman philosophers argued 
that animals had “inherent or natural rights independent of human civilization and government”, a 
concept known as jus animalium (Nash, 1989: 1).  In its modern form, the theoretical underpinnings 
of the rights of nature began to gain traction through the writings of Nash, Thomas Berry (2001) 
and Cormac Cullinan (2003).  In the Ecuadorian context, the rights of nature entered the discussion 
of the new constitution being drafted in the coastal town of Montecristi through the governing 
political party Alianza PAIS, through the writings of a local academic and politician of the governing 
party who was President of the Constitutional Assembly, Alberto Acosta, and one of Latin 
America’s most iconic journalists and novelists, Eduardo Galeano.  Acosta and Galeano were 
particularly influential in shaping the constitutional debate surrounding the rights of nature in 
Ecuador.  Acosta, who is an economist, has always defended environmentalist postures within his 






Galeano, who is best known for his historical work The Open Veins of Latin America, wrote an essay 
entitled “Nature is not Mute” that was read during the discussion of the new Constitution and, 
according to Acosta, consolidated a position on the debate surrounding the rights of nature that did 
not seem promising at the beginning of the constitutional process.  In the article Galeano states that  
“since the sword and the cross landed on American soil, the European 
conquest punished the worship of nature, which was the sin of idolatry, with 
punishments of lashing, gallows or fire. The communion between nature and 
people, a pagan custom, was abolished in the name of God and then in the 
name of Civilization. In all of America, and in the world, we continue to pay 
the consequences of that compulsory divorce” (2008).   
The process of incorporating the rights of nature into the Ecuadorian constitution was not void of 
external global influence.  Gudynas (2009) argues that a number of different international NGOs 
and environmentalists were involved in various consultation roles that heavily influenced the 
constitutional debate.  One justification for incorporating the rights of nature into the constitution 
was that it was a legal representation of the harmonious relationship that the Indigenous have with 
Pachamama.  
 
2.4 The Nature Dichotomy  
The operationalization of Indigenous concepts, such as sumak kawsay, has resulted in a dichotomy 
between Indigenous perspectives and lived realities and the state’s hegemonic definition and 
implementation of buen vivir.  A dichotomic tension can be seen in the inclusion of the rights of 
nature in the Constitution.  The tension between competing sets of rights, those of nature and those 
of human beings, is exemplified in various sections of the Ecuadorian Constitution.  Chapter 7 of 
the Constitution states that “Nature, or Pachamama…has the right to integral respect for its existence 
and for the maintenance and regeneration of its life cycles, structure, functions and evolutionary 
processes” and that the “State shall give incentives to natural persons and legal entities and to 
communities to protect nature and to promote respect for all the elements comprising an 
ecosystem” (El Estado incentivará a las personas naturales y jurídicas, y a los colectivos, para que protejan la 
naturaleza, y promoverá el respeto a todos los elementos que forman un ecosistema) (Article 71).  Article 14 states 
that the population has the right “to live in a healthy and ecologically balanced environment that 





derecho de la población a vivir en un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado, que garantice la sostenibilidad y el 
buen vivir, sumak kawsay).   
 
However, Articles 283 and 284 say that the state will promote an economic system that sees the 
human being, not nature, as the subject and an end.  The state will ensure the  
“material and immaterial conditions that can bring about the good way of 
living…[through] national production, systemic productivity and 
competitiveness, the accumulation of scientific and technological knowledge, 
strategic insertion into the world economy, and complementary productive 
activities within regional integration” (Constitution, 2008).   
“las condiciones materiales e inmateriales que posibiliten el buen vivir…[a través de] la 
producción nacional, la productividad y competitividad sistémicas, la acumulación del 
conocimiento científico y tecnológico, la inserción estratégica en la economía mundial y las 
actividades productivas complementarias en la integración regional.” 
SENPLADES - Secretaría Nacional de Planificación y Desarrollo (National Secretariat for Planning and 
Development) - exemplifies the institutionalization of sumak kawsay/buen vivir.  SENPLADES was 
created to “lead, coordinate and articulate medium and long-term planning, aimed at the sustainable 
and inclusive development of the country, which improves the quality of life of the population” 
(SENPLADES, 2020).2  The current national development plan (Plan Nacional para el Desarrollo 2017-
2021) created by SENPLADES has the specific goal to reduce deforestation rates by 15% by 2021, 
as well as to promote environmental conservation, reforestation, and the adequate and responsible 
use of water sources (SENPLADES, 2017). 
 
However, the dichotomous relationship between state rhetoric and policy is exemplified in the 
attempts to operationalize sumak kawsay or justify industries, such as the extractive industry, under 
the guise of buen vivir.  These policies can run counter to the preservation of ecosystem biodiversity 
and the rights of nature.  For example, under Correa the Ecuadorian state has increased its extractive 
industries, specifically opening up its nascent mining industry.  In 2012, then president Correa made 
a clear statement on his government’s view about opening up the mining industry to national and 
international investment when he stated “No podemos ser mendigos sentados en un saco de oro” (we can’t be 
 
2 Original Spanish: “Liderar, coordinar y articular la planificación a mediano y largo plazo, orientada al desarrollo 





beggars sitting on a bag of gold) (Erazo, 2012).  It was clear that Ecuador was prioritizing mining as 
a “national interest” and, with the election of Correa’s successor Lenin Moreno, the country has 
increasingly opened its doors to foreign investors in the mining sector (Guambaña, 2019). What runs 
counter to the rights of nature is that mining is one of the most environmentally destructive 
extractive industries and has detrimental social and cultural impacts, specifically on Indigenous 
communities (see Magdaleno, 2018; Bebbington, 2012).  In its National Mining Plan, the 
government of Ecuador sees mining as  
“part of the strategic sectors, and, therefore, it is a priority for the National 
Government. For this reason, public policies are proposed that accelerate the 
mining sector’s development in favor of national interests, such as changing 
the productive matrix and contributing to GDP with the goal of increasing the 
development of projects in the mining sector, materializing strategic mining 
projects, and generating a new portfolio of projects that increase and 
contribute to the growth of the national economy” (Ministerio de Minería, 
2016: 155).   
“La minería es parte de los sectores estratégicos, y por consiguiente es de prioridad para el  
Gobierno  Nacional,para  el  efecto  se  plantean  políticas  públicas  que  aceleren  su 
desarrollo en favor de los intereses nacional como el cambio de la matriz productiva , aporte  
al  PIB, con el  fin de  aumentar  el  desarrollo  de  proyectos  del  sector  minero, 
materializando losproyectos estratégicos mineros, y generando una nueva cartera de proyectos 
que incrementen y contribuyan al crecimiento de la economía nacional” 
Gudynas refers to this increased role of the state in the extractives industry as “progressive neo-
extractivism” that redistributes profit from these industries through social policy (Gudynas, 2011).  
However, Dávalos (2013) argues that the increased role of the extractive industry has nothing to do 
with progressive policies, but has always been “a matter of geopolitics to expand the extractive 
frontier and to be able to guarantee legal security to investors and their companies, criminalizing 
[Ecuadorian] society” (212).  
 
This policy stance would seem to be in opposition to the rights of nature.  As a result, many authors 
were quick to point out the existing gap between the theoretical rights of nature expressed in the 
constitution and the expansion of resource extraction policies and activities for economic and social 
development in Ecuador (Kauffmann and Martin, 2016; Morley, 2017).  The debate surrounding the 
rights of nature and the institutionalization of sumak kawsay/buen vivir expressed in various public 





communities understand that constitutionally nature has rights, they are unsure about the practicality 
of implementing these rights.  Members of one focus group stated that “we don’t fully understand 
the concept of the rights of nature and what it means.  Maybe you can explain it to us?”  This 
comment indicates the complexity of giving rights to nature.    
 
While the debate is important, the practical implications of constitutionalized rights of nature helps 
to set Socio Bosque within a particular framework that is unique to Ecuador.  This framework 
obligates the state to carry out various programs that ensure the sustainable use of nature while, at 
the same time, balancing communities’ rights to buen vivir and sustainable livelihoods.  As a result, 
environmental governance within this social, political, and economic context has become a priority.  
Socio Bosque has been championed by the state as a policy solution to conserve nature’s rights (MAE, 
2019).  Therefore, the institutionalization of the Socio Bosque program takes place within the complex, 
and often times debated, framework of the rights of nature.  The politics of buen vivir also shows the 
complexities of defining an Indigenous concept that is rooted in the cultural, spiritual, economic, 
and political practices of Indigenous life, which has proven to be difficult for the Ecuadorian state.  
Furthermore, the implementation of policies and programs meant to achieve buen vivir have, at times, 
caused conflict with Indigenous cosmovisiones and ways of living, creating a dichotomy between the 
inclusive and participatory discourse of the state and the daily lives of indigenous communities that 
reflect the praxis of concepts like sumak kawsay. 
 
2.5 Participation in the Context of Historical Marginalization 
With the Election of Rafael Correa and his Alianza PAIS political party, the Ecuadorian state moved 
towards more inclusionary and participatory decision-making processes under a plurinational state.3  
However, studies have shown that even under the Revolución Ciudadana, participation within the 
socio-political-economic context of Ecuador is complex and often benefits historically dominant 
elites (North and Clark, 2018), and within the specific context of Chimborazo the issue of 
 
3 The 2008 Constitution mentions citizen participation in numerous sections.  Various mechanisms to guarantee 
participation were implemented, such as participatory budgeting, local citizen councils and the national Citizen 
Participation and Social Control Council (CPCCS) whose mission is to “promote and encourage the exercise of rights 





participation becomes even more complex as Indigenous communities have been historically 
marginalized from meaningful participation in social, political and economic spheres (Lyons 2006, 
2016; Cameron, 2009).  While gains were made in the political sphere in the late 1990s and early 
2000s with the national Indigenous political party, Pachakutik (see Becker, 2008; 2010 and Clark and 
Becker, 2007), in recent years the social and political organization of Indigenous communities has 
been weakened by corruption, alliances with traditional political parties and elites, and a feeling of 
discontent and disconnection from the community base these organizations supposedly serve 
(Tuaza, 2011; Mijeski and Beck, 2011).  Furthermore, a centralized state in Ecuador has created new 
challenges for meaningful inclusion and participation of Indigenous peoples in climate change 
strategies.   
 
Lewis (2016) notes that the Revolución Ciudadana strengthened the state as an actor in environmental 
governance and resource management and, as a result, “struggles that had been formerly waged 
between ecoresisters4 and resource extractors (mostly transnational corporations) are being played 
out between activists and the state” (163).  The conflict between the state and civil society was 
brought to the forefront in the recent 2019 political crisis that saw Indigenous and civil society 
organizations protest throughout the country.  The protests ended in violence and saw the death of 
8 protestors and over 1,300 people injured (Collyns, 2019).  While the demands of the protestors 
were many and focused on the implementation of recent IMF loan austerity measures5, the 
heightened tensions between the state and Indigenous communities suggests a lack of clear and 
meaningful participation and inclusion of these communities in larger policy debates and 
implementation.  In spite of a socially progressive constitution that lays the groundwork for an 
inclusive, plurinational state, the implementation of neoliberal, state-led, environmental governance 
policies continues to marginalize Indigenous peoples. 
 
 
4 Ecoresisters are “national, regional, or local-level actors that receive little to no resources from abroad” who are 
adversarial to the state and who are “against neoliberal model; formulating alternatives; favors buen vivir/sumak 
kawsay” (Lewis, 2016: 46-47). 
5 While the main focus of the protests was the removal of fuel subsidies which lead to the increase of food and 
basic goods, Indigenous communities expressed concern over a state abandonment of rural areas and livelihood 
priorities of Indigenous communities in exchange for a prioritization of international, corporate interests (El 





The concern with environmental governance programs like PES is that new and historically 
hegemonic forms of authority and appropriation can be maintained and implemented under the 
guise of Indigenous inclusion and participation and through the reorganization of social relations 
and relations to space and place.  As Fairhead, Leach and Scoones note, appropriation comes in 
many forms, including through the restructuring of relationships, norms and practices by which 
“land or resources are removed from the control of their prior users, or access and use rights are 
limited” (Fairhead et al., 2012: 247).  In the context of Ecuador, relationships between the state and 
Indigenous communities are clientelist.  According to Freidenberg and Pachano, within Ecuador 
there are “clientelist political practices where parties not only count on great experience but also on 
an apparatus that guarantees their reproduction…[and] the parties end up converting themselves 
into instruments [of populism and clientelism]. (2016: 156).  Pachano (2001, 2008) argues that, in 
spite of a more participatory rhetoric, clientelist practices continued under the Correa regime 
through state institutions that “operate under a different logic and respond to other motivations and 
operate through other mechanisms” (2001: 31).  The important question is, can true inclusion and 
participation of Indigenous peoples and their cosmovisiones (worldviews), which are represented in 
livelihoods, land use, and resource management practices, take place within PES programs in a local 
context that has historically marginalized and, at times, violently oppressed Indigenous ways of living 
and being?  
 
2.6 The History of Socio Bosque  
Well before the launch of Socio Bosque in 2008, various environmental governance programs began to 
pave the way for the country’s first national payment for ecosystem services program. Even before 
the programs outlined below began, Ecuador’s National Biodiversity Strategy (Estrategia Nacional de 
Biodiversidad) (2001) discussed ecosystem services and proposed the establishment of a “payment 
system for environmental services of native forests, mainly in watershed protection and water 
supply, soil conservation, protection of floods and other services related to global climate change” 
(13).6  The document discusses ecosystem services extensively and it is clear that as early as 2001 the 
government of Ecuador saw a “profitable market for the environmental services of the ecosystems” 
 
6 Original Spanish: sistema de pago por servicios ambientales de los bosques nativos, principalmente en la 
protección de cuencas y provisión de agua, conservación de suelos, protección de inundaciones y otros servicios 





of the country and lays out various steps that needed to be taken to set up a national payment 
system for environmental services (40).    
 
One of the first experiences of large environmental conservation projects involving PES schemes in 
Ecuador is that of PROFAFOR (Programa FACE de Forestación – FACE Forestation Program).  
PROFAFOR was created as part of the FACE program (Forests Absorbing Carbon-dioxide 
Emissions), which was supported by four Dutch electric companies to offset their carbon emissions.  
The project provided financing for forestation projects, with incentives between $68-$199 USD per 
hectare (Albán and Argüello, 2004).  Since 1993, PROFAFOR has reforested approximately 24,000 
hectares and signed 154 forestation contracts with communities and private landowners (Albán and 
Argüello, 2004).  In Chimborazo, PROFAFOR signed 13 forestation contracts with Indigenous 
communities (Pillco et al., 2019).  However, the following criticisms have been made about the 
PROFAFOR: 1) contracts with communities last from 25 to 99 years, are non-negotiable and do not 
allow the communities to carry out any activities on the land; 2) 30% of the sale of the lumber at the 
end of the contract must be given back to PROFAFOR; and 3) communities must provide free 
labour and upkeep of the forest plantation (Albán and Argüello, 2004; MMBT, 2006,).  FACE also 
has a forestation project that promotes pine and eucalyptus plantations as economic alternatives for 
local communities.  These tree species have adverse effects on local water sources and many 
communities have experienced these effects first hand, such as a loss of productive land 
(Magdaleno, 2018).  
 
A second PES program involved payment for water services in the municipalities of Pimampiro 
(2000), El Chaco (2004) and Celica (2006).  Each municipality launched a payment for services 
program to protect ecosystems surrounding their water sources.  In each case, local residents were 
charged an additional fee for their water use for human consumption and these funds were then 
paid out to property owners to protect land where vital sources provided water to the municipality 
(Camacho, 2008).  Finally, a third conservation project that influenced Socio Bosque was a project 
implemented in 2003 by the German International Cooperation (GIZ) and Conservation 
International (CI).  The program worked with the Chachi Indigenous community in order to preserve 





creation of the Chachi Grand Reserve (Speiser et al., 2009).  In 2005, the Chachis negotiated annual 
economic compensation of $36,000 through funding from GIZ, CI, and USAID (United States 
Agency for International Development), and the funds were invested into community development 
that was agreed upon by a committee formed of local community members and representatives 
from GIZ and CI (Grieber and Schiele, 2011)7.  The table below provides a timeline of these various 
projects, as well as Ecuador’s REDD+ accomplishments, which are important to understand the 
current connection between Socio Bosque and REDD+ initiatives in the country. 
 
Table 1: History of Socio Bosque  
Socio Bosque History 
PROFAFOR 
1993 PROFAFOR (Programa FACE de Forestación) begins to establish and manage forest plantations to 
contribute to climate change mitigation.   
 Local Municipal Incentive Based Conservation Projects 
2000 Pimampiro 
2004 El Chaco  
2006 Celica  
GIZ Chachi Gran Reserva Project 
2004 The program worked with the Chachi indigenous to preserve 7,200 hectares of forest 
Socio Bosque  
2008 Socio Bosque began as a pilot project in limited communities and in November SENPLADES set up Socio 
Bosque  as an official MAE ministry project 
2009 Implementation of Socio Bosque began at the national level 
 Socio Páramo was developed as a separate branch of Socio Bosque  
REDD+ 
2009 Ecuador entered into discussion with REDD+ 
2012 National Climate Change Strategy (2012 – 2025) developed 
 Framework for REDD+ political, operational, institutional, and normative preconditions established (2012 – 
2014) 
2016 National REDD+ Action Plan developed and established (Plan de Acción REDD+: Bosques para el Buen vivir) 
2017 Ecuador is the 2nd country worldwide to complete the REDD+ preparation phase 
 
In September 2008 Socio Bosque  became an official ministry project through ministerial agreement 
#169, invoking various articles in the 2008 Constitution which says that the Ecuadorian state has the 
duty to plan national development, eradicate poverty, and promote sustainable development, while 
protecting the natural and cultural heritage of the country (Article 3: 7 and 7). The agreement also 
cites Article 71 of the Constitution which says, “the state shall give incentives to natural persons and 
legal entities and to communities to protect nature and to promote respect for all the elements 
 
7 The Greiber and Schiele document, Governance of Ecosystem Services: Lessons Learned from Cameroon, China, 
Costa Rica, and Ecuador, was published by the IUCN (International Union for the Conservation of Nature) in 2011 





comprising an ecosystem” (El Estado incentivará a las personas naturales y jurídicas, y a los colectivos, para que 
protejan la naturaleza, y promoverá el respeto a todos los elementos que forman un ecosistema).  Finally, the 
agreement states that on July 2, 2008, SENPLADES declared Socio Bosque as a national priority 
project.  Full country-wide roll out of Socio Bosque began in 2009 and the separate branch of Socio 
Páramo was developed to meet the specific needs of communities and individuals in the páramo 
ecosystem.  One of the main concerns of the program is its financial sustainability.  Even though the 
program represents only 0.02 – 0.03% of the national budget, the program is not seen as an integral 
part of national development (Lascano, 2015).  As a result, strategic alliances with international 
agencies and climate change funding, such as REDD+, GEF (Green Environmental Fund) and 
GCF (Green Climate Fund), are seen as a solution to the problem of financial sustainability (MAE, 
2012; MAE, 2013).  
 
2.7 Socio Bosque, International Finance and Sustainability: A REDD Solution?  
Since its inception in 2008, Socio Bosque has had the support of various international organizations.  
The program, as well as the Ecuadorian government, has been lauded as a success by international 
environmental governance actors and institutions (Vander Velde, 2015; UNREDD 2018).  Pierre-
Yvez Guedez, Senior Regional REDD+ Technical Advisor of the United Nations Development 
Programme’s Climate and Forests Team, reaffirmed the UNDP’s support for the program and 
praised Socio Bosque  as a reference for other countries “for its willingness to base actions on 
fundamental elements such as poverty reduction, sustainable development, indigenous rights, food 
sovereignty, adaptation and mitigation of climate change” (Reliefweb, 2018).  Guedez also praises 
the program for being a “platform that integrates representatives of government, NGOs, and 
producers…[and] will undoubtedly contribute to several of the Sustainable Development Goals” 
(Reliefweb, 2018).  The international attention placed on Socio Bosque has come with funding to 
support the program, but a lack of steady financial resources is a problem that continues to plague 
Socio Bosque.  It is currently not a public policy and, therefore, does not have a specific budget 
allocated annually.  The program depends on the overall MAE budget and on international 
financing.  In a number of interviews with government and NGO representatives, the long-term 
financial stability of the program was a main concern.  Various solutions were discussed, such as 





like the Bono de desarrollo humano (Human Development Bond)8, which was implemented as a policy 
in 1998 and has become an important part of the lives of those in need, then Ecuadorians would not 
allow for the program to be dissolved, and they would fight to maintain it, much like they do the 
bono.  As it stands, Socio Bosque is at the whims of the current regime and relies on international 
funding to sustain itself”.  The section below will explore the evolution of Socio Bosque from a 
national, sovereign environmental governance program into a possible mechanism for international 
climate change frameworks and goals, such as REDD+. 
 
Socio Bosque was created originally as a sovereign effort of the Ecuadorian state to combat climate 
change and was not tied to other international conservation and mitigation efforts, such as the UN-
REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation). In the beginning 
phases of the program, MAE and the Ecuadorian government made a clear distinction between Socio 
Bosque and REDD+ initiatives (MAE, 2012: 28).  However, the program has made various 
contributions to the outcomes of REDD+ by providing technical inputs and facilitating stakeholder 
consultations and has positioned Ecuador as a global leader in REDD+ (UN-REDD, 2018). 
Ecuador began receiving support from the REDD+ program in 2011 and became the second 
country in the world to complete all the necessary requirements to receive results-based payments 
from meeting REDD+ goals.   
 
REDD+ is a United Nations program launched in 2008 to incentivize countries to conserve forests 
by offering results-based payments for actions to reduce or remove forest carbon emissions (UN-
REDD, 2019).  In 2012, with help from the German Cooperation agency (GIZ), MAE released their 
REDD+ Readiness in Ecuador document.  This document outlines the state’s efforts to pave the 
way for REDD+ implementation.  Socio Bosque  is mentioned, but is described as “neither a REDD+ 
mechanism nor is it part of the National REDD+ Programme, it is part of the Forest Governance 
Model so the Ministry of Environment must define how the REDD+ mechanism and PNREDD+ 
(Plan Nacional REDD+) will support the financial sustainability of this incentive programme for the 
 
8 The Bono de desarollo humano is a monthly payment to those in poverty or economic vulnerability and consists 
of a “monthly conditional cash transfer of USD 50.00 conceptualized to cover vulnerabilities related to the 





conservation of Ecuador’s natural ecosystems” (21).  It is clear that as Socio Bosque demonstrated 
results, it moved from being a sovereign state-led initiative and was viewed as a key element of 
REDD+ in Ecuador moving forward, particularly how REDD+ could help support the long-term 
sustainability of the program.  However, the 2012 document is still clear in stating that the program 
was not officially part of the REDD+ program. 
 
In the years following, Ecuador became increasingly involved in global environmental governance 
frameworks like REDD+ by meeting the requirements of these frameworks.  REDD+ requires 
participating countries to complete the following four documents in preparation for implementation 
of the overall strategy: 1) a national REDD+ strategy; 2) a national reference remission level or 
forest reference level; 3) a national forest monitoring system; and 4) a national safeguard system.  In 
2016, Ecuador developed and launched its national REDD+ strategy entitled Bosques para el Buen vivir 
(Forests for Good Living).  This document provides the main state framework in which forest 
governance programs operate within the country.  The document states that REDD+ has a “special 
relationship” with Objective 7 of the 2013 Plan Nacional del Buen vivir – “to guarantee the rights of 
nature and to promote territorial and global environmental sustainability” -, and with Objective 10 – 
“to boost the transformation of the ‘productive matrix’” (16)9.  The REDD+ national strategy is 
seen as a way to apply constitutional precepts and policy guidelines by creating concrete processes of 
economic and productive transition, such as “the integration of the forest sector as a productive 
alternative to diversify rural economies” (60). The strategy places emphasis on policies and actions 
that integrate and complement incentives that help to decrease deforestation and degradation, 
specifically giving priority to Socio Bosque as a key component of REDD+ in Ecuador (124).  One 
high ranking MAE official interviewed stated that “there is a policy change, we need resources and 
we need REDD+ and we work in all conditions to access REDD+ funds…for international 
cooperation Socio Bosque is REDD+. They try to channel funds to Socio Bosque”.  This official’s 
comments suggest that while the Ecuadorian government might maintain in rhetoric that Socio Bosque  
is a sovereign conservation program, it is becoming increasingly evident that in practice, specifically 
in the realm of international conservation funding agencies, Socio Bosque needs to be a key 
component of Ecuador’s REDD+ and climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies. The 
 
9 Original Spanish: Objetivo 7: Garantizar los derechos de la naturaleza y promover la sostenibilidad ambiental 





acceptance, albeit reluctant on the part of the state, of Socio Bosque within the national REDD+ 
framework was a sharp turn for the government, but not one that cannot be understood when the 
surrounding context of financial sustainability is analyzed.   
 
It is still unknown exactly how Socio Bosque will fit into the country’s REDD+ Action Plan, but the 
long-term sustainability of the program is in jeopardy and aligning it with REDD+ is seen by MAE 
as a strategic maneuver to ensure financial sustainability (MAE, 2013).  Financial sustainability of 
Socio Bosque has been a concern since the initial phases of the project with documents suggesting 
various financial sources, such as corporate social responsibility and biodiversity conservation 
donations, international multilateral and bilateral support, the international carbon market, and other 
national sources like hydroelectric companies (Socio Bosque, 2013). In 2019, the financial crisis of Socio 
Bosque was heightened when the state reduced its budget for MAE and SENAGUA – Secretaría 
Nacional del Agua (National Water Secretariat) by nearly 34%, with Socio Bosque being the most 
affected program with a 71% budget reduction (22.8 million to 6.62 million) (Alarcón, 2019).  As a 
result, financial sources outside of the Ecuadorian state’s budget have become increasingly 
important to the continued functioning of the program.  In 2012, 100% of the Socio Bosque budget 
came from the state, but in 2015 19% of the budget came from sources external to the state.  
However, the majority of these funds came from Conservation International in the initial phases of 
the program, while international multilateral/bilateral support from KfW (Germany’s state-owned 
development bank) and funding through technical support from IADB (Inter-American 
Development Bank) has materialized in recent years.  In a 2013 document, MAE explained that the 
total cost to run the program was projected to be $98,919,960 million USD – $17,010,000 million 
funded by KfW and the remaining $81,909,960 million coming from Ecuadorian state resources 
(MAE, 2012).  It is interesting to note that this same document states that part of the KfW funding 
is attached to “helping consolidate Socio Bosque and the REDD strategy in Ecuador” (28).  While no 
official decision has been made on Socio Bosque as a REDD+ mechanism, many government officials 
that were interviewed stated that Socio Bosque could be used as a mechanism to distribute funds 
received as part of REDD+.  Ecuador has received millions of dollars from international funding 
agencies associated with REDD+.  The Green Climate Fund (GCF), established in 2010 as a 
financial mechanism to assist developing countries in combating climate change, has also committed 





Currently, 41.2 million of GCF funding is being spent to implement Ecuador’s REDD+ Action Plan 
with four other institutions contributing 42.8 million (MAE – 31.8 million, MAGAP, 8.5 million, 
UNDP 1.1 million, UNDP and UNEP 680,000, FAO 820,000) for a total of 84 million. From this 
total, 28.5 million is set to go “financial and non-financial mechanisms for restoration, conservation 
and connectivity”, of which Socio Bosque will receive 20 million (GCF 7.7 million and co-financing 
12.3 million) (GCF, 2016).  MAE is also looking to private companies to help finance Socio Bosque, as 
demonstrated by an agreement signed with Chevrolet which will provide approximately 230,000 
USD per year for 5 years to conserve 10,000 hectares as part of a carbon neutral initiative for their 
Sail model car (MAE, 2019a). 
 
It is clear that financial sustainability of Socio Bosque is, and will continue to be a central issue moving 
forward.  Various community members interviewed during field research understood the precarious 
position in which they and the program find themselves.  One tayta (elder) explained that he believes 
that in 20 years the program may end because it is not funded by the state but by international 
cooperation agencies and developed countries who provide 70% of the funding, while 30% is from 
the state.  A lack of political will power could ultimately create the downfall of Socio Bosque if, in 20 
years, a new government takes power and decides not to continue funding the project or even make 
it a priority in the international agenda for Ecuador.  Communities that were interviewed recognize 
the need to make Socio Bosque an institutionalized public policy in order to maintain both financial 
and political sustainability.  One tayta interviewed proposed that the state declares all páramos, 
whether part of the program or not, patrimonio comunitario (community heritage) because “if it is left 
up to politics and politicians, there is no guarantee”.10  While the reasons may be many, it is clear 
that Socio Bosque is becoming increasingly linked to international environmental governance 
strategies, such as REDD+.  While the exact implications of connecting Socio Bosque to larger 
international efforts and frameworks is unknown, the focus of complying to these frameworks may 
continue to restrict local land use and resource management practices in order to meet international 
goals and requirements.  Furthermore, various scholars have expressed concerns over the ability of 
 
10 Original Spanish: “No solamente para los que están el programa Socio Bosque, más bien para todos los páramos 
como dice la Constitución de la Republica. Queremos que sea declarado como patrimonio comunitario y otro como 
recarga hídrica, de esta manera está definido. Credo solo por política no tiene mayor garantía, en Chimborazo 






international frameworks and goals to provide meaningful inclusion and participation of Indigenous 
communities (Kebec, 2013; Long, 2013; Reuters, 2015; Borrows, 2017; Brugnach et al., 2017; 
















































This research seeks to provide insight into the apparent dichotomy between the utility and 
practicality of nature and natural resources that provide livelihoods to communities and the meaning 
that Indigenous communities ascribe to nature through complex, interconnected relationships 
between individuals, communities, nature and the divine.  Furthermore, this research sheds light on 
questions of political, social, and ideological hegemony in environmental governance programs by 
discussing Indigenous agency and participation in payment for ecosystem services (PES) programs.  
In order to achieve these outcomes, this section seeks to outline the core assumptions of the 
theoretical perspectives underpinning PES programs, such as REDD+, and compare and contrast 
these assumptions with Indigenous ways of living, being and knowing that are informed by an 
intimate relationship with nature, specifically the Kichwa Indigenous and their relationship with 
Pachamama.  Specific attention will be paid to how PES theories and programs understand the 
inclusion and participation of Indigenous communities in relation to environmental governance and 
resource use.  The concept of hegemony will provide an anchor to guide the discussion of 
Indigenous agency and participation in PES programs.  To frame and understand the empirical data 
of this research, this section will be divided into the following three theoretical debates: 
1. Debate 1 – Environmental Governance: Laissez faire vs Regulation 
This section will explore the dichotomy between neoliberal, market-based environmental 
conservation in theory and the regulatory measures, if any, in place when PES programs are 
implemented.   
2. Debate 2 – Assigning Value to Nature 
This section will focus on how value is assigned to nature within PES programs and 
compare and contrast the economic assignation of value to nature with how Indigenous 
environmental knowledge values nature, drawing on various authors to understand the 
specific relationship that the Kichwa have with Pachamama. 
3. Debate 3 – Indigenous Agency or Hegemonic Ideology 
This final section will explore Indigenous agency within a largely global environmental 
governance program, PES.  The concept of hegemony will be defined and discussed to help 
understand the ways in which Indigenous communities engage with and adapt to 






In the end, I will argue that PES programs in Indigenous communities do not operate void of a local 
social, political, economic, cultural and historical context.  In the local contexts of the communities 
in this research, the dominant institution of the hacienda has left an indelible mark on the social 
norms and practices that frame interactions between the state and Indigenous communities. As a 
result, Indigenous communities interact with and participate in state-led environmental governance 
programs like Socio Bosque  as a means of sobrevivencia (survival) that helps to sustain livelihoods and to 
maintain ties to land, place and space, as well as to continue traditional connections to the 
communal, the natural, and the divine aspects of nature. 
 
3.2 Debate 1 – Free Market Environmentalism vs Regulatory Governance 
The first debate central to PES programs is that of free market ideology vs regulation in the form of 
rules and norms in environmental governance.  Historically and theoretically, PES programs draw 
from market-based, neoliberal perspectives on regulation and control, arguing that regulating 
behaviour to conserve the environment is too costly and the efficiency and elegance of market 
mechanisms will encourage cooperation and conservation through payments (Dryzek, 2013). 
Proponents of market-based mechanisms for environmental governance or “free market 
environmentalism” see regulation as a “command and control” that impedes the natural function of 
the market (Anderson and Leal, 2001, 2015; Dryzek, 2013).  Two pillars are integral for free market 
environmentalism.  First, private property rights “compel owners to account for the costs and 
benefits of their actions” and to know the potential of and demand for the environmental resources, 
goods and services of their property (Anderson and Leal, 2015: 3).  In turn, private property 
facilitates markets “that create efficiency-enhancing gains from trade” through the right incentives 
for conservation in the form of market prices (Anderson and Leal, 2015: 3).   
 
Free market environmentalism has dominated global environmental government discourse and 
policy.  As Baden states, “there is wide agreement that FME [Free Market Environmentalism] is 
intellectually dominant; no responsible scholar still supports the old command-and-control resource 
management model of the Progressive Era” (Baden, 2012: 182).  Therefore, a neoliberal, laissez-faire 
approach to environmental governance permeates the epistemic assumptions of PES programs.  
The FME approach sees conservation as a cost/benefit where the cost of conservation must be 





livelihoods create powerful forces and incentives for environmental degradation, and environmental 
conservation becomes a cost to those who depend on nature to sustain livelihoods (Dryzek, 2013; 
Goodin, 2005; Stavins and Whitehead, 2005; Barbier, 2011; Fairhead et al., 2012).  As a result, the 
market-based rationale behind PES programs posits that individuals and communities must be 
compensated for the loss of income that is experienced through conservation of land and resources 
that were previously or potentially used to generate livelihoods. 
 
To achieve financial compensation, PES programs create a “financial value for the carbon stored in 
forests by offering incentives for developing countries to reduce emissions from forested lands and 
invest in low-carbon paths to sustainable development” (UN-REDD, 2019).  The underlying 
principle of PES programs is to pay local resource users to conserve areas of global ecological value 
(Wunder, 2005, 2009; Wunder and Wertz-Kanounnikoff, 2009; Lipper et al., 2009; UNEP, 2010; 
Farley et al.., 2011; Grima et al., 2013; Martin-Ortega et al., 2013; UNDP, 2017; Duchelle et al., 
2018; Massarella et al., 2018).  However, finding a price that adequately reflects the subjective nature 
of ecological services and institutionalizing market-based mechanisms can affect local, pre-existing 
resource governance and land use practices (Krause and Loft, 2013; Schroeder and Okereke, 2013; 
Chan et al., 2017; Sikor et al., 2017).  As a result, the effects of PES programs are debated among 
scholars (Kumar and Muradian, 2009; Chan et al., 2017), with some seeing these programs as viable 
options to curb climate change (Mitchell and Maxwell 2010; Barbier, 2011; Schroeder and Okereke 
2013; Bishop and Hill 2014), while others take more critical perspective of PES programs (Kosoy, 
2009; Sunderlin and Atmadja, 2009; Skutsch and McCall, 2010, Corbera, 2012; Kebec, 2013, Chan et 
al., 2017).   
 
While the success of PES programs in addressing climate change is debated, these programs are seen 
as an alternative to regulatory methods of environmental conservation. PES programs’ neoliberal 
assumptions seem to point towards less regulation, but Dryzek (2012) argues that PES programs 
operate differently in practice where significant regulation occurs.  Therefore, it is important to 
understand the level of regulatory control, if any, that exists in the implementation of PES programs 
in practice.  This research will explore the role of rules and norms in regulating behaviour in PES 





the lassier-faire approach of neoliberal, market-based environmental governance programs. The 
empirical evidence suggests that PES programs are highly regulated through rules and norms that 
frame Indigenous participation. 
 
Finally, PES incentive programs directed at environmental conservation have been shown to 
marginalize local populations and change livelihoods, specifically those of Indigenous communities 
(Fairhead et al., 2012; Brockhaus et al., 2014; Kashwan, 2017; Sikor et al., 2017; Duchelle et al., 2018; 
Massarella et al., 2018).  The idea of placing a price on nature in order to incentivize inclusion and 
participation of local populations seems to contradict the notion of self-determination, participation, 
and inclusion outlined in the Ecuadorian Constitution.  According to Acosta, one can understand 
this apparent contradiction by understanding that the Ecuadorian nation-state was built on a logic 
imposed by capitalism, a logic of exclusivity that constricted local capacity for cultural, social, and 
productive development (Acosta, 2013b).  Furthermore, the Ecuadorian state was founded on the 
colonial state that marginalized and excluded indigenous populations from social, economic, and 
political participation and, as a result, the process of indigenous struggle must be understood as 
“emancipatory struggles that seek to overcome the deep colonial, oligarchic and neoliberal 
remnants” (Acosta, 2013b: 11).  Viewed from this perspective, the inclusion of Indigenous concepts 
into the 2008 Constitution and the participation of Indigenous political and intellectual leaders in the 
development of the Constitution represented a step forward in the struggle for recognition of 
Indigenous rights and cosmovisiones as valid livelihood alternatives.  However, subsequent policies in 
the area of environmental governance and conservation have been rooted in a neoliberal approach 
of free market environmentalism that seeks to incentivize local populations to conserve local forests 
and grasslands and to participate in global climate change initiatives.  This same neoliberal approach 
has historically marginalized and oppressed the equal and meaningful inclusion and participation of 
Indigenous peoples in the economic, social, and political circles of Ecuadorian society. 
 
3.3 Debate 2 – Assigning Value: Materiality vs Spirituality  
A second debate central to PES programs is the assignation of value placed on nature.  This section 
seeks to outline the difference between Scientific Forest Governance (SFG) assignation of value to 





politics and economics of protecting nature through PES programs, such as cap-and-trade and 
REDD+, has highlighted the economic and political challenges of establishing an “ideal” price on 
ecological resources and services (Sunderlin et al., 2009; Lipper et al., 2009; Skutsch et al., 2010; 
UNEP, 2010; Farley et al.., 2011; Grima et al., 2013; Krause and Loft, 2013; Lang, 2013; Martin-
Ortega et al., 2013; Schroeder and Okereke, 2013; Paterson et al., 2014; UN-REDD, 2015; Martin et 
al., 2015; Morley, 2017; Sikor et al., 2017; UNDP, 2017; Chan et al., 2017). From a neoliberal 
perspective, the economic challenge entails assigning a price that will change people’s actions and 
decisions regarding resources (see Stavins and Whitehead, 2005). Politically, it entails the more 
difficult challenge of institutionalizing market-based mechanisms in a context of competing or pre-
existing resource governance regimes, and here it has been argued that paying for nature is rooted in 
a model of neoliberal economics that effectively contradicts or undermines local and traditional 
models of resource access, governance, values, and allocation (McCauley 2006; Kosoy and Corbera 
2010; Turnhout et al. 2013; Gomez-Baggethun & Ruiz-Perez 2011; Lewis, 2016; Morley, 2017; Sikor 
et al., 2017). Putting a price on ecological services raises questions about the ways in which we value 
resources, including the terms on which we assign prices for resources that are effectively priceless, 
such as burial grounds and other sacred places (Goodin, 2005; Papayannis and Mallarach, 2007; 
Mallarach, 2008; Boillat et al., 2013; Berkes, 2018; Verschuuren and Brown, 2018). Finally, there is 
an equity problem in the sense that some actors and individuals are better able to capture the 
benefits of local conservation practices (Goodin, 2005; Dryzek, 2013). 
 
Economic Value of Nature 
In order to understand how market-based environmental governance mechanisms, such as PES 
programs, place a value on nature, the epistemic underpinnings of these mechanisms need to be 
explained.  PES programs are rooted in Scientific Forest Governance (SFG), the dominant 
perspective within Western environmental governance policies and programs (Scott, 1998; Dryzek 
and Schlosberg, 2005; Berkes, 2018).  SFG views ecosystems from a purely utilitarian perspective 
where nature is seen as an economic resource or source of capital that can be monetized, and SFG 
reduces climate change to an economic problem, specifically one of incentives and externalities 
(Goodin, 2005; Kosoy and Corbera, 2010; Barbier, 2011), with some scholars referring to this type 
of commodification of ecosystems as the “neoliberalization of nature” (Igoe, 2007; Castree, 2008, 





prioritizes individual responses and behavioural changes which together result in larger shifts in 
community behaviour to conserve ecosystems and to combat the negative effects of climate change.  
Economic incentives are the means used to motivate behaviour change and conservation of 
ecosystems.   
 
Individual economic incentives as motivators become complicated in a local context of Indigenous 
communities that, according to González and Javier, obligate Indigenous to individual 
representation when they come from a local, participatory form of governance, which causes 
Indigenous peoples “to establish themselves in the egoism of individuality when they live in 
solidarity” (2013: 85).  While different perspectives on the environment and natural resources do 
include other forms of understanding, the field of environmental governance and climate change 
adaptation and mitigation has been dominated by specific epistemic underpinnings rooted in SFG 
(Berkes, 2018).   
 
Assigning value based on ecosystem services is epistemologically rooted in “high modernism” 
(Scott, 1998).  According to Scott (1998), high modernism is a belief in the linear, scientific and 
technical progress associated with industrialization and modernization in the West that plays out in 
the day to day “administrative ordering of nature and society” with the goal of improving the human 
condition and organizing society into a legible, simplified polity (Scott, 1998).  Scott demonstrates 
how this ordering is achieved through an analysis of the historical process of scientific forestry that 
reduces nature to its purely utilitarian aspect and replaces the term nature with natural resources.  As 
Scott states, this ordering requires a “narrowing of vision…that brings into sharp focus certain 
limited aspects of an otherwise far more complex and unwieldly reality” (Scott, 1998: 11), and, as a 
result, reduces complex, local realities to something that is easily legible and measured.  
Furthermore, according to Berkes (2018), SFG employs a positivist-reductionist perspective that 
places an emphasis on a technocratic-bureaucratic knowledge and organization of ecosystems and 






The technification and expertization of knowledge within environmental governance produces a 
“centrality of expert knowledges (and discourses)” that shape environmental governance problems 
and solutions, relegating Indigenous populations to the margins of decision making (Peet et al., 
2011: 10).  Ultimately, the use of “technical and scientific concepts and vocabularies, most of which 
are poorly understood by non-REDD+ forest stakeholders, has become a powerful tool in 
legitimizing and envisioning the program” (Astuti and McGregor, 2015, 26).  Similarly, Dryzek 
defines the SFG approach to environmental governance as administrative rationalism – “a problem-
solving discourse which emphasizes the role of the expert rather than the citizen or 
producer/consumer in social problem solving” (Dryzek, 2013: 75).  SFG thinking places emphasis 
on the technical, bureaucratic “expert”, implements a “top-down” planning that prioritizes universal, 
centrally controlled goals and the means by which to achieve such goals which displaces forms of 
traditional knowledge (Scott, 1998; Dryzek, 2013; Peet, 2011; Berkes, 2018).  In other words, the 
tools used to legitimize PES programs are exclusionary in their epistemic foundations and, as a 
result, continue to marginalize Indigenous communities to the periphery of true inclusion and 
participation within market based environmental governance programs like REDD+ and PES.   
 
As a result of SFG being the dominant perspective of nature, one solution to the problem of climate 
change is found in identifying a market-value and compensation to landowners for the ecological 
services their forests provide (Barbier, 2011; Pagiola and Platais, 2007).  More specifically, REDD+ 
and PES programs represent a utilitarian environmental governance approach that “simplifies nature 
[and represents] a paradigmatic example of market-based conservation, that is the management of 
nature according to monetary values, and utilitarian principles of supply and demand” (Corbera, 
2012: 613).  According to Dryzek (2013: 124), markets can be usefully defined as “systems in which 
goods, services and financial instruments are exchanged for each other”. “Markets work smoothly,” 
he argues, when “participants in transactions can be confident that they do in fact have a right to sell 
or buy the goods in question - in other words, they have property rights, be it to a car, a can of 
beans, a company, a bond or a piece of land” (124).  However, many environmental goods and 
services do not conform to these general principles. Resources like air and water are difficult (if not 
impossible) to privatize because they cannot be easily divided and transferred. Instead of privatizing 
individual parcels of resources (as we would with individual parcels of land), market-based 





or quotas. One popular example of this kind of policy is the use of “cap-and-trade” schemes 
(Paterson et al., 2014), in which governments set limits on the total amount of pollutants that 
companies or individuals are allowed to emit over a given period of time. Another is the use of 
“payments for ecological services,” in which authorities place a monetary value on a broad range of 
ecological services (including the opportunity costs of sustaining these services) in exchange for 
conserving a forest or a watershed (Stavins and Whitehead, 2005). 
 
In order to create a market, neoliberal, market-based environmental governance programs must 
assign an economic value to nature.  However, as Ebeling and Yasue (2008) point out, this value is 
not always linked to ecosystem biodiversity: 
"...carbon markets value carbon not biodiversity and are designed to focus on 
the lowest cost options for generating emission reductions. They will thus 
favour areas with low land-use opportunity costs which may not coincide with 
areas of high conservation priorities. For example, global hot spots for 
biodiversity conservation have high land-use conversion rates (Myers et al, 
2000) and are consequently likely to have high opportunity costs for 
conservation. (1921)" 
  
Due to value being assigned to ecosystems of high carbon value, highly biodiverse and important 
areas like the páramo may be underprioritized within the global carbon market in contrast to high-
carbon locations, such as the Amazon jungle, where presupposed carbon values drive mitigation and 
adaptation strategies.  The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA) brought the concept of 
ecosystem services into the mainstream climate change policy agenda and defined the concept as 
“the benefits that people obtain from nature” (2005: 53).   However, the idea of ecosystems 
providing a number of cultural, economic, environmental, and social benefits to humankind began 
well before the MEA in the 1970s (Gómez-Baggethun, 2010).  In the 1990s, theories around 
ecosystem services began to put an economic value on the services provided by nature (Costanza et 
al., 1997).  Since then, payment for ecosystem services as a viable compensation option for 
communities that depend on ecosystems for their livelihoods has become more prominent in both 
academic circles and environmental governance policies and programs.   
 
While the definition of PES can vary, the Global Environmental Facility’s definition is useful.  GEF 





which those that pay are fully aware of what it is that they are paying for, and those that sell are 
proactively and deliberately engaging in resource use practices designed to secure the provision of 
the services” (GEF, 2014: 3).  Wunder’s criteria are generally accepted within the PES literature as a 
starting point for defining PES programs.  For Wunder, the following 5 factors must be present in a 
PES program “(1) a voluntary transaction in which (2) a well-defined environmental service (or a 
land use likely to secure that service) (3) is ‘bought’ by a (minimum of one) buyer (4) from a 
(minimum of one) provider (5) if and only if the provider continuously secures the provision of the 
service (conditionality)” (Wunder, 2005: 3).   
 
The Lived Experiences of Indigenous Environmental Knowledge 
In contrast to the value that SFG places on nature, Indigenous perspectives, also known as 
Indigenous Environmental Knowledge (IEK), have a more encompassing view of nature.  In many 
cases, IEK is often placed in juxtaposition to Western science and resource management.  However, 
this dichotomy is based on differences between the two worldviews and tends to oversimplify them 
both.  As a result, the two views can be made to appear at odds which masks important 
commonalities between SFG and IEK.  While IEK and SFG do have differences, these differences 
do not mean that the two perspectives cannot be complementary. Various empirical studies 
demonstrate how IEK is not opposed to SFG (Alexander et al., 2011; Laborde et al., 2012; Klein et 
al., 2014).   
 
One of the difficulties SFG encounters with IEK is its lack of a universal definition.  Because of the 
diversity of IEK, it becomes difficult to develop an encompassing and definitive definition.  Hobart 
warns that by attempting to define IEK we may “domesticate practice by recourse yet again to a 
hegemonic epistemology” (Hobart 1993: 14).  While I recognize that it is important to be cautious 
about classifying IEK in a way that diminishes the diversity and meaning of different Indigenous 
knowledge systems, I will draw from a number of authors to provide an understanding of the 
concept.  IEK can be defined as a system of knowledge that “has evolved through tradition as well 
as adaptive processes over time and has passed from generation to generation by cultural 
transmission” (Burkett 2013: 100).  IEK is experientially learned rather than formally taught, it is 





Berkes describes IEK as the ecological part of Indigenous knowledge which is a “land based, 
practical knowledge of species, and the beliefs regarding human interaction with the ecosystem” 
(Berkes, 2018: 8).  Menzies, citing Jameson Brant, a Mohawk Indigenous, states that IEK is 
“cumulative and long-term, dynamic, historical, local, holistic, embedded, and moral and spiritual” 
and “a body of information about the interconnected elements of the natural environment which 
traditional indigenous people have been taught, from generation to generation” (Menzies, 2006: 2).   
 
Some scholars (Battiste and Henderson, 2000) have identified traditional ecological knowledge and 
wisdom of Indigenous peoples as scientific in the sense that it is empirical, experimental, and 
systematic. However, although IEK may be classified as scientific by some, it differs with SFG on 
the epistemic level, that is, the ways in which knowledge is obtained and, as a result, the world 
around us understood.  Specifically, the rules that govern knowledge processing within IEK tend to 
be different from those of SFG in terms of evidence, repeatability, and quantification (Berkes, 2018).  
The scientific method is based on the idea of testing and disseminating principles through processes 
of measurement, replication, quantification, and evidence (Berkes, 2018).  Similarly, scientific 
forestry is based on the idea of replicating by disseminating a singular model of forest management 
like PES programs. IEK focuses on reading and interpreting a complex web of relationships 
between humans, animals, plants, natural forces, spirits, and landforms in a particular locality, as 
opposed to the discovery of universal “laws” that can be understood in their entirety (Berkes, 2018: 
44).  Finally, many systems of Indigenous knowledge are often embedded in deeply spiritual or 
religious beliefs and values that do not “make sense to science or fall outside of the realm of 
science” (Berkes, 2018: 11).  This aspect of IEK is important for the study of the Kichwa Indigenous 
peoples and their relationship with Pachamama, a relationship that finds its meaning in practical and 
spiritual rituals. 
 
The debate surrounding SFG and IEK has moved past a polar dichotomy and one where 
understanding how each perspective can positively influence the other is key.  However, when 
dealing with scientific, mainly Western, perspectives on the environment and Indigenous cosmovisiones 
about nature, there is an inherent power struggle that can be understood in what Quijano calls the 





environmental governance conversation, that conversation takes place in a historical context where 
certain knowledge has been marginalized and even erased, while other knowledge has been 
prioritized. As Agrawal notes, strategies for protecting and disseminating knowledge benefit 
different groups in different ways and the confusing labels of “Indigenous” and “Western” only 
obscure the fact that power struggles surround all knowledge production and dissemination 
(Agrawal, 1995).  These power struggles have not only undermined Indigenous knowledge but also 
informed our understanding of Indigenous peoples. As Berkes (2018) notes, the study of IEK is 
hampered by preconceived notions about Indigenous communities and their views of and 
interactions with their surrounding ecosystems. The “ecologically noble savage” who lives in 
complete harmony with nature is a common misconception among scholars and environmental 
groups (Buege, 1996; Smithers, 2015).   
 
Therefore, it is important not to romanticise Indigenous communities’ relationship with nature but, 
at the same time, it is important to understand the land use and resource management practices of 
Indigenous communities, practices that see humans as part of and deeply connected to a larger 
ecosystem. It is also important not to create such a deep divide between IEK and SFG and that 
when we move away from rigid labels we “seek out bridges across the constructed chasm between 
the traditional and the scientific [and] initiate a productive dialogue”, a dialogue that in the end will 
benefit the most vulnerable populations (Agrawal, 1995: 433; 2014: 4).  We must not think of the 
“Indigenous” and the “Western” as diametrically opposed within the field of environmental 
governance and resource management.  We need to begin to think how Indigenous knowledge is 
validated as legitimate forms of knowing and understanding the world and, as a result, how it can 
work in a harmonious relationship with Western scientific knowledge to seek solutions that improve 
the lives of the populations most vulnerable to climate change.    
 
IEK and Ecuador 
The inclusion of Indigenous environmental knowledge in the social, political, and economic context 
of Ecuador can be better understood with a brief discussion about the concept of sumak kawsay.  
The government of Rafael Correa incorporated the Indigenous concept of sumak kawsay into the 
national discussion about development and living well. The term buen vivir comes from the 





and constructs a system of knowledge and living based on the communion of humans and nature 
and on the spatial-temporal harmonious totality of existence” (Walsh 2010: 18).  While the origins of 
this term have been debated, it is nonetheless rooted in an Indigenous worldview that seeks a 
harmonious relationship with nature and community.  For some, the Constitutional recognition of 
sumak kawsay in the form of its Spanish equivalent buen vivir provides a legal and socio-cultural 
alternative to the prevailing model of extractivist economic development (Acosta, 2009; Escobar, 
2010; Gudynas and Acosta, 2011). For others, the inclusion of Indigenous concepts and peoples 
only reinforces ethnic stereotypes, racialized differences and deepens unequal “ecology of 
knowledges” (de Sousa Santos, 2007: Walsh, 2010; Choque Canqui, 2011; Mignolo, 2011; Patzi 
Paco, 2013; Estermann, 2015; Lewis, 2016).   
 
In other words, as de Sousa Santos states, an ecology of knowledges grants equal opportunities to 
different kinds of knowledge in the epistemological debates to build a more democratic and just 
society and where a plurality of options is considered when debating social, political, and economic 
policies (de Sousa Santo, 2007: xx).  How sumak kawsay has been institutionalized and implemented 
through policies of buen vivir is still debated in both scholarly and political debates.  Some scholars 
argue that buen vivir as implemented by the State is a Western interpretation of sumak kawsay rooted 
in capitalist ideology (Mignolo, 2011; Estermann, 2012, 2015; Oviedo Freire, 2013, 2014, 2016), 
while other scholars view buen vivir as a practical alternative to development (Escobar, 2010; Cubillo-
Guevara, et al. 2014; Le Quang & Vercoutére, 2013 ). 
 
The struggle for the inclusion of Indigenous cosmovisiones as viable options for living and being does 
not take place in a vacuum, but within a “structure of power [that] was and even continues to be 
organized on and around the colonial axis” (Quijano, 2000: 568).  For Quijano (1989), the colonial 
axis represented more than the colonization of land and peoples, but included the imposition of a 
supposedly superior form of knowing and understanding of the world that, as a universal paradigm, 
must be critiqued. As Quijano stated, “the instrumentalization of reason by the colonial power 
produced distorted knowledge paradigms” and spoiled the liberating promises of modernity and, as 
a result, “the much-needed alternative is the destruction of the coloniality of world power” (2007: 
177).  This destruction must begin with  
“epistemological decolonization to give way to a new intercultural 
communication, to an exchange of experiences and of significances.  [There is] 





a particular ethnicity is imposed as the universal rationality.” (Quijano, 2007: 
177) 
While Quijano’s calls for the destruction of the coloniality of world power may seem radical, it helps 
to recognize that the continued struggle of Indigenous peoples must first be understood as one that 
takes place on an epistemic level of understanding the world around us and that, historically, 
Indigenous cosmovisiones have been marginalized and, often times, violently erased from the larger 
political and social debates about society, life and, in particular, nature.  The discursive struggle over 
the definition of Indigenous concepts in Ecuador and their practical implementation through 
policies and programs takes place within a context where Indigenous forms of knowing and living 
have been placed into a “subaltern” category that are “disqualified, and sometimes reappropriated in 
downgraded form as a mere resource” (Kleiche-Dray and Waast, 2016: 90 ).  However, Indigenous, 
decolonial options “emerge from the ruins of languages, categories of thoughts and 
subjectivities…that had been consistently negated by the rhetoric of modernity and in the imperial 
implementation of the logic of coloniality” (Mignolo, 2007: 455).  As Mignolo goes on to note, 
Indigenous ways of seeing the world “represent options confronting and delinking from…the 
colonial matrix of power” and, as a result, confront modernity and modern ways of seeing and 
dealing with global problems (Mignolo, 2011: xxvi).  Therefore, the impacts of environmental 
governance programs on Indigenous communities and their cosmovisiones must be analyzed within an 
understanding, albeit basic, of the coloniality of power, the epistemic struggle described above, and 
the alternative knowledges offered within Indigenous communities.   
 
Spirituality of Nature 
One important aspect of how Indigenous communities value nature that is not found within the 
SFG perspective is the mythical and spiritual connection many communities have with nature.  For 
many Indigenous peoples, nature is part of a larger cosmos that is connected to human beings 
through, among other things, a spiritual relationship “that goes beyond merely ordering productive 
activities geographically and also beyond the physical boundaries of a place” (Boillat et al., 2013 
:668). This thinking parallels the idea of a place, in this case nature, as an event or relations rather 
than an abstract object (Howitt, 2002), defining ecosystems as “non-linear and multi-equilibrium 
systems” (Berkes et al., 1998).  In many cases, scholars have identified a deep sense of spiritual and 
cultural connection to place that is expressed through language, sacred sites, and cultural landscapes 





2013; Berkes, 2018; Verschuuren and Brown, 2019).  This meaning and identity goes largely 
unnoticed within PES programs and SFG due to the fact that spiritual and cultural connections to 
place and ecosystems are difficult to express in the monetary terms expressed in neoliberal, market-
based environmental governance programs (Bryce et al., 2016; Cooper et al., 2016; Chan et al., 
2016).  Therefore, central to the debate on PES programs and their ability to engage with 
Indigenous cosmovisiones is the clear negation of cultural and spiritual connections that Indigenous 




3.4 Debate 3 – From the Bottom-up or Top-down?: Participation through Indigenous Agency or Ideological 
Hegemony 
This final section will explore Indigenous agency and participation in PES programs that seemingly 
oppress and marginalize Indigenous values and cosmovisiones with a global, hegemonic ideology of 
environmental governance rooted in SFG and market-based approaches.  PES programs, more 
specifically REDD+, have been criticized as institutionalizing a continued marginalization of 
Indigenous communities’ worldviews, needs, and ways of living in order to meet the global goals of 
tackling climate change (Brockhaus et al., 2014; Kashwan, 2017; Sikor et al., 2017; Duchelle et al., 
2018; Massarella et al., 2018).  Dehm describes Indigenous inclusion in REDD+ as “disciplinary 
inclusion” that uses “subtle forms of disciplinary power, policies of conditional inclusion and the 
enactment of responsible ecological subjectivities” (Dehm, 2016: 193).  On a global scale, 
Indigenous inclusion and participation within international climate change and environmental 
governance frameworks seems limited. 
 
Responding to criticisms of the negative effects of PES programs, in 2010 REDD+ adopted the 
Cancun Safeguards, or “measures to protect or to avoid risks (do no harm), while protecting benefits 
(do good)” (UN-REDD, 2019a).  The third safeguard seeks the inclusion of Indigenous peoples by 
respecting “the knowledge and rights of indigenous peoples and members of local communities” 
through relevant international obligations, national circumstances and laws, such as the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).  The fourth safeguard 





peoples and local communities”.  However, exactly how these safeguards are met and reported in 
each country is left up to national and local governments to decide on where safeguards are applied 
and what reporting systems are put in place, leaving a dangerously ambiguous model in place 
(UNFCCC, 2011).   
 
Through the Cancun Safeguards and the elaboration of REDD+’s guidelines for Engagement of 
Indigenous Peoples and other Forest Dependent Communities (UN-REDD, 2009), it is clear that 
REDD+ views Indigenous peoples as key partners, at least in rhetoric, and that without the full 
inclusion and participation of Indigenous peoples in climate change mitigation and adaptation 
strategies, achieving the global goals will be difficult. However, meaningful inclusion and 
participation of Indigenous peoples in environmental governance and climate change policies has 
been limited to representation in international, large-scale frameworks, such as the UNFCCC 
(Doolittle, 2010), and there is scepticism towards the ability of international frameworks (such as 
UNDRIP, the UNFCCC or the UN Platform for Indigenous and Local Community Climate Action) 
to recognize and protect Indigenous peoples who remain dependent upon national policies and state 
institutions (Kebec, 2013; Long, 2013; Reuters, 2015; Borrows, 2017; Brugnach et al., 2017; 
Knockwood, 2017; Nicol, 2017; Nichols, 2017; Youngblood Henderson, 2017).  Furthermore, while 
representation is a fundamental step in achieving participation, the latter is far more complex and 
requires a substantive process of inclusion through various mechanisms surrounding the epistemic, 
institutional, and distributional decision-making processes of local resource use and environmental 
governance. 
 
While REDD+ claims to be open to the participation of a diverse number of actors through various 
channels, in practice many participating countries lack clear mechanisms for inclusion and 
participation of non-state actors, specifically Indigenous peoples and rural communities who lack 
program title to land and forests (Williams, 2012; Lemaitre, 2011; Abate and Warner, 2013). Some 
scholars argue that PES programs can change local environmental practices and “open up new 
spaces for participation and negotiation over rights” (McElwee et al., 2014: 436; see also Shapiro-
Garza, 2013).  However, participation of Indigenous communities within PES programs is often 





Osborne, 2014; Sikor et al., 2017; FAO, 2019), weak legal, financial, and institutional frameworks 
(Wunscher et al., 2011; Reed, 2011), a lack of previous social, human, and financial capital (Bremer 
et al., 2014a) and/or suspicion and fear of land appropriation within indigenous communities and 
umbrella organizations (Pagiola et al., 2005; Zbinden and Lee, 2005; Wunder, 2008; CONAIE, 2011; 
Reed, 2011).  Paulson et al. (2012) note that global conditions exist that constrict participation, such 
as unequal power relations between Indigenous communities and the global north, limited resources 
to create inclusion, and challenges of legitimacy or “who represents whom at the global scale” (255).  
Aguilar-Støen et al. (2016) argue that participatory mechanisms of REDD+ have become spaces 
where certain legitimized groups participate while community-based participation is lacking (2016) 
As a result, participation of Indigenous peoples is limited to a checkbox item, lacking meaningful 
inclusion and participation and, often times, reduced to a one-time activity rather than a long-term 
engagement between Indigenous communities, civil society, and state institutions. 
 
Although inclusion and participation of Indigenous communities in PES programs has become a 
mainstay of the international environmental governance and climate change discourse, studies of 
participation within PES programs have used primarily quantitative methods and are limited in the 
scope, focusing on willingness to participate (Zbinden and Lee, 2005) and the factors that influence 
participation (Pagiola et al., 2008; Krause et al., 2013). Only a few studies have employed qualitative 
approaches to understand local participation of Indigenous peoples in PES programs and the work 
that has been done focuses on the factors that drive local communities to participate in these 
programs (Kosoy et al., 2008, Corbera et al., 2007, Krause et al., 2013).  Previous research suggests 
challenges regarding local participation in PES programs like Socio Bosque (IRG, 2010, Rojas et al., 
2011; Krause et al., 2013a; Collen et al., 2016; Duchelle et al., 2018), but little research has been 
carried out analyzing participation from the ground up. 
 
Ideological Hegemony or Indigenous Agency 
With various research suggesting that meaningful participation and inclusion of Indigenous peoples 
in PES programs is limited and evidence suggesting that these programs marginalize Indigenous 
worldviews, why would indigenous communities participate in programs that limit their participation 





seeking to answer this question, the concept of hegemony provides a framework within which 
Indigenous inclusion and participation in PES programs can be analyzed.  This final section will 
explore hegemony as it relates to PES programs and Indigenous communities with the goal of 
providing a framework to understand Indigenous agency and state-led hegemony in environmental 
governance programs.  It is important to note that this research does not presuppose that state elites 
have a “hegemonic project”, but seeks to explore the hegemonic ideology of PES programs and the 
participation of Indigenous peoples in these programs through empirical analysis. 
 
The concept of hegemony is largely attributed to the work of Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci.  
While the concept of hegemony did not originate with Gramsci, his use of the term has influenced 
numerous political, social, cultural, and economic theorists.  Since Gramsci’s use of the term, social 
scientists have used the concept to analyze power, domination, and subordination in a variety of 
contexts.  Gramsci’s definition of hegemony is uncertain and scholars vary in their understanding 
and interpretation of the concept (Anderson, 2017).  As a result of the ambiguity and scholarly 
debate around Gramsci’s use of the term, this section is less concerned with providing a proper 
interpretation of Gramsci than with understanding and applying his concepts to the case of Socio 
Bosque in Kichwa communities of Chimborazo. 
 
In his work to understand the stability of capitalism in Western Europe, some argue that Gramsci’s 
use of hegemony focused on the intellectual and moral leadership that a ruling class exercises over 
subordinate or subaltern groups (Kurtz, 1996).  For Gramsci, the exercise of hegemony “is 
characterised by the combination of force and consent, which balance each other reciprocally, 
without force predominating excessively over consent” (Forgacs, 2017: 261). However, limiting 
hegemony to its purely ideological form achieved through consent of the masses is problematic.  
This notion of hegemony is narrow in that it leads to an unhelpful separation of ideas and practice, 
or what people believe and how they live, separating material and social relationships from 
ideological “consciousness”.  In their critique of the “dominant thesis ideology”, Abercrombie and 
Turner (1978) argue that the dominant ideology provides cohesion and reinforcement of the 
dominant class more than create compliance and passive acceptance within dominated or 





even impossible.  Scott (1985) challenges the notion of hegemony as purely ideological by exploring 
the lack of consensus of the dominated through various forms of subtle, everyday forms of 
resistance.  To understand this struggle, Scott’s (1985) analysis of hegemony proves useful here 
when he states, “class rule is affected not so much by sanctions and coercion as by the consent and 
passive compliance of subordinate classes” (316).  In order to achieve compliance, hegemonic 
ideology is not always spread from the top down, but “it is always the creation of prior struggle and 
compromises that are continually being tested and modified” (Scott, 1985: 336).  As a result, the 
ideology of the ruling class requires that  
“particular interest be reformulated and presented as general interest…it must 
claim that the system of privilege, status, and property it defends operates in 
the interest not only of elites but also of subordinate groups whose compliance 
or support is being elicited… [making] implicit promises of benefits for 
subordinate groups that will serve as the stake which they too have in the 
prevailing social order” (Scott, 1985: 337).   
These promises offered by elites must be fulfilled in order to gain compliance.  However, Scott’s 
view of hegemony tends to minimize material social relationships and subject positions that 
contribute to, or result from, hegemony in favour of identifying hegemony as ideological and 
associated with consciousness.   
 
Therefore, others (Hall, 1998; Mitchell, 1990; Rosebury; 1994) understand hegemony as a concept 
that is material, social and cultural, “referring to the practices, relationships and meanings that 
establish or maintain domination on a broader basis than simple coercion while not precluding 
coercion” (Lyons, 2006; 19).  By using this definition of hegemony, consent, coercion, and positive 
incentives are interlinked and subordinate classes are seen not as passive subjects conforming to the 
dominant ideology, but as active agents in their participation within hegemonic ideologies and 
practices.  In this definition, exploring how social categories and relationships are constructed, 
maintained and reproduced is important to understand how hegemonic ideologies and practices 
becomes engrained within societies.  As Rosebury (1994) argues, hegemony is not “a finished and 
monolithic ideological formation but…a problematic, contested, political process of domination and 
struggle” (358).  As a result, hegemony cannot be reduced to simple consent and compliance, but it 
must be understood through “the ways in which the words, images, symbols, forms, organizations, 





accommodate themselves to, or resist their domination are shaped by the process of domination 
itself. What hegemony constructs, then, is not a shared ideology but a common material and 
meaningful framework for living through, talking about, and acting upon social orders characterized 
by domination” (Rosebury, 1994: 360 – 361).  Viewed in this way, hegemony and the processes 
associated with it do not separate the “dominant” elite and the “subaltern” groups, but the complex 
inter-relation between both parties, as well as the laws, programs and procedures that are 
implemented by the state into local realities are important factors that contribute to hegemony. 
 
In the particular case of PES programs, hegemony will help to explain how and why Indigenous 
communities choose to participate in these programs.  The privatization of land required by PES 
programs in order to create a market-based incentive program creates capitalist appropriation of 
communal lands within Indigenous communities.  In the case of Socio Bosque, the use of Indigenous 
concepts as “euphemizations of economic power” to gain control over communal land and 
communities needs to be analyzed because  
“where direct physical coercion is not possible and where pure indirect 
domination of the capitalist market is not yet sufficient to ensure appropriation 
by itself…appropriation must take place through a socially recognized form of 
domination.  Such domination is not simply imposed by force but most 
assume a form that gains social compliance” (Scott, 1985: 307).   
Overall, the three debates outlined above form a framework used to present and to understand the 
institutional, distributional, and epistemic dimensions of Socio Bosque.  Each theoretical debate 
corresponds to, but is not limited to, each empirical chapter.  Theoretical debate #1 between free-
market environmentalism and the rules and regulations of environmental governance will frame the 
first empirical chapter about the institutionalization of Socio Bosque and the rules and norms 
embedded in the program.  Theoretical debate #2 which deals with the value assigned to nature by 
PES programs corresponds to the distributional chapter which will explore the value Socio Bosque and 
the Ecuadorian state place on nature, as well as the value and use that communities ascribe to the 
incentive payment they receive from the program.  Finally, theoretical debate #3 frames the 
epistemic chapter by using the concept of hegemony to understand the agency displayed by 
Indigenous communities in participating in Socio Bosque by exploring the epistemic underpinnings of 
PES programs, specifically Socio Bosque, and comparing and contrasting these underpinnings with the 





Pachamama.  The concept of hegemony is not limited to the final chapter but helps to understand 
why Indigenous communities participate in a state-led program that, on the surface, actively erases 
Indigenous cosmovisiones, changes local land use and livelihood patterns, and creates rules and norms 













































4.1 Site Selection: Why Ecuador? 
Ecuador offers a unique case study for environmental governance programs in Indigenous 
communities since it is one of the most biodiverse countries in the world (Biodiversitygroup, 2017).  
However, Ecuador’s biodiverse ecosystems are under threat from modern extractivist industries, 
such as oil and mining, causing the country to have one of the highest rates of deforestation in 
South America (FAO 2011; MAE 2011a).  In spite of many state efforts, such as a national 
forestation and reforestation plan and Socio Bosque, the cutting down of native forests continues with 
approximately 12.8 millions hectares in 2018, which is only two million hectares less than the high 
deforestation experienced in the 1990s (El Universo, 2019a).  Furthermore, Indigenous communities 
live in and use the resources of approximately 6.8 million hectares of forest, making research in 
these communities of utmost importance (UNEP, 2010).  The province of Chimborazo was chosen 
because it is the province in Ecuador that has the highest number of Indigenous people and the 
highest poverty rate in the country with an estimated 80 percent living below the poverty line, with 
some counties reaching 95 percent poverty (FAO, 2017).  Chimborazo was also chosen because I 
have worked in the province for nearly ten years, developing close relationships with various 
communities and leaders and making it easier to start and to complete field research. For this reason, 
Indigenous communities in the province of Chimborazo offer a unique location in which to study 
the effects of environmental governance programs on Indigenous communities.   
 
The socio-economic make-up of the province is not the only reason Chimborazo has been chosen.  
While the province of Chimborazo does not have large amounts of forested areas, it does have the 
unique páramo (grassland/highland watershed) ecosystem of the Andes mountain range where 
Indigenous communities are dependent upon land and resources provided by this ecosystem for 
their livelihoods.  Páramos are complex ecosystems that are difficult to define but, in general, they 
refer to the vegetation zone above the tree limit but below the perpetual snow of the Andes 
Mountains (IUCN, 2014).  These unique ecosystems host a wide variety of flora and fauna that have 
adapted to the difficult climate conditions.  In Ecuador, the páramo covers approximately 5% of the 
land surface where a total of 1,524 species of plants have been found (Sklenár, et al., 2005; Beltrán, 
et al., 2009).    On top of the biodiversity, the soils of the páramo serve an important function to 
store precipitation and act as a natural filter.  Many communities living in the region, including larger 





irrigation.  The communities surrounding the páramo are highly dependent on agricultural and 
livestock activities that, due to neoliberal reforms and the agricultural “green revolution”, have 
intensified land use and forced communities to move up the mountainside, further invading the 
fragile páramo ecosystems, a problem that is not isolated to Chimborazo (Lefeber, 2003).  The páramo 
ecosystem is an important ecological and geographical site for this study because it offers unique 
insights into the effects of PES programs on a fragile ecosystem and on communities that depend 
on these ecosystems and are the most vulnerable to the effects of climate change.  Chimborazo also 
provides opportunities to learn about the complex relationship that Indigenous peoples, specifically 
the Kichwa, have through land use and resource management practices, as well as relationships rooted 
in cultural and spiritual connections to land and place. 
 






The current political climate of Ecuador also offers a unique opportunity to study PES programs.  
Following the presidential election of 2017, the newly-elected government of Lenin Moreno has 
been rolling back many of the principal restrictions that were put in place by the Correa government 
on mining, forestry, and oil and gas, suggesting a decisive break from the Revolución Ciudadana to a 
more aggressive form of extractivism involving the expansion of petro-chemical industries, the 
destruction of ecologically sensitive areas, and the displacement of local and Indigenous 
communities.  In 2017-18, the Ecuadorian government announced five new oil and gas concessions, 
and paid a number of diplomatic visits to Chile and Canada, where it was announced that mining 
was once again open for international investment.  The increase of extractivism, combined with 
agricultural and livestock activities, places competing pressure on unique resources of ecosystems 
like the páramo, and in the case of Chimborazo this is evidenced in the various resource extraction 
projects, mainly mining, taking place alongside environmental conservation efforts.  Therefore, 
Ecuador offers a unique case study to understand how PES programs are being implemented in the 
delicate social, cultural, political, environmental, and economic context of the country, a country 
whose political economy is firmly rooted in the extractive sector ((Latorre et al., 2015; Morley, 2017; 
Kingsbury et al., 2018).  PES programs are meant to compensate the opportunity costs of 
conserving forests and grasslands, but the fact that Chimborazo experiences a number of competing 
land use and resource management practices suggests that the costs of conserving the páramo will be 
high.  Therefore, the case of Chimborazo will contribute to understanding how competing land use 
and resource management practices affect the implementation of PES programs in Indigenous 
communities.  
 
The Socio Bosque program in Ecuador offers an important case study to understand the effects of 
PES programs on Indigenous communities.  Currently, 18,746 hectares of páramo form part of the 
Socio Bosque program and approximately 129 agreements have been signed, benefiting 19,862 people 
with an estimated annual payout of $395,000 USD (Socio Bosque, 2017).  While these numbers 
represent a relatively small portion of the program – 1% of total hectares within Ecuador, 5% of 
total signed agreements, 12% of country-wide beneficiaries, and only 4% of total country-wide 
payouts – the social, cultural, spiritual, and economic importance of the páramo ecosystem to local 
communities is evident, making communities within the province of Chimborazo an ideal case study 






Finally, Ecuador has been chosen because while various studies have been carried out regarding the 
challenges and opportunities of environmental governance and PES programs at the international 
level (Ninan, 2009, Abate et al., 2013) and the Ecuadorian level, even in the páramo specifically, 
(Farley et al., 2011; Krause, 2013a, 2013b; Bendix et al., 2013, Loaiza et al, 2015, Latorre, 2015), 
studies based on Kichwa Indigenous communities of Chimborazo and PES programs are limited and 
focus mainly on motivations for participation (Bremer et al., 2014; Murtinho and Hayes, 2017), 
biodiversity outcomes (Bremer et al, 2019), and land use behaviour (Hayes et al., 2017). 
Furthermore, the case of Ecuador offers a rich source of material for analysis, particularly various 
state programs and institutions whose goals are the achievement of sumak kawsay/buen vivir.  The 
country has touted itself as a model of alternative sustainable development that is inclusive and 
equitable, and Ecuador has received international recognition, with Correa presenting lectures at 
prestigious universities like Yale and Harvard (HarvardUniversity, 2014; YaleUniversity, 2014). 
 
4.2 Research Methods 
Community engaged, decolonial research 
This research combines various qualitative and quantitative methods, such as semi-structured 
interviews, focus groups, archival research and key informant interviews. The section below will 
briefly discuss the multiple qualitative and quantitative research methods that were used in this 
research to provide a richer and more complete account of PES programs in Chimborazo, Ecuador.  
Qualitative methods have been chosen because the vast majority of studies on PES programs have 
been large-N, quantitative studies that overlook the normative, qualitative dimensions that are of 
interest to this research.  By using qualitative methods, such as focus groups and interviews, various 
voices will be captured in this research, voices such as those of local, Indigenous communities that 
are historically marginalized from public policy discussions on environmental governance.  While 
conducting field research, my engagement with Indigenous community leaders and taytas (elders), as 
well as local and national government representatives, was based on values and principles of love, 
compassion, kindness, and reciprocity.  I, as a researcher, must be cognisant of the historical 





engagement with Western academia has meant a loss of culture and an appropriation of knowledge 
by colonial others who speak in a universal voice for many diverse Indigenous communities.  
 
Drawing from extensive field research working with Kichwa Indigenous peoples in Ecuador, this 
research suggests ways in which scholars can engage with Indigenous communities as equal partners.  
This section and the subsequent empirical chapters explore the importance of Indigenous values, 
such as randi randi (reciprocity), relationality, complementarity, correspondence, and cyclicity and the 
normative practice of these concepts, in forming the base of a relationship of community engaged 
scholarship between researchers and communities. Community engaged scholarship can be seen as a 
decolonizing act that situates “the processes and relationships of engagement in new and 
transformed places and relationships” (Schultz, 2013: 51) and builds new spaces and networks of 
engagement based on principles of equality.   Community-engaged research seeks to involve 
communities as active participants in the research process, to respect local customs and knowledge, 
and to provide a platform for Indigenous peoples to express their understanding of the world in 
which they live.   
 
The Indigenization of research methods and pedagogy is nothing new (Tuhiwai-Smith, 2012; Walsh, 
2017), but it would seem that practice and implementation of “decolonized” methodologies lags 
behind theoretical frameworks.  Most universities are focusing on hiring Indigenous scholars, 
recruiting Indigenous students, incorporating Indigenous language courses into University curricula 
and including “indigenous worldviews” into course syllabi as means of achieving “Indigenization” 
(Samson, 2019), while decolonizing research methods remains more complicated.  Decolonizing 
research is critical for countering hegemonic knowledge production, and community-engaged 
scholarship (CES) is one way which makes decolonizing knowledge possible. While defining exactly 
what constitutes engaged scholarship is complicated (Mullins, 2011), Shultz and Kajner (2013) 
explain CES is concerned with the “lifeworld in the community, not necessarily with the lifeworld of 
scholars” (2).  In other words, the communal life and experiences are placed at the forefront of the 
research as scholars seek unique ways to engage with the everyday social, political, economic, and 
cultural struggles of local communities and individuals through a mutually beneficial and reciprocal 





with the life of the community.  For example, having worked with Kichwa communities in 
Chimborazo for over ten years, my life, my concerns and my work is intricately linked to that of the 
communities in a number of ways.  Having said that, using CES as a methodological starting point 
focuses my attention as a scholar on ensuring that the voices and experiences of the community are 
adequately reflected in my own work. 
 
In my experience, CES is relational and involves a sustained, complementary relationship between 
scholars and the communities with whom they engage.  CES involves living, as much as possible, 
and meaningfully engaging with those who are the focal point of the research, while at the same time 
recognizing inherent power dynamics found within those relationships. As Henri Nouwen stated 
through his experience of living with poor and marginalized communities in Peru,  
“can we truly live with the poor [since]…my living with the poor hardly makes me 
poor…Living here not only makes me aware that I have never been poor, but also 
that my whole way of being, thinking, feeling, and acting is molded by a culture 
radically different from the one I live in now…At this moment, I feel that a certain 
realism is necessary. I am not poor as my neighbors are.” (Nouwen, 1993: 115).   
As Henri Nouwen rightly points out, no matter how much time one spends with a community or 
individual in a culture or situation that is radically different from his/her own, he/she will always 
have a different experience than that of the community.  Often times, and as is the case in my 
research, this difference is shaped by a “coloniality of power” (Quijano, 2000) which structures 
relationships and power “on or around the colonial axis” (568).  Various scholars have built on 
Quijano’s coloniality of power to contest and unravel certain truth regimes that uphold and privilege 
colonial hegemonies and knowledge (Said, 1979; Tuhiwai-Smith, 2012; Absolon, 2011; de Sousa 
Santos, 2018; Mignolo and Walsh, 2018).  Yet, the challenge remains to transform decolonial theory 
into decolonial praxis, and as Mignolo (2011) states, the “dispute of the control of authority and of 
knowledge will be the battlefield of the 21st century” (67).  In this case study, the epistemic 
“dispute” between Indigenous communities and their relationship with Pachamama and the state’s 
perspective about environmental governance and resource management collide in the 
implementation of Socio Bosque within Kichwa communities.  Therefore, to understand the 
implications of this study, a decolonial lens is used to formulate and apply questions that reflect the 
interests of local communities who were involved in the framing and re-framing of research 





for communities and individual community members to share their lived experiences.  That is not to 
say that in this research the questions asked do not reflect the interest of myself and that of the 
“academic community”; however, having lived in and worked with the Chimborazo Kichwa for more 
than ten years, I have gained an understanding of the importance of nature, land, and place within 
these communities.  As a result, my interactions with various communities, taytas, and mamitas has 
shaped my understanding about and inquiry of state-led environmental governance programs like 
Socio Bosque and informed the questions and methodologies applied during field research.  While the 
questions posed in this research reflect my own interests, they also reflect similar questions that 
individuals and communities posed to me during the research and my time in the communities; 
questions about the value of nature, our connection to land and place, and meaningful inclusion and 
participation of Indigenous communities in state-led programs. 
 
Semi-structured Interviews and Focus Groups 
In order to gain a greater understanding of local land and resource use, PES and the Socio Bosque 
program, indigenous cosmovisiones, and sumak kawsay/buen vivir, interviews with key informants and 
focus groups with various community members were the main methodologies used during field 
research in the specific communities of Chimborazo. The five communities that took part in this 
study were selected based on a combination of familiarity and snowball sampling.  Each community 
forms part of the Socio Bosque but offers unique perspectives for analyzing the program. Similarly, 
national, international, and local government representatives were interviewed through a snowball 
sampling. I interviewed key informants from national, regional, and local government agencies, 
community leaders and members, and representatives from international development agencies that 
have implemented environmental governance projects in the region.  The purpose of interviews was 
to gain a greater understanding of how various actors within environmental governance programs 
see PES and other governance strategies helping to achieve sumak kawsay/buen vivir.  Furthermore, 
these interviews provide valuable insight into how various actors in environmental governance 
strategies view the different challenges and opportunities of implementing PES programs in 
indigenous communities.  The methodology of randi randi, explained in greater detail below, was 
particularly helpful in community focus groups and interviews because it indicates my willingness to 





opened up honest discussions about community life, the Socio Bosque  program and community-state 
relationships. 
Table 2: Data sources and methods 
 
Interviews/Primary Data Representatives from 4 International NGOs (IUCN, UNDP, 
GIZ, FAO) 
 Representatives from 3 Local Organizations (Acción Ecológica, 
Pastoral Social de Riobamba, CONDESAN) 
 Focus groups and individual interviews with participants in 5 
Communities in Chimborazo that participated in Socio Bosque. 
Individual interviews were also carried out with community 
leaders and members in 12 different communities that were not 
part of the Socio Bosque program. 




SENPLADES – Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2007 -2010, Plan 
Nacional para el Buen vivir 2009 – 2013, 2013 – 2017 and 2017 – 
2021 
 Local government development and territorial organization plans 
(Planes de desarrollo y ordenamiento territorial - Guamote, Riobamba) 
and Chimborazo Provincial Government 2011 and 2015 territorial 
organization and development plans 
 World Bank Chimborazo Natural Resource Management Project  
 MAGAP (Agriculture and Livestock Ministry) – Incentives for 
Reforestation Program 
 
The five participant communities were chosen based on the following two main criteria: 1. 
communities had to be located in the province of Chimborazo, and 2. communities had to form part 
of the Socio Bosque program.  With this in mind, using local contacts I was able to select five different 
communities.  In order to protect the identity of participants, the communities will be referred to as 
Community 1, Community 2, Community 3, Community 4, and Community 5.  While interviews 
and information were gathered from other communities, the majority of the research was carried out 
in these five main communities.  Other communities were also consulted, but these five 
communities were the focal point of the field research.  Socio Bosque has two types of contracts with 
their local partners, individual and collective.  The focus of this research is on the effects of PES 
programs in Indigenous communities.  Therefore, individual contracts were not taken into account 
during this research.  While it would have been beneficial to interview individual participants in the 





limitation on the research.  Future research possibilities remain in understanding how PES programs 
affect individual landowners compared to collective landowners.  Of the total 128 contracts signed 
with Socio Bosque in Chimborazo, 24 are signed by collective landowners.  In other words, 104 
individuals and 24 communities participate in the program.  The total number of beneficiaries in 
Chimborazo in 2016 was 19,989, of which 564 were beneficiaries of individual contracts and 19,425 
were beneficiaries of collective contracts.  However, collective contracts represented 13,046 hectares 
and individual contracts only 4,349 hectares.  These numbers will be analyzed in further detail in the 
empirical section of this dissertation.  For now, it is important to understand that when discussing 
the impact of PES programs as poverty alleviation strategies, collective contracts represent a much 
higher number of beneficiaries.   
 
Due to previous work in Chimborazo, some of the potential interviewees were identified before 
entering the field.  However, access to key informants for interviews was a challenge, specifically 
government officials, and potential participants were contacted through snowball sampling 
strategies.  Gaining access to MAE and Socio Bosque officials represented a specific challenge that 
involved time and resources.  Many government officials were not willing to speak freely with me 
without first obtaining approval from their superiors which often included jumping a number of 
bureaucratic hoops as I navigated the approval process.  Access to community leaders and members 
was much easier.  Given my previous contacts, I was able to gain access to various communities that 
were willing to share their experiences with me.  Willing interview participants were chosen on the 
basis of their experience with environmental governance and PES strategies.  Key informant 
interviews and focus groups were an integral part of understanding the hacienda system.  
Furthermore, information gained from elderly community members forms an important part of the 
historical account and analysis of the hacienda system since these participants are able to provide a 
living account of the hacienda.  Participants were invited to share information surrounding the 
hacienda system which provided insight into how individuals and communities experienced political, 
social, economic, and environmental change, as well as the effects that this system has had on 
Indigenous communities, particularly in regards to environmental governance. Individual semi-






Key Documents Analysis 
In order to provide a comprehensive understanding of how the institutionalization of certain 
concepts and ideas within the environmental governance framework in Ecuador affects Kichwa 
communities, analysis of various government documents was combined with interviews and focus 
groups carried out with government officials and local participants in the five participating 
communities.  Documents from government agencies and political representatives, such as the now 
defunct Secretaria del Buen vivir (Secretariat of Buen vivir), SENPLADES (Secretaría Nacional de 
Planificación y Desarrollo), and the Ministry of Environment were analyzed.  Below is a list of 
documents that will form part of the analysis of government discourse and practice that guides 
environmental governance in Ecuador. 
Table 3: Key Document Analysis 
Overview of Documents Analyzed 
Institution Document 
Government of Ecuador 2008 Constitution 
SENPLADES (National Secretariat of 
Planning and Development) 
National Development Plan 2007-2010 
National Plan for Buen vivir 2009-2013 
National Plan for Buen vivir 2013-2017 
National Development Plan: Toda una vida 2017-2021 
MAE (Ministry of Environment) REDD+ Action Plan – Forests for Buen vivir 
National Climate Change Strategy 
National Forestation and Reforestation Plan (2014-2017) 
MAGAP (Ministry of Agriculture, 
Livestock, Aquaculture, and Fishing) 
Reforestation Incentive Program for the Purpose of 
Commercialization 
Socio Bosque Program Operating Manual (Ministerial Agreement #115) 
 
The documents above provided insight into various levels of government and their views on forest 
management and environmental governance.  Furthermore, these documents outline specific 
environmental governance policies, changes in priorities over time, and evolving relationships 
between government actors and civil society in the implementation and policy or program 







The theoretical framework is combined with stories and narratives from Indigenous communities 
obtained during my time in the field and previous interactions with Kichwa communities.  The use of 
stories and narratives is an essential part of understanding how Indigenous peoples perceive and 
interact with their surrounding ecosystems and gives life to the theoretical framework by providing 
the stories that are at the heart of the Kichwa relationship with Pachamama.  These stories are not just 
a description of reality, but shape how the Kichwa perceive reality and give insight into “the life-
sustaining relationships of humans with other humans, other organisms and the physical 
environment” (Stibbe, 2015: 9).  As Tuhiwai-Smith (2012) states, stories “contribute to a collective 
story in which every indigenous person has a place” where “the story and the story teller both serve 
to connect the past with the future, one generation with the other, the land with the people and the 
people with the story” (Tuhiwai-Smith, 144).  Storytelling becomes essential for Indigenous 
communities of this study to retain control over their own narrative.  In relation to this particular 
study, these stories and narratives provide a window into why Indigenous communities choose to 
participate in Socio Bosque, a program that seemingly runs contradictory to their cosmovisiones.   
 
The reason I have included stories as an integral part of both my methodology and theoretical 
framework is that I found myself intrigued by the stories and what they told about Indigenous 
cosmovisiones, values, and agency, guided by their understanding of the world in which they live.  The 
complex stories and narratives of this study contain multiple meanings, emotions, and references to 
historical and contemporary socio-economic processes.  These stories are not a “static, ‘ancestral’ 
worldview, but an articulated interpretation with concrete historical perspective” and provide an 
intimate look into the world of Indigenous communities, both present and past (Tuaza, 2017a: 12).  
As Tuaza (2017) goes on to articulate,  
“The past for the Andean Indigenous is not only an existential experience that 
occurred before, but the past is considered ñawpa, that is, the one that comes 
forward, the one that precedes life, the vital breath accumulated by several 
generations that illuminates and makes the continuity of the story 
possible…The Andean world, unlike the West, has different views of reality, 
different ways of educating that can enrich the primary, secondary and higher 
education systems. It remains as a challenge to propose new research agendas 
that are committed to recovering narratives and finding in them other possible 
worlds that allow us to live deep interculturality and celebrate it (233 and 234).” 
“El pasado para los indígenas andinos no solo resulta una experiencia existencial que ocurrió 





a la vida, el aliento vital acumulado por varias generaciones que ilumina y hace posible la 
continuidad de la historia… El mundo Andino, a diferencia de Occidente, posee miradas 
distintas de la realidad, maneras de educar diversas que pueden enriquecer los sistemas de 
educación primaria, secundaria y superior. Queda como reto plantear nuevas agendas de 
investigación que apuesten por recuperar narrativas y encontrar en ellas otros mundos posibles 
que permitan vivir la interculturalidad profunda, y celebrarla.” 
My hope is that the stories contained in this study, when combined with the theoretical framework 
outlined above, help to contribute to recover Indigenous imaginaries and narratives and to celebrate 
the deeply rich perspectives and reality of Indigenous cosmovisiones and ways of living.   
 
Engaging in State Bureaucracy  
A final way in which research was carried out was a form of participant observation to which I refer 
as engaging in state bureaucracy.  On numerous occasions, I had to deal with Ecuadorian state 
institutions as I navigated complex bureaucratic systems to seek interviews with government officials 
and to obtain approval from the Ministry of Environment (MAE) to carry out my research.  
Engaging in this way allowed me to understand the difficulty faced by many communities that 
attempt to meet the extensive list of requirements to be able to be considered for the Socio Bosque 
program. For example, in order to conduct my research, I needed to fill out a long and detailed 
document that gave MAE specific information about my research.  Once my research was approved 
by MAE, in order for me to gain access to data and information on the Socio Bosque participants, I 
needed to pay a $20 USD fee.  So, off to the bank I went to deposit the money in an account 
provided to me by a MAE representative.  Lo and behold, upon arriving at the bank I was told that 
the bank account number was not correct and I could not make the deposit.  I trekked back to MAE 
and was given the correct number to make the deposit.  Numerous taxis and countless hours later, I 
had made the deposit and returned to MAE with the deposit slip to verify the payment.  A week 
later I was able to meet with the Socio Bosque representatives who were able to hand over the data I 
required.   
 
The entire process, from approval of my research to receiving the documents, took nearly one 
month to complete.  I had both the financial resource and time to fulfill the various requests and 





many community members as they make the long trip to the central MAE offices in Riobamba only 
to be told they lack a number of documents and must run from government institution to 
government institution in order to gather the necessary requirements to enter the program or 
provide sustained monitoring and evaluation in order to stay in the program.  Even if communities 
are able to gather the required information and documents, MAE has established a recruitment and 
selection process that will ultimately determine a community’s participation in the program. 
 
Personal Reflections of a Canadian Tayta 
As a researcher, I struggle with writing myself into a story which does, and clearly should, focus on 
the voices of the Kichwa Indigenous peoples and their struggle. However, as I have moved along the 
process of research and writing, I have learned that my feelings, failings, and understanding have 
become intricately intertwined with the story this research tells.  It is impossible for me to separate 
myself from this research and, as Stanley and Wise state, my “consciousness is always the medium 
through which the research occurs; there is no method or technique of doing research other than 
through the medium of the researcher” (Stanley and Wise, 1983: 157).  For me, my time with the 
Kichwa is a productive and liberating experience that causes me to bear in mind their struggles and to 
undertake research that is “politically engaged, materially grounded, and institutionally sensitive” 
(Sultana, 2007: 376).  Early on in my time with the Kichwa, it became apparent that any fieldwork 
conducted in their communities must be attentive to “histories of colonialism, development, 
globalization and local realities, to avoid exploitative research or perpetuation of relations of 
domination and control” (Sultana, 2007: 375).  In this process, it was important to pay attention to 
my own positionality, to reflect on my position, and to understand “the production of knowledge 
and power relations that are inherent in the research process” (Sultana, 2007: 382). 
 
While I feel it is important to write about my own experience and journey during this research 
process, I want to be conscious of the fact that this could easily turn into a naval gazing exercise 
based on self-centredness.  As Puritan theologian Thomas Brooks states, “If it be not strong upon 
thy heart to practice what thou readest, to what end dost thou read? If thy light and knowledge be 
not turned into practice, the more knowing a man thou are, the more miserable a man thou wilt be” 





must lead to change in practice and, more specifically, change in individual behaviour.  While my 
research has certainly changed me as an individual and a scholar, my hope is that this research 
informs PES practices and provides a voice for Indigenous communities, even if that voice is 
interpreted through my own Western lens.  Conducting field research has become a deeply personal 
experience for me.  It has changed me in ways that I never thought possible.   My aim in expounding 
my experience is to relay the profound effects my time with the people in Chimborazo had on me 
both from an academic and personal perspective, as well as contribute to the rich literature on 
research methodologies, particularly community engaged, decolonial research in Indigenous 
communities.  As England states, “fieldwork is intensely personal, in that the positionality and 
biography of the researcher play a central role in the research process, in the field as well as in the 
final text” (England, 1994: 251).  England’s statement rings true with my experience and while my 
own bias and positionality cannot be written out of this research, my hope is that the voices of the 
mamitas and taytas of the communities involved in my research come through in my writing.   
 
It is important that academic researchers continually break down the researcher/subject dichotomy 
that places a barrier between true knowledge exchange, learning and relationships beyond academia.  
While I understand that there will always be power relations and inequality present within the 
researcher/participant relationship, my experience has taught me that, in the Chimborazo context, 
when a researcher is willing to share with the community in their daily lives through mutual respect 
and understanding, doors can be opened and genuine relationships can be built.  While achieving 
genuine relationships and honesty has taken time, it has been a fruitful experience that continues to 
help me to grow both academically, but more importantly, personally.  Therefore, I would be doing 
both my research and my readers an injustice if I did not include personal reflections of my time in 
the field. 
 
Ecuador has been chosen not only because of the important social, environmental, economic, and 
cultural aspects mentioned above, but also because I spent more than 8 years living in the country.  I  
worked, and continue to work, in the province of Chimborazo in various capacities since 2009.  My 
first foray into the Kichwa communities scattered throughout the highlands of Chimborazo, Ecuador 





(Devil’s Nose) train ride that weaves through the mountains from Riobamba to Alausí.  As the train 
made its way through some of the poorest communities found in the Guamote county, I was struck 
by the interactions between the Kichwa children that would run alongside the train as it pulled into or 
out of the small, community train stations and the foreign tourists, some of whom threw caramelitos 
(candy) to the children below.  My twenty-something year-old self would have never envisioned that 
throughout the next 15 years I would develop deep connections to the people and communities of 
Chimborazo that grew into an ongoing relationship and resulted in the research contained in this 
dissertation; research that explores complex issues surrounding environmental governance and 
conservation, Indigenous cosmovisiones and livelihoods, and the politics of inclusion and participation 
in state-led climate change initiatives. The relationships built during the early years of my time in 
Chimborazo have led to sustained and meaningful relationships with various communities and 
individuals within these communities.  I will always credit the Kichwa of Chimborazo as a main 
influence on my understanding of the impacts of global development and the social, cultural, 
political, and economic struggles of marginalized Indigenous communities 
 
The specific research contained in this dissertation grew from my experiences within Kichwa 
communities of Chimborazo beginning in 2009 while doing various baseline studies for the Pan-
American Health Organization in a number of Kichwa communities in the highlands.  The frequent 
trips to Chimborazo have continued throughout the years, and I have returned to these communities 
only to see increased inequalities and marginalization of the Kichwa within economic and political life 
in Ecuador, combined with changing rural livelihoods and increased environmental pressures that 
continue to push the páramo ecosystem to its breaking point.  In the 15 years since my first visit to 
highland communities in Chimborazo, agricultural activity has slowly moved up the unique and 
fragile ecosystem of the highland páramos.  Today, this activity can be seen above 4000m above sea 
level, more than 500m higher than when I first visited in 2009.  In subsequent visits, I have also 
noticed increased resource extraction, specifically mining, carried out by national and trans-national 
corporations in a number of communities and surrounding páramos.  Initially, to me both of these 
activities had negative impacts on the páramo ecosystem that provides fresh water sources to 
surrounding communities and cities.  So, in my mind, the solution was simple; preserve the páramo 
and keep the diverse rich ecosystem intact or suffer the irrevocable consequences.  However, for 





relationship that the Kichwa have with the páramo is not simply an environmental relationship, but a 
complex interconnectivity of social, cultural, spiritual, and economic elements that complete 
preservation and conservation of the páramo would imbalance.  However, if the páramo is not 
conserved in some way, there may be no páramo left.  I was left to wonder what a possible solution 
looks like. 
 
Papas con Cuy – Food, Family, and Community 
While working for the Pan-American Health Organization in 2009, I met Luis Tuaza, a Kichwa 
scholar from Chimborazo who has years of invaluable experience living and working in 
Chimborazo.  He has conducted academic research on the hacienda system, indigenous 
communities and political organization, indigenous education, and his most recent work on 
indigenous imaginaries.  Over the following months and years, Luis and I would develop a 
friendship that inexplicably breaks cultural, racial, and even religious barriers, with Luis coming from 
a strict Roman Catholic background11 and I from a rigid Protestant upbringing.  We have spent 
many hours sharing our time together in various capacities and debating everything from theology to 
development theory.  Luis is a gentle spirit whose smile lights up a room whenever he enters.  He is 
respected in both Ecuadorian academic circles and Kichwa communities.  He has an uncanny ability 
to move between both circles as a researcher/academic and, at the same time, an indigenous man 
who is part of the everyday struggles felt in the rural environment.  He is dedicated to restoring 
dignity to Indigenous communities through his research and also his vocation as an Anglican Priest.  
Needless to say, he sacrifices much of his time and effort for his community and the Kichwa people 
of Chimborazo.   
 
It has taken nearly fifteen years of working in the province of Chimborazo in various capacities and 
making countless visits to Kichwa communities for me to finally begin to feel accepted.  This 
acceptance has much to do with Luis and his support, as well as the support of other local leaders 
and community members.  During my field research for this thesis, Luis introduced me to 
community members and leaders using a term he had not normally used, Tayta.  Tayta is Father in 
 
11 In early 2006, Luis left the Roman Catholic church.  He joined the Anglican church in 2008 and has since served as 





Kichwa and when used in the communities, it is a sign of mutual respect and care.  I was no longer 
Mateo (Matt), but Tayta Mateo.  This type of relationship was not formed by months of field 
research, but through years of meaningful engagement in the lives of individuals and local 
communities. 
 
On one particular occasion during the field research for this dissertation, Luis and I drove through 
the countryside headed towards the Pangor Region of Chimborazo.  This was a community where 
Luis had spent a considerable amount of time in the early days of his Roman Catholic Priesthood.  
The scenery slowly began to change as we passed the marshy Lake Colta, veered off the main 
highway and began to wind our way up the western cordillera of the Andes.  The breathtaking views, 
from the Church of Balbanera built in 1534 to the majestic Tayta Chimborazo Volcano in the 
distance, surrounded us. The land was a patchwork of rich, cultivated fields of various vegetables 
and legumes.  Cultivated land in the rich, low lying plains quickly gave way to scattered crops of 
corn, quinoa, potatoes, and habas (fava beans), which slowly morphed into untouched vegetation and 
grassland of the páramo.  During the entire drive, Luis and I discussed the impact of religion, the 
failure of development projects, and the future of the communities of the Pangor Basin.   
 
Many of the communities in the area we were going to visit formed part of what was once known as 
the Monjas Corral hacienda.  This hacienda passed through the hands of a number of private owners 
from the late 1700s until 1880, at which time the Diocese of Riobamba acquired Monjas Corral for 
14,000 pesos.  The sale included livestock, crops, and 18 indigenous labourers, who were considered 
property of the hacienda (Lyons, 2006: 55).  Hacienda life continued in Pangor until 1962 as the 
Roman Catholic Church rented the land to a number of wealthy political elite members, and 
landholders.  It was not until January 1, 1962, when Bishop Leonidas Proaño, known as the “Bishop 
of the Indians” for his work with local, Indigenous populations, terminated the final renter’s 
contract, thus ending the “classic” hacienda period.  The hacienda then entered into a transition 







Discussing these issues with Luis, I could see his heart for these people, as I often did during my 
time with him in Chimborazo.  He was not simply an academic interested in researching the political 
or social conditions present in these communities.  Neither was he solely an Anglican Priest 
interested in the spiritual growth of the communities.  He was much more.  He was a Kichwa-
speaking Indigenous person who had lived the daily struggle that many of these communities 
confront, a struggle of racism, exclusion, and oppression that is still present in Chimborazo today 
and is rooted in the hacienda system or the “colonial matrix of power” (Quijano, 2000).  I will be 
forever grateful for the time I spent with Luis, and his insight into indigenous community life has 
been invaluable.  In academic research terms, Luis may be referred to as a “gatekeeper” (Bryman et 
al., 2012: 17; Halperin and Heath, 2017: 296).  However, I find the term insufficient in explaining 
what Luis has meant, not only to my research but also to my personal and spiritual growth.  I am 
indebted to him and prefer to use the term wawki or hermano because he is in every sense of the word 
my brother. 
 
As we made our way up the final climb to the community, I could see a small crowd of people 
gathered outside an adobe hut with smoke swirling from a fire that was lit inside.  I knew what was 
waiting…papas con cuy (potatoes with guinea pig).  Cuy is a typical dish served in these communities.  
It is an important source of protein, but in many instances, it is served to the invited guests.   It is a 
special honour to receive cuy when visiting these communities, particularly the head. In this 
particular community, the cuy was exceptional, as Luis and I both commented on the taste.  Maybe it 
was the altitude, the open fire cooking method, or the freshness that contributed to the delicious 
meal.  I had grown accustomed to being served this dish as a staple in many of the community visits 
during my field research and during my work in Chimborazo since 2009. However, it was not until 
my recent field research that I realized the importance of sharing such a meal with community 
members. As Esteva  notes, “customs and rituals surrounding the growing, preparation and serving 
of food are at the heart of community and communion [that] ‘is a profoundly social and ecological 
event that connects us in the most intimate and primary way to others, to our land, water, and soil, 
to the future, to other species…Eating provides our most intimate association with the other’” 
(Blair, 1996 quoted in Esteva and Prakash, 1998). In Kichwa communities, food is a time for sharing 





member brings something to contribute, be it Coca-cola, potatoes, vegetables, or cooking utensils.  
Communities also see the sharing of food as part of randi randi or reciprocity.   
 
Reciprocity dates back to Incan society and some Andeanist scholars claim that these gifts kept 
relationships between the conquering Incas and local Indigenous people from being exploitative 
(Murra: 1980, 2017; Wachtel 1977: 83).  Similarly, reciprocity was used by wealthy landowners to 
legitimate the exploitation of peasants in the contemporary hacienda system (Lyons, 2006).  
Landowners would provide alcohol and resources for indigenous community fiestas, while at the 
same time maintaining an oppressive and abusive relationship towards their workers.  Literally 
translated randi randi means giving and giving or mutual exchange, but within indigenous 
communities, it means much more than simply giving gifts.  As Ferraro states, reciprocity is 
considered the nucleus of Andean social and economic organization.  Reciprocity is the mechanism 
that regulates the flow of labour, goods, and services in the institutions of production, redistribution, 
and consumption (Ferraro, 2004: 40).  The word expresses a sense of offering knowledge, help, and 
experience to the community. Therefore, randi randi is a giving and taking within communal life that 
involves much more than food.  It is an opportunity for community members to contribute to 
communal life and progress.  This type of reciprocity has become apparent to me with the more 
time I spend in Indigenous communities in Chimborazo.   
 
In many communities I have visited in the past and also the communities that participated in this 
research, food was always served.  Most times, as a guest I was served a large plate of cuy.  In the 
most special of cases, I was served the head of the cuy which is considered an honour.  While I have 
worked in many different capacities in these communities, I have seen that this is their way of giving 
back.  While they may be unable to make financial contributions or pay back development projects 
or assistance, Indigenous communities in Chimborazo will always say thank you through food.  This 
has become apparent to the various participants of development projects that I have accompanied 
into these communities.  Often times, unbeknownst to the development worker, rejecting the food 
can be disrespectful to the community.  My understanding of Kichwa reciprocity was greatly changed 
by people like Luis who helped me to avoid cultural mishaps and offenses that, if left to my own 






As I began to understand this complex relationship of reciprocity, I realized that I could also 
participate in this unique experience by contributing to the feast.  As a scholar carrying out research, 
I was allowed to experience a window to community life and knowledge, even if it was limited.  The 
least I could do to show my gratitude was to contribute to the food that was always part of focus 
groups and interviews.  In each community I entered, I would bring whole chickens, ready to be 
cooked and served.  This was my way of thanking the communities for their time and becoming part 
of the communal experience.  Being accepted and included within a Kichwa Indigenous community is 
no small feat.  These communities are generally wary of foreigners and while they may allow some 
people to enter their community, the inner workings of the social, political, economic, and spiritual 
aspects of the community are not openly shared.  I will be forever grateful to the mamitas and taytas 
of the various communities I visited during my time in the field.  Without their willingness to share 
their experiences with me, this research would be lacking key information. 
 
However, I also understand Luis’ positionality as an academic and Anglican priest will garner certain 
responses from the community.  On numerous occasions, Luis has expressed to me how his own 
life experiences, such as the opportunity to study and gain a PhD, has placed him in a certain 
position within the academy as a Kichwa scholar, but also within the communities where he has been 
referred to as a mishu, or mestizo/elite, simply because he wears glasses and has obtained an 
education beyond primary school. Luis’ positionality combined with my own positionality has 
undoubtedly affected the communities and their responses.  However, the communities and 
individuals who participated in this research and their responses and collective information reflects, 
to a certain degree, their feelings about and interactions with the state-led program of Socio Bosque.  
Where at all possible, I am cognisant of positionality of all those involved in this research, and I 
have taken necessary steps, such as engaging in communal activities of reciprocity and contribution, 
in order to mitigate, as much as possible, unequal power dynamics inherent in our positionality. 
 





As Linda Tuhiwai Smith states, research, from the vantage point of the colonized, is linked to 
imperialism and colonialism (Tuhiwai-Smith, 2012).  Historically, research for indigenous 
communities has meant a devaluing of local knowledge and customs and, at the same time, a 
pillaging of land, resources, and knowledge in the name of academic pursuit.  Therefore, in order to 
discuss research methodology and indigenous peoples, one must understand the complex 
interconnectivity between knowledge pursuit and colonial practices.  As Sultana states, “conducting 
international fieldwork involves being attentive to histories of colonialism, development, 
globalization and local realities, to avoid exploitative research or perpetuation of relations of 
domination and control” (Sultana, 2007: 375).   
 
In my own research and given the positionality of Luis as an Anglican priest, I recognize that some 
might argue that he, and as a result, I, are extensions of the exploitative colonial project, or could be 
interpreted as such by the local communities.  However, in my experience the deep connection and 
respect that Luis has within the communities, as well as for the communities, indicates that he is able 
to maintain a healthy balance between spiritual life as a Priest and academic research.  He is part of 
the emancipatory struggle of the communities in which he works and lives as both a Priest and a 
researcher.  I recognize the complexities surrounding Luis’ positionality and, as an extension, my 
own positionality but working with Luis and various connections I have developed throughout the 
years of working with local communities has given me access to people and communities and their 
daily lives; an access that most foreigners would never have the privilege to experience.  As a result, 
and even with the complications of positionality taken into account, the research data gathered is 
demonstrative of ways in which non-indigenous scholars like myself can engage with indigenous 
communities in a relationship that seeks to build upon values and principles of love, respect, and 
reciprocity.  A deeper discussion about colonial practices of knowledge appropriation and 
knowledge devaluation will be elaborated when I enter into a deeper analysis of the epistemic effects 
of PES programs  
 
Limitations 
In order to be transparent about what I can and cannot say about the empirical evidence of this 





used must be addressed.  One of the major limitations of this research is the scale of the research.  
By focusing on only 5 Kichwa communities from the province of Chimborazo, this research does not 
speak to the other regions, Indigenous peoples, or individuals who also participate in Socio Bosque.  In 
spite of this limitation, I can draw inferences about larger community use of Socio Bosque funds, 
relationships between communities and state-led PES programs, and the relationship some 
Indigenous communities have with land, place and their surrounding ecosystems.  Furthermore, this 
research was not intended to be a comparative study of provinces or communities beyond 
Chimborazo, and my familiarity of the case and communities that formed part of this research 
allowed me to gather rich empirical data that would be absent from a larger, more comparative 
study.   
 
A second limitation is the focus of the research and methods on community focus groups and key 
informant interviews, opting not to use household surveys that most of the research on Socio Bosque  
in Chimborazo has used (Perafán and Pabón, 2019; Arriagada et al. 2018; Hayes et al., 2017; 
Murtinho and Hayes, 2017; Hayes et al., 2015).  Sample surveys offer one possible means of 
documenting people’s perceptions, but they are not particularly good at documenting the feelings 
and historical experiences that underlie people’s responses to standardized questionnaires.  
Recognizing the limitations of sample survey research, I sought to document the ways in which local 
leaders, elders, and the larger community perceived the origins and longer-term implications of Socio 
Bosque for land, livelihood and community. Whether and to what extent such responses were shared 
by other community members is of course limited, but they do offer an important lens through 
which I can document and interpret the connection between traditional Indigenous knowledge and 
Socio Bosque. As a result of a lack of systematic exploration of intra-household experiences, this 
research is not able to discern the impacts of Socio Bosque  on individual households and livelihoods 
or the incentive payment distribution at an individual level, but community focus groups offered 
unique opportunities to hear communal experiences with Socio Bosque  and gain an understanding of 
the communal perspectives on Indigenous knowledge and relationships with nature.  Therefore, the 
trade-off is an understanding of larger, community views about the program, community 






A third limitation is the insufficient perspective of women throughout the interviews and field 
research.  While this limitation presents a clear gap in the research, it also allows for further avenues 
of investigation on the gendered aspects of PES programs and how they disproportionately affect 
women.  The voices of various mamitas are present within interviews and focus groups and the views 
of many taytas were expressed in the presence of mamitas who generally agreed with these opinions.  
However, statements made by men in front of women do not necessarily reflect women’s opinions 
due to power imbalances in the communities.  Inadequate opinions of women in the study presents 
a largely male centred analysis of the impacts of Socio Bosque on the communities.  This focus does 
not discredit the empirical analysis and conclusions that are drawn from the research, but it does 
provide questions about the inter and intra community effects of Socio Bosque on women in particular 
and the power dynamics at play. 
 
One final limitation is the inter-generational opinions and views that are missing from the study.  
Since the field research was carried out in rural communities, many of the younger generation has 
migrated to the city in search of work.  As a result, their opinions are somewhat absent from the 
chapters below.  That is not to say that none of the opinions or views expressed below represent a 
younger generation, but a large proportion of participants in focus groups and community 
interviews were from an older generation that may have different views from younger people who 
have different experiences.  As was suggested in a number of interviews and focus groups, the 
younger generation has lost touch with nature and the sense of community or sumak kawsay that is 
important to the older generation.  As one mamita put it when discussing what sumak kawsay means 
to her and how the younger generation lacks respect towards the elders, the youth today “think they 
are better, that they have more education, and that they know more. Before, even passing the dog, 
we would greet it (Los jóvenes piensen que son más y tienen más educación y saben más son mejores.  Antes hasta 
pasando el perro nos saludamos) (Mamita interviewed in Community 3, 2018-3-26).  While these 
limitations exist within the research, they do not limit the rich empirical evidence that was gathered 














Regulating Local Behaviours: The Institutionalization 














5.1 Introduction  
In order for PES programs to function, certain institutional arrangements and bureaucratic 
requirements are needed at the state level that regulate local actions and behaviours.  These 
arrangements and requirements involve new laws, procedures, rules, regulations and institutions that 
are established for assigning value, selecting beneficiaries, allocating payments, enforcing contracts, 
and finally, prohibiting other forms of extraction, processing and access to ecosystems. Some 
scholars argue that these institutional changes can alter local environmental practices and, at the 
same time, “open up new spaces for participation and negotiation over rights” (McElwee et al., 
2014: 436; see also Shapiro-Garza, 2013a, Higgins et al., 2012). Similarly, Agrawal notes that “a 
reorganization of the institutional arrangements [of environmental governance] has facilitated 
changes in environmental practices and levels of involvement in government” (2005: 202).  REDD+ 
describes social inclusion as a “key feature” that enables “local communities and marginalized 
groups to participate in, and benefit from the policies and measures that governments design, enact 
and implement for sustainable development” (UN-REDD, 2016).  In theory, REDD+ and PES 
programs advocate for the inclusion and participation of marginalized and neglected groups in all 
aspects of these programs from development and design to implementation.  As a result, the 
pressing question that must be asked is, to what extent do institutionalized PES programs, such as 
Socio Bosque, achieve meaningful social inclusion and participation of Indigenous communities in 
practice? This question will be answered by: 
1. describing the institutionalization of Socio Bosque as a policy to achieve buen vivir 
2. understanding the rules of inclusion and participation through the eligibility and selection 
process of Socio Bosque  
3. analyzing the institutionalized performance norms, indicators, and outcomes of Socio Bosque  
I will argue that, in contrast to the underlying economic theory and social inclusion rhetoric of 
market-based PES programs, the central aim of Socio Bosque  is not meaningful social inclusion and 
participation of Indigenous communities, but rather to institutionalize a predictable and measurable 
performance regime which is itself imbedded in a historical context of unequal power relations 
between communities and the state. Furthermore, through the use of rules and norms, markets are 
heavily governed and not left to govern themselves as many free-market environmentalists argue.  
As a result, the rules and norms embedded in market-based environmental governance programs 





to the free market ideology of market-based environmental governance instruments, such as 
REDD+, that claim to promote inclusion and participation of marginalized groups.   
 
An important discussion in this chapter will revolve around the implementation of rules and norms 
implemented by MAE that restrict access to the Socio Bosque program, as well as outline measurable 
results to which communities must conform.  In order to quantify results and achieve national and 
global climate change goals, the Ecuadorian state’s view of society and nature is one that reduces 
complex relationships to easily measurable goals and indicators.  The work of James Scott (1998) 
provides a useful framework for understanding the institutional implications of reducing society and 
nature to easily measurable units and, in the case of the Kichwa of Chimborazo, the effects on the 
complex relationship between the communities and Pachamama.  As Scott (1998) notes, this 
narrowing view “brings into sharp focus certain limited aspects of an otherwise far more complex 
and unwieldy reality” (11).  By applying this reductionist view, nature can be broken down into a 
quantifiable and measurable field of vision, making possible a “high degree of schematic knowledge, 
control and manipulation” (Scott, 1998: 11).  Furthermore, institutionalized rules and norms 
disproportionately affect marginalized communities because there is an “unequal burden of 
seemingly equitable institutional arrangements under asymmetric social relations” (Scott, 1998: 208).  
Therefore, since the social and political interactions of Socio Bosque in Chimborazo take place within 
a contextual environment that marginalizes Indigenous populations, it is important to understand 
how “seemingly equal and symmetric institutional rules, fall unevenly on those subject to the rules” 
(Agarwal, 2005: 208).   
 
A full understanding of the impacts that institutional changes in Ecuador, and the changing rules 
and norms incorporated within these changes, have on the meaningful inclusion and participation of 
Indigenous communities and local land use and resource management practices is not evident.  
Research on the institutional aspects of Socio Bosque has focused on the effects Socio Bosque has on 
decision making and institutional governance at the local level (Hayes, et al, 2015).  However, few 
scholars have analyzed the implications institutionalized PES programs have on meaningful 
participation and inclusion of Indigenous communities in national climate change and 





regional institutional hierarchies that are rooted in specific socio-economic and political contexts.  In 
the case of the Kichwa, the local context and historical institutions, such as the hacienda, have 
marginalized and oppressed Indigenous populations and their cosmovisiones.  Therefore, it is 
important to understand the following two aspects of inclusion and participation within 
institutionalized PES programs in Indigenous communities in Chimborazo: 
1. the extent to which new, participatory spaces are opened up by PES programs that improve 
local Indigenous involvement in the decisions surrounding environmental governance and 
resource use within their territory, as well as the possible barriers for marginalized 
communities that are created in institutionalized, state-led environmental governance 
programs 
2. the ways in which institutionalized environmental governance programs like Socio Bosque 
create territorial restructuring of land and local relations 
In order to address these questions, this chapter will briefly review some of the institutional and 
state arrangements in Ecuador that have provided a framework for a new era of environmental 
governance with programs like Socio Bosque becoming the implementing arm of environmental 
conservation in the country.  To begin, I will discuss key documents that provide the overarching, 
institutional framework within which Socio Bosque is implemented.  Then, I will provide a historical 
analysis of the creation of the Socio Bosque program to understand how the program developed into a 
national climate change strategy.  Finally, I will discuss the various bureaucratic requirements, rules, 
norms and measurements that form part of the contract between communities that participate in 
Socio Bosque and the Ministry of Environment.  By exploring these institutionalized norms and 
practices, this chapter will show the following: 
1. Socio Bosque organizes complex local populations, land, and resources into simplified, legible 
grids that can be centrally recorded, quantified, and measured by the state (Scott, 1998)  
2. While environmental governance programs in Ecuador seem to be more inclusive and 
participatory, a closer look reveals that unequal power relations rooted in the socio-political 
history and current context of Chimborazo make indigenous participation extremely 
superficial in an institutionalized program like Socio Bosque.   
3. Changing institutional arrangements and bureaucratic requirements within the local context 
of Chimborazo are based on the history of the hacienda that delineated social norms and 






5.2 Definition of an Institution 
Since a focus of this chapter is on describing the institutionalization of Socio Bosque, it is important to 
provide a clear definition of the term in order to frame the following empirical analysis.  Loosely 
defined, institutions can be understood as “the humanly devised constraints that structure political, 
economic and social interaction” (North, 1991:97) or “rules of the game” that frame the conduct of 
individuals and organizations (Ostrom, 1990: 3). “Institutions may be seen as commonly understood 
codes of behaviour that potentially reduce uncertainty, mediate self-interest, and facilitate collective 
action” (Ostrom and Cox 2010:4-5).  These “rules” can be both formal (mostly written) and 
informal (mostly unwritten) rules that people recognize in a given situation and the mechanisms 
established to enforce those rules (Dietz et al. 2002, Ostrom, 1990, Ostrom et al. 1994). Vatn’s 
distinction of three different types of institutions within PES programs - market, hierarchy and 
community - will provide a useful framework for analysis (Vatn, 2010). However, it is important to 
understand that the reach of institutions extends far beyond written or unwritten rules and includes 
the institutional discourses that become embedded in normative practices and policies.  As Dryzek 
states, “the impact of discourse can often be felt in the policies of government or international 
organizations…beyond affecting institutions, discourses can become embodied in institutions.  
When this happens, discourses “constitute the informal understandings that provide the context for 
social interaction” (2013: 20).   
 
Central to the discussion on institutions are the norms and rules that guide and regulate behaviour.  
Norms can be defined as a “rule or standard of behaviour shared by members of a social group. 
Norms may be internalized —i.e., incorporated within the individual so that there is conformity 
without external rewards or punishments, or they may be enforced by positive or negative sanctions 
from without” (Encyclopedia Britannica).  Ostrom (2008) describes norms as “preferences related to 
prescriptions about actions or outcomes that are not focused primarily on short-term material 
payoffs to self” (12).  In contrast, rules can be defined as  
“linguistic statements similar to norms, but rules carry an additional, assigned 
sanction if forbidden actions are taken and observed by a monitor. For rules to 
exist, any particular situation must be linked to a rule-making situation and 





Crawford and Ostrom (2005) differentiate norms and rules by the latter containing an “or else”, 
which is usually enforced through sanctions. 
 
Both formal and informal norms and rules frame the institutionalization of Socio Bosque and 
powerfully shape social practices.  Within Kichwa communities, various norms frame social 
interactions.  One such norm is reciprocity that, according to Lyons (2006) helped to “sustain 
generosity and mutual consideration as norms that hacienda Runa [indigenous] applied in judging 
their overlords” (92).  The concept of reciprocity will be discussed in detail in Chapter 7, but for this 
current chapter it is important to understand how norms and rules of Socio Bosque affect Kichwa 
communities and how Kichwa, indigenous norms affect state-community interactions throughout the 
program.  Therefore, an important question in the context of Chimborazo is how, or even if, the 
norms and rules of Socio Bosque change local norms that guide land use and resource management 
practices.  For example, the continued impact of the formal and informal norms and rules the 
hacienda era that shape state-community and inter and intra-community relationships are not 
formalized in bureaucratic regulations but are part of the everyday life and reality of Kichwa 
community interactions with state institutions, such as the Ministry of Environment.  As a result, 
how does the continuation of hacienda norms and rules impact community participation within Socio 
Bosque?   
 
This chapter explores the formal and informal rules and norms that govern resource use and 
practice through an analysis of the institutional arrangements between the “brick and mortar” 
international, national, and local institutions and actors, while at the same time paying close attention 
to the changing discourse of these actors as it relates to environmental governance, indigenous 
communities, and climate change.  This discourse has shaped the normative framework for the 
implementation of Socio Bosque in Ecuador and, as a result, changed land use and resource 








5.3 The Legacy of the Hacienda and Land Reform 
Before beginning the empirical analysis, it is important to briefly review the dominant institutional 
framework in Chimborazo, Ecuador that has guided community and state interactions and, as a 
result, has direct implications on Indigenous inclusion and participation in state-led environmental 
governance programs. The context section of this research provides an in-depth analysis of the 
hacienda, but for the purposes of this chapter, it is important to remember that the hacienda system 
has a continued influence in shaping the social, political, and economic interactions between the 
Kichwa communities of Chimborazo and the state.  The current environmental governance regime in 
Ecuador and Chimborazo is placed within the existing framework left behind by the hacienda 
system.  This framework organizes social, political, and economic relationships between the state 
and Kichwa indigenous communities.  Therefore, the institutional analysis below must be taken into 
account in the light of asymmetric state-community relationships.  For the purposes of this section, 
it is important to highlight the following: 
1. The hacienda system was a small “state within the state” that controlled local economic, 
social, and political activity (Bretón, 2014). 
2. The hacienda system was not controlled by hegemonic oppression alone, but by a complex 
set of formal and informal rules and regulations that guided interactions between hacienda 
landowner and hausipungeros/indigenous workers, between hacienda Indigenous peoples and 
the state, between the Indigenous and mestizo populations, and between hacienda 
Indigenous peoples and those Indigenous peoples outside of the hacienda (Tuaza, 2018; 
Bretón, 2014; Lyons, 2006). 
3. The hacienda was not seen by Indigenous people as a regime of domination or a production 
unit, but was maintained under patriarchal interrelations between masters, overseers (jipus), 
and Indigenous people as “a space that guarantees survival, offers favours, rewards those 
who are faithful to the master, and imposes rules on the family and the community” (Tuaza, 
2014: 120).   
To this day, the hacienda system remains a pivotal institution in the formation of state-indigenous-
mestizo relations.  As Lyons demonstrates, the hacienda system was vital in shaping, and continuing 
to shape, how indigenous communities “engage with cultural symbols and scenarios, interpret them, 
make choices, rework and modify them in coming to terms with the world and pursuing their goals” 





agrarian reform abolished the huasipungo labour system, a precarious labour relationship between 
Indigenous workers and hacienda landowners.  The huasipungo relationship was one of a number of 
labour and social relationships between Indigenous communities and hacienda landowners. In 
exchange for his/her labour, the Indigenous worker (huasipungero) was given a miniscule salary and 
small plot of land (huasipungo) on which he could cultivate subsistence crops.  The huasipungero also 
had rights to access water, firewood, and pasture on the hacienda (Becker and Tutillo, 2009).  More 
often than not, this relationships between the huasipungero and the landowner became a “debt 
peonage” where Indigenous debt was transferred from generation to generation in a type of quasi-
slavery and became engrained in the social and economic framework of Chimborazo and the 
everyday lives of Indigenous peoples (Guerrero, 1991a, 1991b, 1991c; Bretón, 2008, 2012). As Lyons 
(2006) notes, many Indigenous communities saw the huasipungo labour relation as a simple “fact of 
life” where they exchanged labour for access to land and were resigned to this exploitative 
relationship as normal (129).   
 
While the huasipungo was part of the majority of private haciendas, the Roman Catholic church and 
the Asistencia Publica (National Welfare Program) were also large landholders in the province of 
Chimborazo.  In the case of the church and public lands, these haciendas operated through rental 
agreements which involved secondary tenancy agreements (Lyons, 2006; Haney and Haney, 1987).  
While the labour conditions of Indigenous on these haciendas were not that of the huasipungo, the 
treatment of the Indigenous by land renters was, in many cases, abhorrent, and pay was a minimal.  
In the 1970s, the private, church, and state-owned haciendas owned approximately 80 percent of 
arable land in the province of Chimborazo (Haney and Haney, 1987: 51).  The struggle of 
Indigenous peoples in Chimborazo against the hacienda has centred around access to land. 
Indigenous communities have a deep cultural and spiritual connection to land, but land has always 
provided livelihoods and subsistence to Indigenous communities.   
 
The government of Ecuador’s Land Reform Act of 1964 abolished the huasipungo labour system of 
servile labour on large, highland estates and placed new limits on individual land holdings, which 
was positive for land redistribution but also reduced the availability of open lands and pastures (Ross 
et al. 2017).  IERAC (Instituto Ecuatoriano de Reforma Agraria y Colonización) was created in 1964 to 





Indigenous representation, limiting IERAC’s ability to institute favourable land reform for 
Indigenous communities while providing economic benefits to landowners who sold their land to 
the institution (Goodwin, 2017).  As a result, only 3 percent of Chimborazo’s land was allocated to 
small landholders in the seven years following the 1964 reform.  At the same time, former 
Indigenous huasipungeros lost the right to access hacienda pastures and other resources, such as water 
and firewood, that their previous hausipungo status permitted (Korovkin, 2003).  While some view the 
1964 land reform as a failure in regards to land redistribution (Barsky 1984; Guerrero, 1983), 
Korovkin (2003) argues that the 1964 reform had other positive effects, such as political and 
institutional gains that led to the creation of Indigenous organizations, such as Ecuarunari -
Confederación de Pueblos de la Nacionalidad Kichwa del Ecuador (Confederation of Peoples of Kichwa 
Nationality) which, in turn, increased Indigenous participation in local organizations and local and 
national politics.  In order to appease a highly mobilized peasant movement in Chimborazo, the 
Ecuadorian government increased land redistribution, and by 1988 19.3 percent of the total amount 
of provincial land had been redistributed (Korovkin, 2003: 134).  However, in spite of increased land 
distribution, small farms (under five hectares) in 1989 were 87 percent of agricultural units, but 
controlled only 17 percent more farmland in Chimborazo, as compared to 1954 where farms under 
five hectares accounted for 83 percent of all farms and controlled as little as 15 percent of the 
province’s land (Korovkin, 2003).   
 
The 1973 agrarian reform increased land redistribution as the Ecuadorian government implemented 
capitalist modernization of agricultural production and efficiency as a means of promoting national 
development. As a result, unfarmed or underutilized land was subject to expropriation, and ex-
hacienda owners moved from traditional food crop production to livestock which fulfilled land 
productivity goals in the eyes of IERAC and also reduced hacienda dependence on local labour 
(Korovkin, 2003).  However, in practice, the Ecuadorian government invested very little in the 
modernization of agriculture and livestock for rural Indigenous communities.  In contrast, under the 
guise of modernization, landowners saw diary farming as a way to appease IERAC’s demands on 
land productivity and to keep large landholdings.  The dairy industry was accompanied by very little 
technological or productivity improvements and today is based on small-landholdings, many in 
Indigenous communities, who rely on traditional methods, resulting in yields well below national 






The land reforms in 1964 and 1973 gave Indigenous peoples the right to purchase lands from 
former hacienda owners but this also resulted in greater household and community debt.  As 
Indigenous communities sought to repay these debts, the result was increasing pressure on land and 
páramo ecosystems through agricultural and livestock activities (Ross et al. 2017).  While agrarian 
reform and the creation of IERAC were instrumental in land redistribution, Indigenous 
communities were not passive agents waiting for handouts.  Many communities struggled to obtain 
land from ex-haciendas, even well after land reform.  Indigenous mobilization was crucial in 
“determining the amount of land redistributed but also in determining the conditions under which 
the land was transferred” (Goodwin, 2017: 587).   
 
Nearly 40 years and two agrarian reforms later seemingly did little to address the issue of adequate 
land redistribution and inequality, and access to arable land remain barriers for Indigenous 
communities (Korovkin, 2003; Cameron, 2010). The consequences of this unequal distribution of 
land can be seen today as Indigenous communities continue to exploit land on the slopes of the 
mountains, putting in jeopardy the fragile páramo ecosystem.  Indigenous struggles for land 
continued into the 80s and 90s, as the statement below from Ecuarunari indicates: 
Our fundamental problem is that the majority of us have a small parcel of land 
that does not yield enough to support our families nor satisfy our most basic 
needs. If our parents or we were able to secure a huasipungo or plot of land, 
we or our children do not even have a handful of land … What land are we 
going to leave our children? None! We cannot divide our land anymore. 
(Ecuarunari 1984: 16 cited in Goodwin, 2017) 
Access to land and adequate land reform was part of the 1990 Indigenous levantamiento (uprising) that 
brought the issue of sovereign Indigenous control over their land and territory to the forefront 
(Becker, 2008).  However, the impact of the government’s resulting Ley de Desarrollo Agrario was 
minimal and Indigenous communities continue to be marginalized from genuine participation in 
decision making and policies surrounding land distribution (Bretón, 1997; Goodwin, 2007). 
 
In spite of state rhetoric, recent attempts at improving land access for Indigenous communities 
under the Correa regime have also been largely unsuccessful.  Correa himself recognized the 





changed substantially and it is one of the most unequal distributions in the world; the Gini 
coefficient exceeds 0.9 in terms of land tenure” (tenencia de la tierra en Ecuador no ha cambiado 
sustancialmente y es una de las distribuciones más inequitativas del mundo; el coeficiente de Gini supera el 0,9 en 
cuanto a tenencia de tierra) (Le Monde Diplomatique, cited in Acosta, 2013b: 16).  As a way out of this 
inequality, Correa stated that “large landowners sell their land and in this way tenure is 
democratized, that is what is sought. This has been done in many parts of the world. It is more 
efficient than agrarian reform” (que los grandes terratenientes vendan sus tierras y de esta forma se democratice la 
tenencia, eso es lo que se busca, esto se ha hecho en muchas partes del mundo, es más eficiente que la reforma agraria) 
(Acosta, 2013b: 16).  Furthermore, the Article 282 of the Constitution establishes that “the state  
will regulate the use and access to land that must fulfill a social and environmental function. A 
national land fund, established by law, will regulate equitable land access for peasants. Large estates 
and concentration of land are prohibited, as well as hoarding or privatization of water and its 
sources” (El Estado normará el uso y acceso a la tierra que deberá cumplir la función social y ambiental. Un fondo 
nacional de tierra, establecido por ley, regulará el acceso equitativo de campesinos y campesinas a la tierra.  Se prohíbe 
el latifundio y la concentración de la tierra, así como el acaparamiento o privatización del agua y sus fuentes), while 
Article 281 outlines that the state will “promote redistributive policies that allow the peasantry access 
to land, water and other productive resources” (promover  políticas redistributivas  que  permitan  el  acceso  
del  campesinado  a  la  tierra,  al  agua  y  otros  recursos productivos).  In spite of the importance of land 
redistribution in the state’s guiding documents, the government of Ecuador has not implemented 
any broad reaching land redistribution policies, but has opted to maintain the status quo of the 
agrarian structure (Hidalgo, 2013). 
 
Even with the abolition of the huasipungo relation and subsequent land reform in the 1960s and 70s, 
the Ecuadorian state has not made equal land distribution a priority, specifically for the Highland 
Kichwa communities. Furthermore, the hacienda and its institutionalized rules and regulations that 
accompanied this economic and social systems through hegemonic practices remain at the forefront 
of the Indigenous social imaginary.  It is important to note that, as Lyons (2005) argues, hegemony is 
not limited to physical coercion and, often times in practice consent, coercion, and persuasion are 
indistinguishable.  In this context, hegemony is the “struggle to define the ‘universal’, to elevate 
contingent, local sets of ideas to the status of normal, true, and good so that they seem 





the huasipungo labour system, and inadequate land reforms limit Indigenous inclusion and 
participation in Socio Bosque to a framework delineated by the normalized and “commonsensical” 
social practices and rules of the hacienda, which as Tuaza (2014) suggests, confines social, and 
political participation of Indigenous communities and marginalizes meaningful participation. 
Therefore, meaningful inclusion and participation within this context is limited to an 
institutionalized state framework of rules and norms that delineate what inclusion and participation 
look like. 
 
5.4 Local Memories of the Hacienda 
The following section uses focus group and key informant interviews to provide an understanding 
of the history and memory of land and social relations under the hacienda system.  The aim of 
engaging with local communities about the hacienda was to understand land use and social relations 
during the hacienda era and how these uses and relations affect present day interactions between 
communities and land, and communities and the state. Many of the community members who 
participated in this research remembered the páramos during the times of the hacienda as “having 
more grass, native animals, and plants that are now gone” (antes había más paramo, animales nativos y 
plantas que ahora no hay), recalled one tayta (Interviewed in Community 5, 2018-03-26).  Of particular 
interest is that many community members discussed the change in water. Recollections of an 
abundance of water in the past was common during numerous community interviews and focus 
groups.  One community member recalled that “during the hacienda, there was a lot of water…there 
were times where I could not cross the river, due to the amount of water.  Now, that river is nearly 
dried up” (durante el tiempo de la hacienda había mucha agua…había tiempos donde no podía cruzar el rio por el 
agua.  Ahora el rio es casi seco) .  Changes brought about by the two agrarian reforms had drastic 
impacts on how Indigenous communities use the surrounding páramos.   
 
The 1964 and 1973 agrarian reforms sought to expand the agricultural frontier to increase 
production. Hacienda landowners were forced to redistribute their land; the Ecuadorian Institute of 
Agrarian Reform and Colonization (IERAC) paid landowners for their lands and subsequently sold 
the lands to indigenous communities.  In many cases, communities were indebted to the IERAC for 





economic debt to the IERAC as soon as possible, many communities slashed and burned the páramo 
vegetation to plant cash crops, such as potatoes and onions (Korovkin, 2002). The abolition of the 
hacienda system, the huasipungo labour relations, and the subsequent sale of land resulted in 
Indigenous communities receiving the land on the slopes of the mountains while hacienda 
landowners kept the much more fertile land of the valleys.  After agrarian reform, “less than half the 
land reallocated by IERAC fell into the category of farmland; the rest was unsuitable for either 
agricultural or pastoral activities”, with some estimates of only 20.1 percent of land transferred to 
Indigenous communities as suitable for crops or livestock (Banco Central del Ecuador and 
Ecofuturo, cited in Korovkin, 2003: 134).   
 
In hacienda times, agricultural activity reached up to 3,200 metres above sea level, but when the 
Indigenous communities acquired the lands they extended agricultural production to higher 
ecological levels.  As a result, indigenous communities began to adapt their relationship with the 
páramos in order to maintain their land and livelihood.  However, the encroaching agricultural 
frontier into the páramo not only changed the communities’ economic relationship with nature, but it 
also had long-lasting effects on land productivity and local water sources due to the deterioration of 
the unique páramo ecosystem.  In Community 2, one tayta stated that the páramo is “dry, there is no 
water.  Ten years ago, there was plenty of water”.  During focus groups in Community 3, the 
community recalled that there were two lakes in the altitude of the páramo and these lakes no longer 
exist.  Community members demonstrated how they “suffer for water” in the high altitude páramo.  
Water no longer exists and they are using Socio Bosque incentive payments to build an irrigation 
system to make land arable.  
 
After the agrarian reform, communities needed to pay the debts incurred by purchasing their land 
from IERAC.  Various communities interviewed during my time in the field discussed changes to 
land use that took place after agrarian reform and the abolition of the huasipungo system.  
Communities grew various crops to pay the debt to IERAC, while others planted pine trees to sell as 
lumber.  Other community members paid their debt by gathering sheep fertilizer to sell.  One of the 
main changes to the páramo ecosystem was commercial agricultural production.  Potatoes were 





land were profitable. However, in the following years the production decreased, and the quality of 
the soil was affected. In contrast to the land in the valleys, which is fertile and with a considerable 
vegetative layer, the soils of the higher altitudes are fragile (Llambí, and Cuesta, 2014). The arable 
layer is two metres of soil, while the surface is composed of sand and stone. As the tillage 
progresses, the fertile soil of the slope drops annually and in the upper part only stones and sand 
remain. Also, during the years of drought, the fragile soil of clay is lifted by the winds and in the 
winter the torrents of water drag away the fertile soil.  
 
The problem of desertification was aggravated by the introduction of the tractor and the excessive 
use of chemical fertilizers and pesticides. The use of chemical fertilizers replaced the old tactic of 
fertilizing the field with the manure of cows, donkeys, horses, and sheep. This change in traditional 
agricultural practices has had adverse effects on the productive capacity of Indigenous land.  
Communities have become dependent on external economic and supply systems and the chemical 
fertilizers and pesticides have damaged soil structure and polluted water sources (Bebbington, 2004). 
Furthermore, due to damaged soil, communities expand livestock and agricultural activity up the 
mountains into previously untouched páramos, further exacerbating the environmental degradation 
(Lyons, 2006; Tuaza, 2014; Ross et al. 2017; Appenzeller 2019).  As a result, communities move 
higher up the mountain range, slashing and burning the páramo to plant crops and maintain 
livelihoods.  The effects of the hacienda outlined above and the way in which agrarian reform was 
implemented create a unique, local context in which Socio Bosque is implemented.  This context is 
embedded in the institutional framework of economic, political, social, and cultural relations left 
behind by the aftermath of the reforms of the hacienda system.  While the hacienda and the 
huasipungo labour system have been abolished in practice, the ongoing effects of a system that 
dominated the Ecuadorian landscape for nearly 300 years continue to shape land use and resource 
management practices, as well as inter and intra communal relations and state-community relations 
and interactions. 
 
5.5 Institutionalized Environmental Governance in Ecuador 
Since the 2006 election of Rafael Correa’s Alianza PAIS political party and its Revolución Ciudadana 





inclusion and participation of civil society in their new, pluri-national state.  However, some scholars 
have argued that new institutions and policies put in place during the Revolución Ciudadana have not 
led to deeper structural change that was promised in the 2008 Constitution (González and Javier, 
2013).  The state prioritized sovereign, national policies and programs that proposed alternative ways 
to combat climate change, such as the Yasuni ITT initiative and Socio Bosque.  While Socio Bosque was 
hailed by the state as a sovereign national climate change program, a closer look reveals that the 
Ecuadorian state’s compliance with international climate change frameworks, such as the UNFCCC 
and eventually REDD+, is a key motivator in environmental governance and climate change policies 
in Ecuador.  The following section will outline the institutional framework of climate change 
adaptation and mitigation in Ecuador and analyze key documents from various state institutions that 
guide climate change strategies in the country.  An understanding of the institutionalized framework 
at the national level will lay the foundation for a micro-level analysis of the institutionalized norms 
and practices that affect Kichwa communities through climate change policies and programs, 
specifically Socio Bosque. 
 
5.6 State Centric Governance 
The new Ecuadorian Constitution, written in 2008, places the state at the centre of environmental 
governance policy and resource management as the protector of nature.  The state is not the only 
environmental governance actor outlined in the Constitution. Article 15 highlights environmental 
governance as a matter of public interest by stating that the Ecuadorian population has the right to  
“live in a healthy and ecologically balanced environment…[and that] 
environmental conservation, the protection of ecosystems, biodiversity and the 
integrity of the country’s genetic assets, the prevention of environmental 
damage, and the recovery of degraded natural spaces are declared matters of 
public interest” (Constitution of Ecuador, Art. 14).   
“vivir en un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado…[y que] Se declara de interés 
público la preservación del ambiente, la conservación de los  ecosistemas, la biodiversidad y la 
integridad del patrimonio genético del país, la prevención del daño ambiental y la recuperación 
de los espacios naturales degradados” 
However, how “public interest” is achieved is clearly placed within the centralized power of the state 
through the state guaranteeing a model of sustainable development that is “environmentally 
balanced, respects cultural diversity, and conserves biodiversity and ensures the natural regeneration 





la capacidad de regeneración natural de los ecosistemas) (Art. 391.1; Art. 395).  The same section of the 
Constitution (Nature and Environment) obligates the state to implement environmental governance 
policies, while Section 2 states that biodiversity conservation is of public interest and declares that 
the state exercises administration and governance sovereignty over biodiversity (Section 2, Art. 400).  
Of particular interest is Article 74, which states that environmental services cannot be appropriated 
and are under total regulation of the state.   
 
Clearly, the state controls the value placed on ecosystem services and the resulting incentive 
payment framework, as well as the overarching environmental governance initiatives carried out in 
Ecuador. Furthermore, as Socio Bosque becomes increasingly tied to REDD+ efforts in Ecuador, 
complications may arise in the distribution of incentive payments received from REDD+ and 
communities may lose control over payments received from PES programs linked to REDD+.  The 
potential for REDD+ to affect community control over incentive payments is seen in The Forest 
Dialogue background paper on REDD+ Readiness where it states while MAE has agreed “in 
principle” that most benefits should go directly to those who reduce deforestation and conserve 
ecosystems at the local level, “specific benefit distribution [of REDD+ funds] will be defined 
through environmental services regulations, pursuant to what is stipulated in Art. 74 of the 
Constitution” (Hübenthal et al., 2010: 23 – 24).  
 
It is clear that the wording within the Constitution and the subsequent interpretation of this wording 
by international institutions, such as REDD+, place a centralized, Ecuadorian state at the forefront 
of determining how financial benefits paid for environmental services will be distributed, placing 
Indigenous communities in a precarious position, balancing on the political whims and wills of the 
Ecuadorian state.  While the 2008 Constitution ushered in some changes within Ecuadorian political 
and social structures, it was a continuation of a political legacy that has tended to centralize political 
power and executive control over civil society, while at the same time allowing powerful interest 
groups to influence policy (Conaghan, 2017).  As de la Torre argues, new technocrats and 
bureaucratic experts under the Correa government differed from their neoliberal predecessors in 
that they came from academia and NGOs instead of private financial institutions and international 





technocrats, Correa’s regime embraced a “moral and redemptive mission” of rebuilding their nation 
by achieving buen vivir (de la Torre, 2013; SENPLADES, 2009) 
 
In regards to specific environmental governance and climate change policies, Article 414 of the 
Constitution states that  
“the State shall adopt adequate and cross-cutting measures for the mitigation 
of climate change, by limiting greenhouse gas emissions, deforestation, and air 
pollution; it shall take measures for the conservation of the forests and 
vegetation; and it shall protect the population at risk” (Constitution of 
Ecuador).  
“El Estado adoptará medidas adecuadas y transversales para la mitigación del cambio 
climático, mediante la limitación de las emisiones de gases de efecto invernadero, de la 
deforestación y de la contaminación atmosférica; tomará medidas para la conservación de los 
bosques y la vegetación, y protegerá a la población en riesgo” 
Furthermore, the state has the obligation to “incentivize natural persons and legal entities and to 
communities to protect nature and to promote respect for all the elements comprising an 
ecosystem” (Art. 71) (incentivará a las personas naturales y jurídicas, y a los colectivos, para que protejan la 
naturaleza, y promoverá el respeto a todos los elementos que forman un ecosistema), as well as “compensate 
individuals and communities that depend on affected natural systems” (Art. 72) (Indemnizar a los 
individuos y colectivos que dependan de los sistemas naturales afectados).  The state is given the authority to 
“establish the most effective mechanisms to achieve the restoration and shall adopt adequate 
measures to eliminate or mitigate harmful environmental consequences” (Art. 72) (establecerá los 
mecanismos más eficaces para alcanzar la restauración, y adoptará las medidas adecuadas para eliminar o mitigar las 
consecuencias ambientales nocivas) and to regulate the appropriation, production, delivery, use, and 
development of environmental services (Constitution of Ecuador, Section 7).  These articles clearly 
identify the role of the state as the central figure that organizes, implements, and governs climate 
change mitigation efforts and places programs like Socio Bosque at the centre of environmental 
governance and conservation. The table below provides a brief outline of the number of articles 
within the Constitution that are related to environmental governance. 
Table 4: The Constitution and Environmental Governance 
Article  
Preamble A new form of citizen coexistence in diversity and harmony with nature to achieve buen vivir, 






Una nueva forma de convivencia ciudadana, en diversidad y armonía con la naturaleza, para alcanzar el buen 
vivir, el sumak kawsay 
14 The right of the population to live in a healthy and ecologically balanced environment is 
recognized, which guarantees sustainability and buen vivir, sumak kawsay.  
 
The preservation of the environment, the conservation of ecosystems, biodiversity and the 
integrity of the country's genetic heritage, the prevention of environmental damage and the 
recovery of degraded natural spaces are declared of public interest. 
 
Se reconoce el derecho de la población a vivir en un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado, que garantice la 
sostenibilidad y el buen vivir, sumak kawsay. 
 
Se declara de interés público la preservación del ambiente, la conservación de los ecosistemas, la biodiversidad y la 
integridad del patrimonio genético del país, la prevención del daño ambiental y la recuperación de los espacios 
naturales degradados. 
57 Indigenous communities, peoples and nationalities are recognized and guaranteed, in 
accordance with the Constitution and with covenants, conventions, declarations and other 
international human rights instruments. 
 
Se reconoce y garantizará a las comunas, comunidades, pueblos y nacionalidades indígenas, de conformidad con 
la Constitución y con los pactos, convenios, declaraciones y demás instrumentos internacionales de derechos 
humanos. 
 
To preserve and to promote their biodiversity management practices and their natural 
environment, the State will establish and execute programs, with the participation of the 
community, to ensure the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity. 
 
Conservar y promover sus prácticas de manejo de la biodiversidad y de su entorno natural. El Estado 
establecerá y ejecutará programas, con la participación de la comunidad, para asegurar la conservación y 
utilización sustentable de la biodiversidad. 
71 The State will encourage natural and legal persons, and collectives, to protect nature, and 
promote respect for all the elements that form an ecosystem. 
 
El Estado incentivará a las personas naturales y jurídicas, y a los colectivos, para que protejan la naturaleza, y 
promoverá el respeto a todos los elementos que forman un ecosistema. 
74 Individuals, communities, peoples and nationalities will have the right to benefit from the 
environment and natural resources that allow them to live well (buen vivir). 
 
Environmental services will not be subject to appropriation; their production, provision, use 
and exploitation will be regulated by the State. 
 
Las personas, comunidades, pueblos y nacionalidades tendrán derecho a beneficiarse del ambiente y de las 
riquezas naturales que les permitan el buen vivir. 
 
Los servicios ambientales no serán susceptibles de apropiación; su producción, prestación, uso y aprovechamiento 
serán regulados por el Estado. 
267.4 Rural parish governments will exercise the following exclusive powers, notwithstanding the 
additional ones determined by law: 
 
To encourage the development of community productive activities, the preservation of 






Los gobiernos parroquiales rurales ejercerán las siguientes competencias exclusivas, sin perjuicio de las 
adicionales que determine la ley: 
 
Incentivar el desarrollo de actividades productivas comunitarias, la preservación de la biodiversidad y la 
protección del ambiente. 
275 The development regime is an organized, sustainable and dynamic set of economic, political, 
socio-cultural and environmental systems which guarantee the realization of buen vivir, or 
sumak kawsay 
 
The State shall plan the development of the country to guarantee the exercise of rights, the 
achievement of the objectives of the development regime and the principles enshrined in the 
Constitution. Planning will promote social and territorial equity, promote consultation, and be 
participatory, decentralized, and transparent. 
 
Buen vivir will require that people, communities, peoples and nationalities effectively enjoy their 
rights and exercise responsibilities within the framework of interculturality, respect for their 
diversity, and harmonious coexistence with nature. 
 
El régimen de desarrollo es el conjunto organizado, sostenible y dinámico de los sistemas económicos, políticos, 
socio-culturales y ambientales, que garantizan la realización del buen vivir, del sumak kawsay. 
 
El Estado planificará el desarrollo del país para garantizar el ejercicio de los derechos, la consecución de los 
objetivos del régimen de desarrollo y los principios consagrados en la Constitución. La planificación propiciará la 
equidad social y territorial, promoverá la concertación, y será participativa, descentralizada, desconcentrada y 
transparente. 
 
El buen vivir requerirá que las personas, comunidades, pueblos y nacionalidades gocen efectivamente de sus 
derechos, y ejerzan responsabilidades en el marco de la interculturalidad, del respeto a sus diversidades, y de la 
convivencia armónica con la naturaleza. 
387 [The state] will promote the generation and production of knowledge, to encourage scientific 
and technological research, and to enhance ancestral knowledge in order to contribute to the 
realization of buen vivir, or Sumak kawsay. 
 
[El estado] promover la generación y producción de conocimiento, fomentar la investigación científica y 
tecnológica, y potenciar los saberes ancestrales, para así contribuir a la realización del buen vivir, al sumak 
kawsay. 
391 The State will generate and apply demographic policies that contribute to a balanced territorial 
and intergenerational development and guarantee the protection of the environment and the 
security of the population, within the framework of respect for the self-determination of 
people and diversity. 
 
El Estado generará y aplicará políticas demográficas que contribuyan a un desarrollo territorial e 
intergeneracional equilibrado y garanticen la protección del ambiente y la seguridad de la población, en el marco 
del respeto a la autodeterminación de las personas y a la diversidad. 
395.1 The State will guarantee a sustainable development model, environmentally balanced and 
respectful of cultural diversity, that conserves biodiversity and the natural regeneration capacity 






El Estado garantizará un modelo sustentable de desarrollo, ambientalmente equilibrado y respetuoso de la 
diversidad cultural, que conserve la biodiversidad y la capacidad de regeneración natural de los ecosistemas, y 
asegure la satisfacción de las necesidades de las generaciones presentes y futuras. 
395.2 Environmental management policies will be applied transversally and will be mandated by the 
State at all levels and by all natural or legal persons in the national territory. 
 
Las políticas de gestión ambiental se aplicarán de manera transversal y serán de obligatorio cumplimiento por 
parte del Estado en todos sus niveles y por todas las personas naturales o jurídicas en el territorio nacional. 
400 The State will exercise sovereignty over biodiversity, whose administration and management 
will be carried out with intergenerational responsibility. 
 
The conservation of biodiversity and all its components, in particular agricultural and wild 
biodiversity and the country's genetic heritage, is declared of public interest. 
 
El Estado ejercerá la soberanía sobre la biodiversidad, cuya administración y gestión se realizará con 
responsabilidad intergeneracional. 
 
Se declara de interés público la conservación de la biodiversidad y todos sus componentes, en particular la 
biodiversidad agrícola y silvestre y el patrimonio genético del país. 
406 The State will regulate the conservation, management and sustainable use, recovery, and 
domain limitations of fragile and threatened ecosystems; among others, the páramos, wetlands, 
cloud forests, dry and humid tropical forests and mangroves, marine and coastal marine 
ecosystems. 
 
El Estado regulará la conservación, manejo y uso sustentable, recuperación, y limitaciones de dominio de los 
ecosistemas frágiles y amenazados; entre otros, los páramos, humedales, bosques nublados, bosques tropicales 
secos y húmedos y manglares, ecosistemas marinos y marinos-costeros. 
 
The state-centric focus of environmental governance policies and programs begins at the national 
level.  The Constitution clearly outlines the overarching framework to which environmental 
governance and climate change strategies must conform.  Based on this constitutional framework, 
various institutions, committees and strategies have been created to achieve a bureaucratic structure 
that can respond to the constitutional requirements. 
 
5.7 National Strategy for Climate Change 
At a national level, the Comité Interinstitucional de Cambio Climático - CCIC (Inter-institutional Committee 
on Climate Change) was created to coordinate and articulate climate change policy measures across 
government institutions.  The CICC has a technical secretariat in MAE called the Subsecretaria del Cambio 
Climático (Climate Change Sub-secretariat) whose principal role, among others, is to lead mitigation and 
adaptation actions in the country, including the implementation of communication, finance and 





different ministries and secretariats.   At the local level, Gobiernos Autónomos Descentralizados – GAD 
(Decentralized Autonomous Governments), should play a protagonist role in the implementation of 
climate change policies, measures, and actions but very little evidence of municipal involvement in Socio 
Bosque or clear environmental governance policies and programs was found.  Each GAD is responsible 
for its own Plan de desarrollo y ordenamiento territorial - PDOT (Territorial Organization and Development 
Plan) which organizes the regional, provincial, county and parish development planning.   
 
These plans are overseen by the central National Planning and Development Secretariat 
(SENPLADES).  SENPLADES also develops the Estrategia Nacional Territorial - ENT (National 
Territorial Strategy), through which the State has ordered and organized the social and spatial 
dimensions of local resource governance. According to the Ecuadorian government, all land is 
considered a “multidimensional and dynamic social construction” that is used as a means of articulating 
national public policy (SENPLADES, 2013: 353).  According to the ENT, these articulations manifest 
themselves through a new model of state management based on the decentralization of government 
institutions and the strengthening of state presence in local territories in order to generate new 
emphases of development and to enhance the attention and management of the state in local territories 
(SENPLADES, 2013: 380).  In other words, environmental governance programs like Socio Bosque are 
strategic state enterprises whose principal objective is to achieve the “conformation of a new regional 
territorial structure under Objective 3: Guarantee the rights of nature for current and future 
generations” (SENPLADES 2013: 27). 
 
The Estrategia Nacional de Cambio Climático - ENCC (National Strategy for Climate Change) is a key 
document that guides national environmental governance discourse and practice in Ecuador.  In its own 
words this document will “guide and dictate the actions in orderly and coordinated actions and 
measures that Ecuador needs to promote to prepare the Nation to face extreme climatic events of 
greater intensity and frequency” (guiará y dictará de manera ordenada y coordinada las acciones y medidas que el 
Ecuador necesita impulsar para preparar a la Nación a enfrentar los eventos extremos climáticos de mayor intensidad y 
frecuencia) (ENCC, Prologue).  The document outlines the levels of management for climate change 
mechanisms and seeks to establish planning and territorial organization processes in an articulated 





adjustment and implementation of the other plans contemplated in the Strategy” (para facilitar el ajuste e 
implementación de los otros dos planes contemplados en esta Estrategia) and has a principal objective of creating 
the necessary environment and implementing programs that help to overcome the main barriers that 
hinder the implementation of the ENCC (72).  The plan goes on to identify 4 main barriers: 1) limited 
information; 2) limited involvement and knowledge within civil society and the public and private 
sectors; 3) limited human and institutional capacity; and 4) limited access to technology and financing (1) 
escasa información; (2) limitado involucramiento y conocimiento de la Sociedad Civil, y de los sectores público y privado; 
(3) limitadas capacidades humanas e institucionales; y (4) limitado acceso a tecnología y financiamiento.) (72).  The 
Strategy outlines the normative framework for climate change in the country that is to be guided by the 
Constitution, the National Development Plan, sectoral policies and agendas which “organize 
Ecuadorian public management [identified in] the Constitution of the Republic: strategic sectors12, social 
sectors and productive sectors, and the institutional framework and key actors” (Para organizar la gestión 
pública ecuatoriana, la Constitución de la República identifica Sectores Estratégicos, Sectores Sociales y Sectores 
Productivos) (72).  The ENCC outlines 9 guiding principles for implementation: 1. Regional and 
international articulation; 2. Consistency with international principles on climate change; 3 Emphasis on 
local implementation; 4. Environmental Integrity; 5. Citizen participation; 6. Proactivity; 7. Protection of 
vulnerable groups and ecosystems; 8. Inter-generational responsibility; and 9. Transversality and 
integrality.  Of particular interest is Citizen Participation which, according to the document, is confined 
to the framework outlined in the Ley Orgánica de Participación Ciudadana (Organic Citizen Participation 
Law, 2010) though Consejos Ciudadanos Sectoriales (Citizen Sectorial Councils) that “constitute a space of 
dialogue between Civil Society and the Government for a public management that harmonizes interests 
from different actors” (constituyen el espacio de diálogo entre la Sociedad Civil y el Gobierno para una gestión pública 
que armonice los intereses de distintos actores) (ENCC, 19).  Therefore, participation is limited to a 
governmental framework confined within bureaucratic norms and practices defined and carried out by 
and within the state system, a system which is structured through various institutions, ministries, 
secretariats and sub-secretariats that the state has organized into committees and councils.   
 
 
12 The strategic sectors are identified as: energy in all its forms, telecommunications, non-renewable natural 






The ENCC seeks to eliminate various barriers to a coordinated climate change plan.  These barriers, 
according to the strategy, will be overcome by inter-institutional and inter-sectorial articulation across 
various government institutions at the local and national level, civil society and the private sector.  The 
following table shows the complexities of inter and intra institutional cooperation sought by the ENCC 
by the number of strategic actors the state deems necessary for the creation and strengthening of the 
conditions necessary to implement the national climate change strategy.   
Table 5: National Plan Stakeholders 
Stakeholders in the National Climate Change Strategy for the Creation and Strengthening of Conditions 
National 
Secretariats 
National Water Secretariat – SENAGUA 
National Secretariat for Superior Education, Science, Technology and Innovation – SENESCYT 
National Secretariat for Planning and Development - SENPLADES 
Implementing 
Ministries 
Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries - MAGAP 
Ministry of Environment – MAE 
Ministry of Electricity and Renewable Energy -MEER 
Ministry of Non-renewable Natural Resources - MRNNR 
Ministry of Exterior Relations, Commerce and Integration - MRECI 
Ministry of Urban Development and Housing - MIDUVI 
Ministry of Industry and Productivity – MIPRO 
Ministry of Public Health – MSP 
Ministry of Transport and Public Works – MTOP 
Coordinating 
Ministries 
Coordinating Ministry of Natural and Cultural Heritage – MCPNC 
Coordinating Ministry of Strategic Sectors – MCSE 
Coordinating Ministry of Economic Policy – MCPE 
Coordinating Ministry of Policy and Decentralized Autonomous Government - MCPGAD 
Coordinating Ministry of Production, Employment and Competitiveness - MCPEC 




National Institute of Farming Investigation – INIAP 
National Irrigation Institute – INR 
Oceanographic Institute 
Institute for Eco-development in the Amazonic Region - ECORAE 
Military Geographic Institute – IGM 
National Institute for Geological Metallurgical Mining Investigation 
National Pre-investment Institution 
Ecuadorian Agro-Quality Assurance Agency - Agrocalidad 
National Statistics and Census Institute – INEC 
Ecuadorian Institute of Intellectual Property – IEPI 
National Institute of Meteorology and Hydrology - INAMHI 
National Fisheries Institute – INP 
Integrated Natural Resources Remote Sensor Survey Center – CLIRSEN 





The ENCC considers Socio Bosque as a part of the overall national mitigation strategy as well, a 
strategy which is outlined to include the following actors. 









National Water Secretariat – SENAGUA 
National Secretariat for Superior Education, Science, Technology and Innovation – 
SENESCYT 
National Secretariat for Planning and Development – SENPLADES 
Implementing 
Ministries 
Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries – MAGAP 
Ministry of Environment – MAE 
Ministry of Electricity and Renewable Energy -MEER 
Ministry of Transport and Public Works – MTOP 
Coordinating 
Ministries 
Coordinating Ministry of Natural and Cultural Heritage – MCPNC 
Coordinating Ministry of Strategic Sectors – MCSE 




National Institute of Farming Investigation – INIAP 
National Institute of Meteorology and Hydrology – INAMHI 
Integrated Natural Resources Remote Sensor Survey Center – CLIRSEN 







Communities, peoples and nationalities 
 
The ENCC also contains a list of key actors in the implementation of the national adaptation plan, 
of which Socio Bosque is seen as an integral tool for adaptation to climate change. 
Table 7: National Adaptation Plan Stakeholders 
National Adaptation Plan Stakeholders 
National 
Secretariats 
National Water Secretariat – SENAGUA 
National Risk Management Secretariat – SNGR 
National Secretariat for Superior Education, Science, Technology and Innovation – 
SENESCYT 
National Secretariat for Planning and Development – SENPLADES 
Executing 
Ministries 
Ministry of Urban Development and Housing - MIDUVI  
Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries – MAGAP 
Ministry of Environment – MAE 
Ministry of Economic and Social Inclusion – MIES 
Ministry of Electricity and Renewable Energy – MEER 
Ministry of Public Health – MSP 
Ministry of Transport and Public Works - MTOP  
Ministry of Tourism – MINTUR 
Ministry of Education 
Coordinating 
Ministries 
Coordinating Ministry of Social Development – MCDS 
Coordinating Ministry of Natural and Cultural Heritage – MCPNC 
Coordinating Ministry of Strategic Sectors – MCSE 
Coordinating Ministry of Policy and Decentralized Autonomous Governments – MCPGAD 





National Institute for Farming Investigation – INIAP 
National Institute for Meteorology and Hydrology -  INAMHI 
Decentralized Autonomous Governments – GADs 
National Fishing Institute – INP 
Izquieta Pérez Institute 












Once again, the ENCC places the state and its institutions at the centre of the development and 
implementation of climate change and environmental governance policies.  The chain of command 
is clear within the following quote that indicates the flow from a central state authority to a local 
government that must comply with a national development plan.  Local Indigenous communities are 
expected to insert themselves into the local government process, as well as national policies and 
programs that are directly implemented in their territory. 
“National public policies are defined by the Executive branch of government.  
Ministries and Secretariats of the state formulate and execute policies that 
correspond to their sector, strictly subject to the objectives and goals of the 
PNBV (Plan Nacional del Buen vivir).  Meanwhile, the GADs develop and execute 
local policies in their ‘field of competition’, which must be part of their 
Development and Territorial Organization Plans (PDOT), subject to the 
provisions of the PNBV and in compliance with national public policies” 
(ENCC, 72) 
 
“la definición de la política pública nacional la ejerce la Función Ejecutiva. Los Ministerios y 
Secretarías de Estado formulan y ejecutan las Políticas que correspondan a su sector, sujetas 
estrictamente a los objetivos y metas del PNBV. Mientras tanto, los GADs desarrollan y 
ejecutan las políticas locales en el ámbito de sus competencias, las que deben estar contenidas en 
sus Planes de Desarrollo y Ordenamiento Territorial, con sujeción a lo establecido en el PNBV 
y en cumplimiento de las Políticas Públicas Nacionales” 
 
The inter and intra institutional framework for environmental governance is also bound by national and 
local territorial organization and development plans.  The Guidelines for Development Planning and 
Territorial Organization from SENPLADES establishes that “national planning is the exclusive 
competition of the central government and the development planning and territorial organization at the 
regional, provincial, county and parish is exclusive competence of the GADs”.  The national planning is 
carried out through national development plans, and civil society participation, specifically that of rural, 
Indigenous communities, is limited to local planning through GADs.  However, during various 
interviews with government officials, Socio Bosque was touted as a program that can, and does, provide a 
platform for Indigenous inclusion and participation in national and international debates surrounding 
environmental governance and possible climate change adaptation and mitigation solutions.  One Socio 





“Socio Bosque is an engine for the same people in the community to be active 
actors in the environmental conservation debate. Currently, they [communities] 
are not conservation actors... NGOs, the State...they are actors but 
communities are not. Fifty thousand families in Socio Bosque is an opportunity 
for these people to be at the forefront of the conservation debate.”  
 
“Socio Bosque es un motor para que la misma gente de la comunididad sean actores activos 
en el debate de la conservación ambiental.  No son actores de conservación…las ONGs, el 
Estado…..si son [actores] pero las comunidades no.  Cincuenta mil familias en Socio Bosque 
es una oportunidad para que estas personas se pongan al frente del debate sobre la 
conservación.”   
 
Another Socio Bosque official noted that participants in the program have formed national and regional 
network of Socio Bosque partners.  Through this network, the socios (partners) were able to participate in 
the new national environmental conservation effort, REverdecer Ecuador (Re-green Ecuador).   So, it 
would seem that, on the surface, Socio Bosque has provided various community members and leaders 
with the opportunity to engage in meaningful dialogue with state institutions and international 
environmental conservation and governance efforts.  Various studies (see Perafán et al., 2019; Arriagada 
et al., 2018) argue that Socio Bosque has strengthened local organization, but the program’s ability to 
provide a larger platform where Indigenous voices and opinions on the program are given equal footing 
to state-led discourse is less apparent.   
 
While MAE does advocate for participation by local communities, this participation is limited to a 
framework outlined by MAE and analyzed in this chapter.  Very little space is given to opposing voices 
or questions that seek to improve the program from a local perspective.  Some evidence suggests that 
some communities, and specific individuals of influence within these communities, are strategically 
using Socio Bosque as a means of exercising political and social agency within their community and even 
at a national level.  Feedback learning loops in the form of workshops and seminars are implemented, 
but from various communities’ perspectives, these practices are top-down, state-led strategies that are 
inherently exclusive and provide opportunities for political “ventriloquists” – a social and political 
intermediary (Guerrero, 1997).  The ventriloquist knows the “semantic field that has to be put into the 
mouth of the Indians…[and] who knows the content, the range and the tone” of what the state 
understands (Guerrero, 1997: 590).  The ventriloquist does not only translate or transcribe, but 





Therefore, Indigenous participation in the institutional and bureaucratic maze created by Socio Bosque is 
often times done by means of “political ventriloquism” and not by the larger community.   
 
As a result, an institutionalized Socio Bosque in the socio-historical context of Chimborazo makes 
Indigenous communities passive recipients of government handouts, while hand-picked representatives, 
usually mestizos or indigenous political and economic elite, speak on behalf of Indigenous community 
values, desires, and customs.  This type of “Indigenous” representation is the historical norm within 
Chimborazo dating back to the times of the hacienda where landowners would speak on behalf of 
Indigenous populations and after agrarian reform, when Indigenous political and economic elite speak 
on behalf of communities with which they have little to no contact.  Therefore, when examining state-
led environmental governance strategies and policies in Indigenous communities, it is impossible to 
disarticulate these policies from the local social, political, and economic reality rooted in complex power 
structures based on historical institutions.  
 
A common critique of Socio Bosque is that it fails to address these unequal power relations and structures 
that underlie the relationship between Kichwa Indigenous communities and the Ecuadorian state. Instead 
of providing a platform for expressing local or alternative ideas for environmental conservation, Socio 
Bosque has institutionalized Indigenous communities as subjects whose ability to conform to the 
structures of the program facilitates the payment for ecosystem services and whose voice and 
representation is limited to that of political “ventriloquists” who neither fully understand local desire or 
operate without self-serving interests.   
 
5.8 Indigenous Participation through Conceptual Appropriation 
Of constant debate within PES programs is the ability of such programs to incorporate Indigenous 
cosmovisiones into their larger aspirational and technological goals of combating climate change (Abate 
and Warner, 2013; Berkes, 2018; Smith et al, 2019).  As a result, many Indigenous peoples, both inside 
and outside of Ecuador, oppose REDD+ and PES endeavours that assign a market-based value to 
nature and undermine Indigenous values of reciprocity, respect, relationality, and reverence towards 





practice has been a key element of including Indigenous cosmovisiones into larger social and political 
spheres.  This chapter and Chapter 2 explore the discourse evoked by the state to describe Socio Bosque 
as an integral program to achieve buen vivir and sumak kawsay, as well as to protect the rights of nature.  
However, the very inclusion of sumak kawsay into state-led political and social discourse is seen with 
skepticism by many community members that were interviewed.  One tayta interviewed claimed that 
“the outgoing mayor had a slogan, ‘Building Sumak Kawsay’.  In practice, nothing has been seen in any 
community during the four years”.  This quote suggests that in many ways the state uses Indigenous 
concepts to legitimize policies and programs that, without the inclusion of Indigenous discourse, 
seemingly run counter to Indigenous cosmovisiones.  
 
By using Kichwa words and concepts, such as sumak kawsay and Pachamama, state institutions are 
portraying Socio Bosque as a national project that aligns with Indigenous cosmovisiones about land, place, 
nature, and livelihoods.  In many of my interactions with various government representatives during 
field research, there was a genuine concern and respect for Indigenous communities and their 
cosmovisiones.  In various interviews, Socio Bosque and MAE bureaucrats recognized the internal debate 
surrounding the incorporation of Indigenous ways of living and knowing within state institutions.  
However, the institutional framework that prioritizes national and international climate change goals 
over local community initiatives imposed by PES programs seemed to fence these government 
representatives into a position in which they themselves recognized the balancing act of obtaining 
results for a national and global climate change framework while, at the same time, honouring and 
incorporating indigenous cosmovisiones and traditional land use practices into local environmental 
governance. The balancing of achieving national and international climate change goals and respecting 
Indigenous cosmovisiones within an Ecuadorian economy that relies heavily on resource extraction is 
complex.  As one high ranking MAE official stated, “The Vice President said to the MAE Minister that 
Socio Bosque is a problem for the state”.  This same official continued by saying,  
“We must accompany these communities and their cosmovisiones, but…there are 
political games in that too. In 2016/17 Socio Bosque became a hindrance to the 
oil industry because it forced them [the state and the oil industry] to enter into 
discussions with the communities. The transnationals were worried because 






“Debemos acompañar a estas comunidades y sus cosmovisiones pero…hay juegos políticos en 
eso también.  En 2016/17 el Socio Bosque se convertio en un estorbo para el petróleo 
porque las comunidades a pesar de los conflictos les obligaba discutir con las comunidades.  
Les preocupaba a los transnacionales porque el Socio Bosque lo veian como un fortalecimiento 
organizativo de las comunidades.” 
This line of thinking represents the various state bureaucrats who realize the incorporation of 
Indigenous concepts and cosmovisiones into the discussion on environmental governance is key, but that 
political economy of Ecuador make this incorporation extremely difficult and complex.  Therefore, 
while Indigenous communities are invited to participate in discussions surrounding the incorporation of 
their concepts and cosmovisiones into state-led programs and policies, they continue to be limited to the 
margins of change and, often times, programs meant to assist these communities are seen as a 
hinderance to the larger state and society development through national projects like mining and oil 
extraction.  For example, in its National Mining Plan, the government of Ecuador sees mining as part of 
its “strategic sectors and [a] priority for the National Government...public policies are proposed to 
accelerate the development of the mining sector in favor of national interests” (sectores estratégicos, y por 
consiguiente es de prioridad para el Gobierno Nacional…se  plantean  políticas  públicas  que  aceleren  su desarrollo en 
favor de los intereses nacional) (National Mining Plan, 2016).  Similarly, a Socio Bosque “Frequent Questions” 
brochure states that resource extraction is “outside the competence of the Socio Bosque Program. The 
Program will be subject to the actions considered strategic by the National Government and its National 
Plan for Good Living” (Socio Bosque, 2019).   
 
In other words, a mining or oil project that is deemed of national interest supersedes land conserved 
through programs like Socio Bosque. Finally, in 2012 Max Lascano, the original director of Socio Bosque, 
stated that oil and mining are “strategic resources of the state and whether there can be exploitation in 
areas of Socio Bosque, that is in the Constitution, and this program is not above the Constitution” 
(Johnson, 2012: 19). The prioritization of resource extraction over conservation is clear, and it would 
seem to be in opposition to the rights of nature.  As a result, many scholars were quick to point out the 
existing gap between the theoretical rights of nature expressed in the constitution and the expansion of 
resource extraction policies and activities for economic and social development in Ecuador (Kauffmann 






For communities participating in Socio Bosque, this dichotomy creates a possible conflict where resource 
extraction is taking place.  Community 2 has their upper páramo land as part of Socio Bosque, while land 
found in the lower páramo is being mined by Chimborazo Cement.  The community recognized the 
negative impacts of mining, such as water contamination, but also understood the economic impacts of 
mining, such as job creation, although in the case of Community 2 community members stated that jobs 
for the community are minimal.  These conflicting state priorities create a complex duality within 
various communities – resource extraction and environmental conservation.  Unfortunately, funds from 
PES programs cannot replace jobs from resource extraction, although PES programs distribute funds 
equally among community members, unlike jobs within mining, for example.  As a result, distribution of 
PES funds becomes a key issue in the long-term sustainability of a program and also greatly affects 
community inclusion and participation. 
 
5.9 National Development, REDD+ and Reforestation Plans 
Since 2007, the first year of the government of Rafael Correa’s Alianza PAIS, Ecuador has 
developed four different national development plans.  As mentioned above, these plans form the 
framework that directs government policies, and it is important to understand the environmental 
discourse used throughout these plans.  By tracing the appearance and subsequent disappearance of 
certain concepts and words, the discursive framework that guides policies and programs set out by 
the state can be analyzed.  The table below outlines the use of six key words or phrases, as well as 
“participation” or “participatory”, in the national development plans from 2007, the first plan 
developed by the Correa administration, to 2017, the latest plan developed by Correa’s successor, 
Lenin Moreno.  I have also included the national REDD+ action plan for comparison. 
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Plan Nacional para el 
Buen vivir (PNBV) 
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Desarrollo (PND) 
2017 - 2021 
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REDD+ Bosques 
para el Buen vivir 
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Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2007 (458 pages); Plan Nacional para el Buen vivir 2009 – 2013 (520 pages); Plan Nacional para el Buen vivir 
2013 – 2017 (602 pages); Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2017 – 2021 (148 pages) 
 
As the table above records, during the early years of the Revolución Ciudadana of the governing 
Alianza PAIS party, the national development plan did not contain many references to the six words 
or phrases outlined (sumak kawsay, buen vivir, Pachamama, medio ambiente (environment), servicios 
ambientales (Environmental services), and derechos de la naturaleza (rights of nature) and participation 
(participatory).  While buen vivir was mentioned in the 2007 PND (Plan Nacional de Desarrollo), it 
was used in combination with a general definition of development that is the “consequence of the 
buen vivir of everyone, in peace and harmony with nature and the indefinite extension of human 
cultures” (entendemos por desarrollo la consecución del buen vivir de todos y todas, en paz y armonía con la 
naturaleza y la prolongación indefinida de las culturas humanas) (54).  It is interesting to note that the 2007 
plan mentions the word environment most frequently out of all the plans.  For the most part, the 
term is used in conjunction with the sustainable use of natural resources and water sources and to 
achieve national objectives for human development, as seen in Objective 4: To promote a clean and 
sustainable environment and to guarantee access to water, soil and air (Promover un medio ambiente sano 
y sostenible, y garantizar el acceso a agua, suelo y aire Seguro) (56).  However, the plan prioritizes 
negotiations between the Ecuadorian state and international institutions in dealing with climate 
change.  According to the PND, compensation by industrialized countries through international 
climate change and environmental conservation agreements needs to be established through “global 
mechanisms to pay the ecological debt and to increase a global environmental vision…based on 
regional and global agreements” (mecanismos globales para el pago de la deuda ecológica y el fomento de una 
visión responsable de alcance mundial…con base en convenios y acuerdos regionales y mundiales) (61).  Clearly, the 
Ecuadorian state viewed the country’s participation in international climate change negotiations and 
frameworks, or norms and practices as outlined in international agreements, as paramount in 
combating climate change but also as a means of economic compensation to less-developed 
countries like Ecuador. Nevertheless, the plan also states that new institutions are needed to protect 





assist communities most affected by deforestation and climate change and to assist these 
communities in conserving ecosystems and reducing negative environmental impacts (65).  While 
the plan does not directly mention the rights of nature, it does discuss the need to “live in harmony 
with nature” and states that nature provides “fundamental services” that “constitute irreplaceable 
conditions and whose preservation is of infinite value”, hinting at the early need for assigning some 
sort of economic value to these services (51). 
 
A dramatic change within state discourse surrounding development and environmental governance 
can be seen in the 2009 PNBV when a clear emphasis is placed on the term buen vivir.  One 
explanation for the increased use of the term could be that the country’s new Constitution was 
finalized in 2008 and, as a result, the emphasis placed on buen vivir in the Constitution now needed to 
be institutionalized at the state level.  In the new Constitution, the concept of buen vivir was at the 
forefront of defining national development and the subsequent national plan contains a clear 
discourse surrounding buen vivir.  In the Constitution and the 2009 PNBV buen vivir is clearly linked 
to the rights of nature, a concept which also begins to gain further inclusion in the 2009 plan.  Buen 
vivir and rights of nature become linked to environmental conservation under the 2009 plan’s 
National Objectives for Buen vivir, Objective 4: To guarantee the rights of nature and to promote a 
clean and sustainable environment (Garantizar los derechos de la naturaleza y promover un ambiente sano y 
sustentable).  The plan seeks to achieve this objective by redefining  
“relations between people, communities, and nationalities, on the one hand, 
and their relationship with the environment…[and] to rethink the respective 
situation between people and their environment and the cosmos. In this way, 
human beings are in a position to rediscover their close relationship with 
Pachamama, and make buen vivir a practical exercise in the sustainability of life 
and life cycles.” (217).   
“relaciones entre personas, comunidades, pueblos y nacionalidades, por un lado, y su relación 
con el ambiente, por otra…[y] a repensar la situación de las personas respecto de su entorno y 
del cosmos. De este modo, los seres humanos están en condiciones de redescubrir su relación 
estrecha con la Pachamama, y hacer del Buen Vivir un ejercicio práctico de sostenibilidad de 
la vida y de los ciclos vitales.” 
Institutional change through adaptation and mitigation, founded on the new constitutional 
framework, is seen as a necessary means to rethink and to redefine the current logic of seeing natural 





“environmental institutionality in Ecuador has been marked by centralized and 
vertical relationship of the state with citizens. By not conceiving that issues 
such as health, education, territorial planning, energy, roads, risk management, 
urban planning or production, could contain an environmental axis, all the 
institutions of the central state, local governments and the private arena have 
maintained disjointed spaces with each other…the powers of the national 
environmental authority have been involved in constant disputes with other 
public instances of the same level. The dispersion of competencies and the lack 
of planning, communication and inter-institutional agreements have resulted in 
slow handling” (231).  
“La institucionalidad ambiental en el Ecuador ha estado marcada por fuerte carga de 
centralismo y relación vertical del Estado con la ciudadanía. Al no concebir que temas como 
salud, educación, ordenamiento territorial, energía, vialidad, gestión de riesgos, urbanismo o 
producción, podrían contener un eje ambiental, todas las instituciones del Estado central, de 
los gobiernos locales y el ámbito privado, han mantenido espacios desarticulados entre si, que 
han venido tratando de manera apenas complementaria o por cumplir con los requisitos, los 
aspectos ambientales en cada uno de sus espacios. La institucionalidad y, por ende, las 
competencias de la autoridad ambiental nacional se han visto involucradas en constantes 
disputas con otras instancias públicas de su mismo nivel. La dispersión de competencias y la 
falta de planificación, comunicación y acuerdos interinstitucionales han resultado en un 
manejo lento” 
The institutional change, according to the plan, also requires an “effective de-concentration in 
territories, and to articulate it [de-concentration] to the management of the new state structure” 
(desconcentración efectiva en los territorios, y articularla a la gestión de la nueva estructura estatal) (217).  It must 
be noted that Socio Bosque began one year prior to the 2009 national development plan but the 
program’s national implementation began in 2009 as a clear policy linked to buen vivir. 
 
While only mentioned six times in the 2009 plan, environmental services are clearly defined in the 
document as “a set of fundamental services for life: temperature, rain, atmospheric composition, 
etc., which constitute irreplaceable conditions and whose preservation has infinite value” (un conjunto 
de servicios fundamentales para la vida: la temperatura la lluvia, la composición atmosférica, etc., que constituyen 
condiciones insustituibles y cuya preservación tiene un valor infinito) (39).  Furthermore, the plan states that 
plans and programs that boost the sustainable use of natural resources through the generation of 
ecosystem services must be developed and implemented (234).  According to the 2009 PNBV, these 
programs and policies are particularly important to achieve buen vivir in the rural areas and ecosystem 
services are seen as local, economic alternatives to traditional agricultural practices that conserve the 





the framework of planning and prioritizing public investment (Section 9), the plan identifies 
ecosystem services as a key investment category that will help to create the accumulation of capital 
of productive sectors, specifically by promoting “nascent industries that assist or promote” 
ecosystem services (406).  Furthermore, the plan names ecosystem services as an industry in and of 
itself by placing it in a list with other underdeveloped industries, such as the petrochemical, 
bioenergy and biofuels, metalworking, biomedicine, pharmaceutical, biochemistry, and hardware and 
software industries, that will be important for the country’s “import substitution” (96).  Clearly, the 
2009 PNBV links environmental services to a larger market-based productive system of capital 
accumulation.  In contrast, the 2009 PNBV reiterates Article 74 of the Constitution by stating that 
ecosystem services are not susceptible to appropriation.  However, by their very nature, PES 
programs require a certain level of ecosystem appropriation and privatization in order to function. 
 
The 2009 plan does take a more enviro-centric focus in the various policies that need to be 
implemented to achieve buen vivir. While these mandates are somewhat vague and open to 
interpretation, the 2009 PNBV suggests a discursive turn in the Ecuadorian state by placing the 
environment within central discussions surrounding the economic, political, and social well-being of 
the country and its citizens.  For example, the table below outlines some policies, specific mandates 
and goals contained within the PNBV to achieve Objective 4, specifically those which relate to 
environmental conservation and governance. 
Table 9: Environmental Governance and the PNBV 
Objective 4: 
To guarantee the rights of nature and promote 
a healthy and sustainable environment 
 
Garantizar los derechos de la naturaleza y promover 
un ambiente sano y sustentable 
Policy Specific Mandates 
Policy 4.5 - To foster adaptation 
and mitigation to climate variability 
with emphasis on the climate 
change process 
 
Fomentar la adaptación y mitigación a la 
variabilidad climática con énfasis en el 
proceso de cambio climático 
a) Generate programs of adaptation and response to climate change 
that promote inter-institutional coordination, and the 
socialization of their actions among the different key actors, with 
particular attention to fragile ecosystems such as páramos, 
mangroves and wetlands. 
 
Generar programas de adaptación y respuesta al cambio climático que 





acciones entre los diferentes actores clave, con particular atención a 
ecosistemas frágiles como páramos, manglares y humedales. 
c) Promote adaptation programs to climatic alterations, with 
emphasis on those linked to energy and food sovereignty. 
 
Impulsar programas de adaptación a las alteraciones climáticas, con énfasis 
en aquellos vinculadas con la soberanía energética y alimentaria. 
d) Assess the impact of climate change on the goods and services 
provided by different ecosystems, in a different state of 
conservation. 
 
Valorar el impacto del cambio climático sobre los bienes y servicios que 
proporcionan los distintos ecosistemas, en diferente estado de conservación. 
e) Incorporate climate change as a variable to consider in projects 
and in the evaluation of environmental impacts, considering the 
opportunities offered by new mitigation schemes 
 
Incorporar el cambio climático como variable a considerar en los proyectos y 
en la evaluación de impactos ambientales, considerando las oportunidades 
que ofrecen los nuevos esquemas de mitigación. 
f) Develop activities aimed at increasing public awareness and 
participation, with an emphasis on women in all activities related 
to climate change and its implications in people's lives. 
 
Desarrollar actividades dirigidas a aumentar la concienciación y 
participación ciudadana, con énfasis en las mujeres diversas, en todas las 
actividades relacionadas con el cambio climático y sus implicaciones en la 
vida de las personas. 
g) Encourage compliance with commitments by industrialized 
countries on technology transfer and financial resources as 
compensation for the negative effects of climate change in non-
industrialized countries 
 
Incentivar el cumplimiento de los compromisos por parte de los países 
industrializados sobre transferencia de tecnología y 
recursos financieros como compensación a los efectos negativos del cambio de 
clima en los países no industrializados. 
Policy 4.7 - Incorporate the 
environmental approach into 
social, economic and cultural 
processes within public 
management. 
 
Incorporar el enfoque ambiental en los 
procesos sociales, económicos 
y culturales dentro de la gestión pública. 
f) Develop plans and programs that promote the sustainable use of 
natural heritage and the generation of bio-knowledge and 
environmental services. 
 
Desarrollar planes y programas que impulsen el uso sostenible del 
patrimonio natural y la generación de bioconocimiento y servicios 
ambientales. 
 
Policy 11.11 - Promote the 
ecosystem sustainability of the 
economy through the 
implementation of clean 
production technologies and 
practices. 
d)  Expand the system of national accounts to record the loss and 
degradation of natural resources and the contribution of 
environmental services. 
 
Ampliar el sistema de cuentas nacionales para registrar la pérdida y 






Promover la sostenibilidad ecosistémica de 
la economía a través la implementación de 




4.1.1. Increase the area of territory under conservation or environmental management by 5 percentage 
points until 2013. 
 
Incrementar en 5 puntos porcentuales el área de territorio bajo conservación o manejo ambiental hasta el 2013. 
4.1.2. Reduce the deforestation rate by 30% by 2013. 
 
Incluir 2.521 km2 de superficie marinocostera y continental bajo conservación o manejo ambiental hasta el 2013. 
4.3.2.     Reduce the ecological footprint so that it does not exceed the biocapacity of Ecuador until 2013. 
 
    Disminuir la huella ecológica de tal manera que no sobrepase la biocapacidad del Ecuador hasta el 2013. 
4.5.1.    Reduce to 23% the high threat level of the vulnerability index of ecosystems to climate change, 
and to 69% the average threat level by 2013. 
 
Reducir al 23% el nivel de amenaza alto del índice de vulnerabilidad de ecosistemas a cambio climático, y al 69% 
el nivel de amenaza medio hasta el 2013. 
 
The goals outlined in the table above indicate an attempt by the Ecuadorian state to quantify and 
measure the country’s success in combating climate change which, in turn, could be leveraged at the 
international level with organizations such as the UNDP, REDD+ and GEF (Global Environmental 
Fund), in the hopes of securing multilateral and bilateral financial support. 
 
The concept of buen vivir, at least in the political discourse of the reigning Alianza PAIS party and 
government institutions, began to see its decline in the 2013 PNBV.  The phrase is mentioned much 
less than in the 2009 plan, but a slight increase in the Indigenous term, sumak kawsay, can be seen.  
In contrast to the 2009 plan, environmental services are discussed more prominently in the 2013 
plan.  While policies are not specific, environmental services are portrayed as a good to be promoted 
and commercialized in the international market, much like other priority sectors, such as tourism, 
transport, and logistics (347).  More specifically, this promotion and commercialization is to take 
place within a “sovereign and strategic commercial policy articulated to the economic and social 
development of the country (una política comercial estratégica y soberana, articulada al desarrollo económico y 
social del país) (346).  The table below outlines the various policies and mandates involving ecosystems 





Table 10: Ecosystem Services and Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation in the PNBV 
2013 – 2017 PNBV 
Objective 7: Guarantee rights of nature and promote global and territorial environmental 
sustainability  
 
Garantizar los derechos de la naturaleza y promover la sostenibilidad ambiental territorial y global 
Policy Specific Mandates 
7.2 - Know, value, conserve and 
sustainably manage natural heritage 
and its terrestrial, continental, 
marine and coastal biodiversity, 
with fair and equitable access to its 
benefits 
 
Conocer, valorar, conservar y manejar 
sustentablemente el patrimonio natural y 
su biodiversidad terrestre, acuática 
continental, marina y costera, con el 
acceso justo y equitativo a sus beneficios 
a) Strengthen the National System of Protected Areas, and other 
forms of conservation based on comprehensive and participatory 
management, and territorial security of terrestrial, aquatic and 
marine landscapes, so that they contribute to the maintenance of 
its structure, functions, and natural and evolutionary cycles, 
ensuring the flow and provision of environmental services. 
 
Fortalecer el Sistema Nacional de Áreas Protegidas, y otras formas de 
conservación basadas en la gestión integral y participativa, y la seguridad 
territorial de los paisajes terrestres, acuáticos y marinos, para que 
contribuyan al mantenimiento de su estructura, funciones, ciclos naturales y 
evolutivos, asegurando el flujo y la provisión de servicios ambientales. 
j)      Promote incentives and appropriate technology for the 
conservation of nature, its forests, water sources and other 
fragile ecosystems, focusing particularly on communities and 
individuals more dependent on nature for survival. 
 
Impulsar incentivos y tecnología apropiada para la conservación de la 
naturaleza, sus bosques, zonas de nacimiento y recarga de agua y otros 
ecosistemas frágiles, enfocados en particular en las comunidades y los 
individuos más dependientes del patrimonio natural para su sobrevivencia. 
7.10 - Implement climate change 
mitigation and adaptation measures 
to reduce economic and 
environmental vulnerability with 
emphasis on groups of 
priority attention 
 
Implementar medidas de mitigación y 
adaptación al cambio climático para 
reducir la vulnerabilidad económica y 
ambiental con énfasis en grupos de 
atención prioritaria 
b) Implement climate change prevention, mitigation and adaptation 
programs, such as evaluation, vulnerability and risk impact in the 
territories of different productive sectors and human settlements 
with emphasis on prioritized sectors, groups of priority care and 
fragile ecosystems. 
 
Implementar programas de prevención, mitigación y adaptación al cambio 
climático, así como de evaluación de impacto, 
vulnerabilidad y riesgo en el territorio para los diferentes sectores productivos 
y asentamientos humanos, con énfasis en los sectores priorizados, los grupos 
de atención prioritaria y los ecosistemas frágiles. 
c) Minimize the impact of climate change on the natural heritage, 
the operation of life cycles and the supply of goods and services 
the various ecosystems provide. 
 
Minimizar el impacto del cambio climático en el patrimonio natural, el 
funcionamiento de los ciclos vitales y la oferta de bienes y servicios que 
proporcionan los diversos ecosistemas. 
Objective 10: Promote the transformation of the productive matrix 
 





10.3 - Diversify and generate 
greater added value in the priority 
sectors that provide services 
 
Diversificar y generar mayor valor 
agregado en los sectores prioritarios que 
proveen servicios 
d) Promote spaces for the development of environmental services 
activities under competitiveness and productivity schemes in its 
provision for the generation of greater added value. 
 
Promover espacios de desarrollo de las actividades de servicios ambientales, 
bajo esquemas de competitividad y productividad en su prestación, para la 
generación de mayor valor agregado. 
Objective 12: Guarantee sovereignty and peace, deepen strategic insertion in the world 
and Latin American integration 
 
Garantizar la soberanía y la paz, profundizar la inserción estratégica en el mundo 
y la integración latinoamericana 
Policy Specific Mandates 
12.3 - Deepen a strategic and 
sovereign commercial policy, 
articulated to the economic and 
social development of the country 
 
Profundizar una política comercial 
estratégica y soberana, articulada al 
desarrollo económico y social del país 
e) Promote the offer of Ecuadorian services internationally, 
emphasizing priority sectors such as tourism, transport and 
logistics, environmental services and software. 
 
Promocionar a nivel internacional la oferta de servicios ecuatorianos dando 
énfasis a los sectores priorizados como el turismo, transporte y logística, 
servicios ambientales y software. 
 
A unique aspect of the 2013 Plan is the division of the country into seven “zones” comprised of 
several provinces to prioritize specific development initiatives.  The division of the country into 
specific zones was organized by SENPLADES to improve the quality and efficiency of centralized 
state services and planning (SENPLADES, 2019).  For Zone 3 – Pastaza, Tungurahua, Cotopaxi 
and Chimborazo, environmental services are not mentioned as a priority as in other Zones, 
specifically that of the province of Pichincha where the capital, Quito, is located.  However, under 
“Patrimonial Sustainability”, a priority for the zone including Chimborazo, are various mandates to 
implement programs and policies that protect and recuperate the páramo ecosystem. 
 
A dramatic change can be seen in Ecuador’s most recent national development plan from 2017 – 
2021.  This plan began after Rafael Correa handed over power to his successor and previous Vice-
President, Lenin Moreno.  However, Moreno shifted government policy, significantly reducing 
spending, closing various government institutions, and opening Ecuador up to increased foreign 
investment and global finance (Carvajal and Angulo, 2017; Valencia, 2019).  As is evident, the 2017 
plan’s discursive focus shifts from and emphasis on the words and phrases presented in Table 5.  
Buen vivir is mentioned in passing compared to the two previous plans and references to the rights of 





Objective 6: Develop productive and environmental capacities to achieve food sovereignty and rural 
buen vivir (84).  The 2017 Plan does not provide specific mandates for each policy but does provide 
measurable goals to be achieved.  Of note is that many of the goals that are attached to the policies 
outlined below are not clearly linked to a specific policy. It is unclear exactly how any of the stated 
goals will help to achieve Policy 6.7, specifically the sustainable management of natural resources 
and environmental services.  The focus of the goals is on education, poverty alleviation, and basic 
services, such as healthcare, water and sanitation.  Furthermore, it suggests that the Ecuadorian state 
prioritizes clear, measurable goals to demonstrate achievement of policies and programs.  
Table 11: Rights of Nature and Environmental Governance in 2017-2021 PND 
2017 – 2021 PND 
Objective 3: Guarantee the rights of the nature for current and future generations 
 
Garantizar los derechos de la naturaleza para las actuales y futuras generaciones 
Policy Specific Goals to achieve Objective 3 
3.1 Conserve, recover and 
regulate the use of natural 
and social, rural and urban, 
continental, insular and 
marine-coastal heritage to 
ensure and protect the 
rights of present and 
future generations. 
 
Conservar, recuperar y regular 
el aprovechamiento del 
patrimonio natural y social, 
rural y urbano, continental, 
insular y marino-costero, que 
asegure y precautele los 
derechos de las presentes y 
futuras generaciones. 
• Prevent the gap between Ecological Footprint and Biocapacity to be less 
than 0.35 global hectares per capita by 2021. (Evitar que la brecha entre Huella 
Ecológica y Biocapacidad sea menor a 0,35 hectáreas globales per cápita hasta 2021). 
 
• Keep 16% of national territory under conservation or environmental 
management by 2021. (Mantener el 16% de territorio nacional bajo conservación o 
manejo ambiental a 2021). 
 
• Increase proper disposal of non-hazardous solid was from 70.3% to 80% 
by 2021. (Incrementar del 70,3% al 80% los residuos sólidos no peligrosos con 
disposición final adecuada a 2021). 
 
• Reduce gross deforestation to 15% compared to reference level of forest 
emissions by 2021. (Reducir al 15% la deforestación bruta con respecto al 
nivel de referencia de emisiones forestales a 2021). 
 
• Increase solid waste from 17% to 35% recycled in relation to the total 
waste generated by 2021. (Incrementar del 17% al 35% los residuos sólidos 
reciclados en relación al total de residuos generados, hasta 2021). 
 
• Reduce and remedy the sources of contamination of the hydrocarbon 
industry, with the endorsement of the environmental authority by 2021. 
(Reducir y remediar las fuentes de contaminación de la industria hidrocarburífera, con aval 
de la autoridad ambiental a 2021). 
 
• Reduce the expansion of the urban and agricultural frontier by 2021. 
(Reducir la expansión de la frontera urbana y agrícola a 2021). 
 
• Reduce and remedy pollution from water sources by 2021. (Reducir y 
remediar la contaminación de fuentes hídricas a 2021). 
3.2 Equally distribute 
access to natural heritage, 
as well as the benefits and 
wealth obtained by its 
leveraging, and promote 
the sustainable governance 




3.3 Prioritize the care of 
natural heritage and human 









• Increase the percentage of wastewater with proper treatment by 2021. 
(Incrementar el porcentaje de aguas residuales con tratamiento adecuado a 2021). 
 
• Increase the number of municipalities that purify the water discharges 
before releasing them into the environment by 2021. (Incrementar el número de 
municipios que depuran las descargas de agua antes de verterlas al ambiente, a 2021). 
. 
• Reduce the climate change Vulnerability Index of the populations, 
livelihoods and ecosystems from high to medium by 2021. (Reducir el Índice de 
Vulnerabilidad de alta a media, de la población, medios de vida y ecosistemas, frente al 
cambio climático, a 2021). 
 
• Increase the utility of machinery, equipment and productive technologies 
considering criteria of programmatic obsolescence by 2021. (Incrementar la 
utilidad de las maquinarias, equipos y tecnologías productivas considerando criterios de 
obsolescencia programática a 2021). 
3.4 Promote good 
practices that contribute to 
the reduction of pollution 
and the conservation, 
mitigation and adaptation 
of the effects of climate 
change, and boost the 
same in the global sphere. 
 
Promover buenas prácticas que 
aporten a la reducción 
de la contaminación, la 
conservación, la mitigación y la 
adaptación a los efectos del 
cambio climático, e impulsar 
las mismas en el ámbito global. 
Objective 6: Develop productive and environmental abilities to achieve the food sovereignty and 
rural Buen vivir 
 
Desarrollar las capacidades productivas y del entorno para lograr la soberanía alimentaria y el 
Buen Vivir Rural 
Policy Specific Goals (Not all goals are listed) 
6.7 - Ensure plural 
participation with a gender 
approach and emphasis on 
village organizations, 
nationalities, communes, 
communities and groups in 
the sustainable 




Garantizar la participación 
plural, con enfoque de género y 
énfasis en las organizaciones de 
pueblos, nacionalidades, 
comunas, comunidades y 
colectivos, en el manejo 
sostenible 
de los recursos naturales y 
servicios ambientales. 
• Reduce the incidence of rural income poverty from 38.2% to 31.9% by 
2021. (Reducir la incidencia de la pobreza por ingresos rural del 
38,2% al 31,9% a 2021). 
 
• Increase the appropriate employment rate in the rural area from 27.8% to 
35.2% by 2021. (Incrementar la tasa de empleo adecuado en el área rural 
del 27,8% al 35,2% a 2021). 
 
• Reduce the multidimensional poverty rate from 59.9% to 49.2% in rural 
areas by 2021. (Reducir del 59,9% al 49,2% la tasa de pobreza 
multidimensional en el área rural a 2021). 
 
• Increase access to irrigation from 760 473 ha. to 826 695 has. by 2021. 
(Incrementar el acceso a riego de 760 473 ha. a 826 695 ha. a 2021). 
 
• Increase from 86.44% to 86.87% the participation of food produced in the 
country in the consumption of Ecuadorian households by 2021. (Incrementar 
del 86,44% al 86,87% la participación de los alimentos producidos en el país en el 
consumo de los hogares ecuatorianos a 2021). 
 
• Increase coverage, quality, and access to services education, with cultural 
and territorial relevance, in rural areas: increased from 64.47% to 75% the 
net rate of Adjusted high school attendance in the rural area to 2021. 
(Aumentar la cobertura, calidad, y acceso a servicios de educación, con pertinencia cultural 
y territorial, en zonas rurales: incrementar del 95,28% al 96,4% la tasa neta de 






• Increase the percentage of households in rural areas that have safe water 
and adequate sanitation: increase the percentage of households that have an 
installation for washing hands with soap and water by 2021. (Incrementar el 
porcentaje de hogares en el área rural que cuentan con agua segura y saneamiento adecuado: 
incrementar el porcentaje de hogares que dispone de una instalación para lavarse las manos 
con agua y jabón a 2021). 
 
• Increase the percentage of households in the rural area that have safe water 
and adequate sanitation: increase the percentage of households that use basic 
sanitation services by 2021. (Incrementar el porcentaje de hogares en el área rural que 
cuentan con agua segura y saneamiento adecuado: incrementar el porcentaje de hogares que 
usa servicios de saneamiento básico a 2021). 
 
• Reduce the concentration of land by 2021. (Reducir la concentración de la tierra 
a 2021). 
 
• Increase land titling by 2021. (Aumentar la titularización de tierras a 2021). 
 
All of the Specific Goals for Policy 6.7 are not listed.  Only a select number of the 18 total number of goals are 
listed. 
The institutionalization of Indigenous concepts into the Ecuadorian state has been a long 
complicated process and, while it is clear that the inclusion of sumak kawsay/buen vivir and the rights 
of nature into the Constitution provided a guiding framework for environmental governance in the 
country, the normative practices and policies that were to be implemented as a result are not as clear.  
However, the shift provided by Correa’s government in 2006 paved the way for environmental 
governance projects to be explored and implemented as national programs.  The following section 
provides a historical analysis of the Socio Bosque program from early, highly localized PES projects 
sponsored by international conservation organizations, such as Conservation International, to a 
national scale PES program that has incorporated diverse ecosystems of the entire country and the 
financial backing and support of foreign governments and international funding agencies. 
 
5.10 Institutionalized Socio Bosque - A Bureaucratic Burden 
Oftentimes, the burden of institutionalized PES programs is borne by Indigenous peoples in the 
form of increased bureaucratic requirements placed on local communities.  Socio Bosque is no 
exception.  The institutionalization of Socio Bosque through a constitutional framework that places the 
state at the centre of environmental governance has created a complex scheme of rules and norms 





rules are set in place to quantify programmatic success and to demonstrate achievement of national 
and international climate change goals.  However, achieving goals takes precedence over local 
community wishes. As one high level MAE official told me during an interview in 2019, “REDD 
pays you for results and results are the most important, not you as people”.   
 
The following figures show the approval process created by MAE for potential Socio Bosque 
participants.  The second figure expands on the “MAE validates and approves application” step in 
the first figure. The process, particularly the one outlined in the second figure, indicates numerous 
bureaucratic hoops through which communities must jump in order to receive entry into the 
program.  One misstep along the way could mean that communities will be disqualified from 
consideration. 
Figure 1: Socio Bosque Selection Process 
 
Adapted by author from Socio Bosque  document titled Proyecto Socio Bosque , 2013. 
 
 






Adapted by author from Protocolo de Postulacion y Calificacion de Nuevas Areas de Conservacion del Proyecto Socio Bosque  
 
For many communities, navigating this complex process is a drain on financial and time resources.  
Many community members interviewed expressed concern over the amount of time and money that 
was spent on meeting the bureaucratic requirements of MAE.  In particular, one tayta interviewed 
asked why the community is involved in the program when “a majority of the money goes back to 
the state and very little comes to the needs of the communities”, which will be discussed in further 
detail in the following chapter on the distribution of Socio Bosque  incentive payments.  In my own 
dealings with MAE, I experienced the difficulty some communities face when trying to fulfill the 
various requirements to enter and maintain themselves in the program when I had to meet various 






5.11 Recruitment and Selection 
On top of the complex maze that communities must navigate in order to be considered for Socio 
Bosque, part of the new bureaucratic requirements put in place is a recruitment and selection process 
that communities must complete in order to be considered for the program. Communities must first 
meet a set of ten requirements that include the following: 
1. Legible copies of identity card and last voting ballot of the community legal representative 
2. Copy of document validating the legal representative 
3. Legible copy of RUC (that matches the legal status indicated by the property title submitted) 
4. Active bank account certificate in the name of the updated collective property. 
5. Legible copy of the Property Title with "registration in the Land Registry" 
6. Copy of the certificate of legal existence and legal status of the community organization 
granted by a public entity. 
7. Geo-referenced map of the area to be conserved (to be developed with PSB field 
technician) 
8. Minutes of community assembly and attendance registration with the following information: 
a) Approval of entry to Socio Bosque b) Approval of Participative Investment Plan. 
9. Updated certificate liens on property 
10. Copy of statutes of the community organization 
Included in these requirements are legal land titles certified by the Property Registrar, legal 
representation, an active bank account, an investment plan, financial accountability in the form of a 
legal accountant, and an “act” from the local assembly giving community approval that must be met 
in order for an individual or community to be part of the program.  It is worth noting that many of 
these requirements are extremely difficult for Indigenous community members to fulfill, particularly 
a majority consensus in a local assembly.  Moreover, the costs associated with obtaining these 
documents are not always reimbursed by Socio Bosque and must be covered by the community.  
Failure to meet the many requirements of the program can result in sanctions and penalties for the 
participating communities.  The above requirements are necessary for a community to be considered 






Every two years communities must also present a sworn statement reaffirming their participation in 
the program along with an updated land title/deed.  Failure to present these documents can be cause 
for dismissal from the program.  During 2016, when MAE failed to make incentive payments on 
time due to budget constraints, many communities were confused about meeting the requirements 
and thought the program might have ended and, as a result, did not comply with requirements and 
failed to hand in the necessary documentation. As a result, the program did not approve the 
incentive payment of 914 (888 individual and 49 collective) partners nationally due to a lack of 
documentation.  One of the communities that formed part of this study was one of the 49 collective 
contracts that was denied payment.  After a back and forth with MAE, the community was able to 
recover its payment, but not without costs, both financial and in time.  MAE also made an exception 
to many of the other partners due to the misunderstanding created from the lack of incentive 
payments due to budget constraints beyond the program and MAE’s control. This confusion 
surrounding responsibilities represents a lack of clarity about the rules and requirements, as well as a 
lack of communication from MAE to local communities.  These requirements - such as bank 
accounts, ID cards (cédulas), and land titles - are all formal documents that the state requires in 
order for communities to be considered for the Socio Bosque program.  The formal institutionalization 
of Socio Bosque extends the authority of the state and its perspective of nature and natural resources, 
land use, and resource management, further marginalizing, and even eliminating, the epistemic 
worldview of the Kichwa.  The dichotomous relationship between the state’s view on nature and the 
Kichwa cosmovision will be discussed in detail in Chapter 7. 
 
Once a community’s initial requirements are met, Socio Bosque follows a complex recruitment and 
selection process for communities who wish to participate in the program.  The table below outlines 
the variables and sub-variables that form part of the points scheme that prioritizes communities for 
their selection into the program.  These variables do not represent hard and fast rules of inclusion 
into the Socio Bosque, but provide guiding norms, as defined above, to those who evaluate the pre-
conditions of communities and their acceptance into the program. 
Table 12: Community Assessment for Selection 
Variable Sub-Variable  Points 
Assigned 
Level of threat Distance to access routes Low distance 9 





High distance 3 
Historical deforestation patterns (if available)  No points 
assigned 
*Demographic pressure – assigned only for páramo 
ecosystems and defined as parish population density 
according to INEC (National Institute of Statistics and 
Census) 
  
*Conversion rate – the historical change in the use of 




Biodiversity refuge (Defined by the use of geographic 
information that determines surface of remaining 
native plant formations that are outside the National 
System of Protected Areas (SNAP). Plant formations 





Highly represented 3 
Medium represented 2 
Low represented 1 
** Hydrological regulation (considers importance of 





Carbon storage (based on the amount of stored carbon 
in different types of native forests, páramos and other 
native plant formations, defined as a function of 
biomass) 




Low carbon content 1 
*Connectivity - consists of prioritizing ecosystem 
connectivity criteria between protected areas, other 
remnants of vegetation and other forest partner areas 
  
Level of poverty 





Poor (greater than or equal to 65% poverty rate – 
Basic Needs - NBI) 
 3 
Not poor (lower than 65% NBI)  0 
TOTAL   22 possible 
points 
MAE Acuerdo Ministerial No 115 
* only for páramo ecosystems 
** under hydrological regulation for páramo ecosystems, the following factors are also taken into consideration: seasonal 
distribution (high 1 point, low 0 points), total precipitation (high 1 point, low 0 points), water demand (high 4 points, 
medium 2 points, low 0 points) 
 
While these requirements are outlined in various MAE documents, it was not evident that they were 
used in the selection of collective contracts of the communities in this study.  The definition of the 
subjective content included, such as the “low, medium or high” represented in the various 
categories, was also not explained in detail.  The use of the above-mentioned prioritization 
categories, while not strictly followed within Socio Bosque, may be explained by an attempt of the 
Ecuadorian state to meet, at least on paper, various international requirements of climate change 
mitigation and adaptation in priority areas, specifically those ecosystems outlined as highly carbon 






5.12 Institutionalized Rules through Monitoring and Evaluation 
Once accepted into the program, participating communities are held to a strict standard of norms 
and rules outlined by MAE.  The rules and regulations within Socio Bosque are guided by the initial set 
of beneficiary selection guidelines outlined above.  When participants are selected, a set of manuals 
detail monitoring and evaluation (M&E) guidelines to MAE employees and community members.  
These manuals provide insight into how the program will select participants and measure success. 
Measurement has become key to the institutionalization of Socio Bosque by providing legitimacy for 
the program’s interventions.  Also, MAE is able to demonstrate in a quantitative manner the ways in 
which the program is having an impact on environmental conservation and the lives of participating 
community members.  In order to be deemed successful, the state must be able to demonstrate 
positive gain in the form of achievable objectives.  Therefore, MAE has created a monitoring 
methodology for Socio Bosque that combines the ranking and selection criteria outlined above with 
yearly visits by MAE technical staff to verify the state of the páramo.  MAE sees monitoring and 
evaluation as key “to comparing the before and after conditions of the inscribed forest to detect and 
prevent change” (MAE, 2011a).  As the graph below shows, MAE has a complex web of monitoring 
and evaluation that begins with a baseline study and continues to “participatory control and follow-















Figure 3: Socio Bosque  Monitoring and Evaluation Cycle 
  
Adapted by the Author from: Metodología de Monitoreo para las Áreas de Conservación del Programa Socio Bosque - Versión 2, 
2016 
 
Part of MAE’s monitoring and evaluation regime includes yearly reports based on quarterly site 
visits by MAE employees to each community.  MAE employees attempt to quantify the 
conservation efforts of local communities into legible measurements demonstrating success.  On top 
of MAE’s monitoring and evaluation efforts, local communities are required to carry out monitoring 
patrols of the conservation area to ensure that all requirements and obligations found in the 
agreement are being upheld by all community members, as well as avoiding intrusion of surrounding 
communities into the conservation area.  Community participation within local monitoring of the 
protected areas is a norm set out by MAE.  While local monitoring schemes and participation varies 
from community to community, MAE seeks to incorporate local, voluntary monitoring from the 
community in exchange for the incentive payment.  In contrast, one main M&E requirement of or 
rule for the communities is an annual Plan de Inversion (PDI) or investment plan, which will be 





payment for each quarter.  The communities are responsible for providing verifiable, legal receipts 
for each purchase, and if these requirements are not met, incentive payments can, and have been, 
withheld. These requirements result in communities being forced to purchase any expenses related 
to the program from formal businesses that provide receipts and, as a result, pay taxes back to the 
state.  Various communities interviewed expressed their concern over the amount of the incentive 
payment that went back to the state in these transactions, considering the fact that many 
communities are accustomed to dealing informally without receipts and avoiding taxes.  Therefore, 
this rule seeks to constrain local behaviours, specifically behaviours surrounding how the incentive 
payment is spent. 
 
This monitoring and evaluation regime based on quantifiable measurements indicates a top-down, 
state-oriented implementation of Socio Bosque with little room for community input on what a 
successful climate change adaptation or mitigation program looks like.  As long as MAE’s objectives 
and measurements are achieved, the program is deemed a success in the eyes of the state.  However, 
many local communities expressed frustration with the participatory aspect of measurement that 
requires them to patrol the conserved area.  This is an obligation of each community member and in 
many communities, fines are in place for those who do not meet their obligations.  Standard forms 
of measurement are important for what Scott (1998) describes as high modernist strategies, such as 
PES programs, to gain legitimacy.  However, these forms of measurement indicate underlying power 
relations.  As Scott notes, “every act of measurement [is] an act marked by the play of power 
relations” (Scott, 1998: 27).  Scott goes on to argue that “objective measurement cannot be 
obtained” and there is “no single, all purpose, correct answer to a question implying measurement 
unless we specify the relevant local concerns that give rise to the question” (Scott, 1998: 26-27).  
Furthermore, the measurement employed by MAE can be considered “scientific” in nature and does 
not always reflect local ways in which successful environmental governance and conservation is 
measured.  During interviews, community members discussed an increase in water and a return of 
animal and plant biodiversity, but also mentioned a decrease in their interactions with the páramo 
through the diminishing frequency of agricultural and livestock activities due to restrictions of the 






MAE does not only monitor and evaluate the mitigation and adaptation success of participating 
communities, but it also has a ranking system for periodic community evaluations designed to assess 
the organizational strength of each community.  Similar to the selection process, these evaluations 
contain a points system based on the following elements 
Table 13: MAE Community Assessment 
Category Sub-Category Points 
Assigned 
Administrative aspects External Accountant 1 
Community members trained in accounting 2 
An accounting system exists 1 
Financial statements reported 2 
An appropriate workplace is available  1 
Equipment is available (computer 2 points and printer 1 point) 3 
A backup of documentation exists (Financial, Legal, Assembly registration) 3 
Basic supplies needed for the work are available (cell phone, internet, radio, 
etc.) 
3 
Personnel are affiliated to IESS (Social Security) 2 
Category Total  18 
Financial aspects The organization/community has managed projects (2 point), funds to 
execute (2 point), funds delivered through work (2 point) 
6 
These projects were followed up 1 
Category Total  7 
Organizational aspects The organization has statues or regulations 2 
When were the statues or regulations last updated (2 points 1 year or less, 1 
point 2-5 years, 0 point 5+ years) 
3 
Do the statutes / regulations establish sanctions for non-compliance with the 
functions and powers of the leaders? 
2 
Do the statutes regulate aspects such as: salaries, per diem, mobilizations, 
etc.? 
2 
Does the organization have: 
Census 
Life Plan or Management Plan 
Planning to comply with the Life Plan 
3 
Does the organization have other institutional alliances 1 
Is the organization up to date with tax obligations 1 
The organization has experience in other productive/economic activities 2 
Category Total  15 






Based on their totals, communities are designated with a high organizational level (31-40 points), a 
medium organizational level (20-30 points), or a low organizational level (19 or lower).  While there 
was no evidence that low-level results in any sanctions or expulsion from the program, it does 
warrant increased and continual monitoring of participating Socio Bosque communities by 
representatives in the Ministry. 
 
Another ranking scheme within the Socio Bosque monitoring program is the follow-up within the 
PDIs.  MAE representatives issue a report following the submission of financial documents from 
the community demonstrating how the incentive payments were spent.  These financial documents 
must include supporting receipts and a strict accounting format that communities, or their hired 
accountants, are required to fill out.  They are scored on the following criteria. 
Table 14: MAE Monitoring and Evaluation Community Compliance Assessment 
Criteria Sub-criteria Points 
awarded 
Does the report have the following (1 point if 
they have it, 1 point if they have used the 
established MAE formats) 
Financial template 2 
Advancement of objectives template 2 
Receipts template 2 
Control and monitoring report (no MAE format) 1 
Activities completed in the established time  (Greater than 70%: 2, Between 50 and 69%: 1 and 
Less than 50%: 0) 
2 
Fulfillment of planned activities (Greater than 70%: 2, Between 50 and 69%: 1 and 
Less than 50%: 0) 
2 
Financial execution in relation to what was 
stipulated 
(Greater than 70%: 2, Between 50 and 69%: 1 and 
Less than 50%: 0) 
2 
Backup (receipts) that justify the report Very satisfactory (3), satisfactory (2), regular (1), 
unsatisfactory (-1) 
3 
Report reception time On time (2), brief delay – less than 1 month (0.5), 
severe delay – more than 1 month (-1),  
2 
Have there been cases of complaints or 
disagreement of partners regarding financial 
management? 
 No points 
assigned 
In general, how is the financial management 
perceived  
Very satisfactory (3), satisfactory (2), regular (1), 
unsatisfactory (-1) 
3 
Total  21 possible 
 
This ranking is used to determine if a community is eligible to receive the next incentive payment.  If 
a community receives between 14-22 points, they will receive their next payment.  If a community 





Anything less than 9 points will result in a sanction of the community losing the next incentive 
payment.   
 
5.13 An Unequal Contract 
Another way in which an institutionalized Socio Bosque organizes local community and state 
interactions is through the contract between MAE and beneficiary communities that outlines partner 
obligations and prohibits traditional land use and practices.  Once communities pass the initial 
approval phases, they are required to sign a non-negotiable, 20-year contract with the Ministry of 
Environment. This contract reinforces a highly unequal distribution of power, which can be seen in 
the number of obligations for each party.  MAE only has 3 obligations while local communities have 
15 obligations. Below is a list of the obligations of each party involved. 
Table 15: Socio Bosque Contract Obligations 
Ministry of Environment Community 
1. Make the incentive transfers on the months 
established in the operation manual 
2. Perform monitoring and evaluation with the purpose 
of verifying fulfillment of this contract 
3. Provide technical assistance to the executor on 
matters related to this agreement 
1. No converting to crops or introducing exotic species 
of flora in the conservation area 
2. No burning in the conservation area 
3. No animal grazing with bovine, ovine or equine 
species, unless MAE grants permission to specific 
cases 
4. No carrying out activities that alter the natural 
behaviour or threaten the capacity to provide refuge 
to biodiversity or alter the natural hydrological 
conditions of the conservation area 
5. No hunting wild animals in the conservation area 
6. Inform, within 5 days, the Socio Bosque program 
about transfers or limitations of ownership of the 
beneficiary estate of the incentive 
7. Prevent fires in the conservation area and, within 5 
days, inform Socio Bosque and other competent 
authorities of any events  
8. Permit the access of Socio Bosque representatives 
into the conservation area and assist them in their 
work 
9. Adequately identify the conservation area with signs 
located at a convenient distance, in agreement with 
Socio Bosque  
10. Deliver to the Socio Bosque project the information 
about the conservation area that is required  
11. Fulfill what is planned in the Plan de Inversion 
(Investment Plan) 
12. Fulfill the obligations established in the 





applicable rules that this Letter from the State issues 
for the purpose and in the agreements signed with 
the MAE for the SB project 
13. Deliver a reliable report of personal information and 
the conservation area 
14. Deliver, every 2 years, a sworn statement mentioning 
that the conservation area is in the same conditions 
as the admission date into the program and that there 
has been a good use of the resources provided by 
MAE 
15. Deliver, every 2 years, an updated ownership 
certificate of the property that is part of the 
conservation area 
 
As can be seen, MAE has very little responsibility for the conservation and protection of the 
conservation area.  Their responsibility is limited to technical assistance, monitoring and evaluation, 
and financial incentive payments.  The “dirty work” for the conservation and protection of the area 
falls entirely on the community as a source of free labour to carry out work on behalf of MAE.  If a 
community fails to meet any one of the 15 obligations in a given period, MAE reserves the right to 
temporarily suspend the incentive payment for one period.  It is also worth highlighting that much 
of the labour provided to conserve the páramo and monitor the success of the program in the 
communities is not remunerated but provided voluntarily by community members on the threat of 
being terminated from the program.  All communities that participated in the research had various 
monitoring strategies where community members were responsible, on a rotating basis, to patrol the 
area to ensure its continued conservation.  None of this work was compensated and penalties were 
in place, such as a fine (sometimes up to $20 USD or a reduction in their portion of the incentive 
payment) for community members who missed their turn.   
 
The contract between MAE and participating communities can also be terminated after three 
incentive payment suspensions, an early, anticipated exit from the “socio”, or by “decision of the 
Ministry of Environment” (Acuerdo Ministerial No. 115, 16).  In each of these cases, MAE will 
present a report with the possibility of applying further sanctions of restitution of incentive 
payments using the scale below.  Even in the case of an early, anticipated exit from the Socio Bosque 
program, MAE has the ultimate approval of the exit which requires “previous authorization of 





back the incentive, if MAE terminates the contract, they can “initiate administrative, civil and penal 
actions according to the law” (Acuerdo Ministerial No. 115, 16). 
Table 16: MAE Sanctions for Community Contract Termination 
Category Time in Socio Bosque  Sanction (% that must be paid back to MAE) 
1 1-5 years 100% restitution 
2 6-10 years 75% restitution 
3 11-15 years 50% restitution 
4 16-20 years 25% restitution 
MAE, Acuerdo Ministerial No. 115 
Nowhere in the Ministerial Agreement or the Socio Bosque operation manual does it state that 
communities are able to terminate their participation in the program if MAE fails to meet its 
obligations.  It could be argued that MAE failed to live up to its obligations in 2016/2017 when it 
fell behind in making incentive payments, one of their obligations, due to financial constraints 
(Ortiz, 2017).  A number of communities interviewed expressed their disappointment with the late 
payments, while at the same time recognizing that incentive payments are subject to circumstances 
that are out of their control.  However, the communities were also aware of the obligations placed 
on them and that they are required to meet these obligations without leniency on the part of MAE.   
 
The sanctions applied to the community for breaking the contract or agreement are highly unequal 
and have created confusion within communities.  In one particular community, incentive payments 
were withheld for breaking the contract.  As one tayta from the community noted,  
“There are requirements to meet and this is very clear. It is our obligation. There was no 
information [from MAE] and I felt annoyed because they took the 2016 incentive 
because they said we did not present the required document. It is not because of 
carelessness...we forgot. We were informed that our community lost the incentive for 
not presenting documents. It cannot be that by a simple document, that if we recognize 
that it is our responsibility, they took away the incentive. We explained ourselves but 
they did not listen”.  (Tayta interviewed in Community 1, 2018-04-30).  
 
“Hay requisitos que cumplir y esto está muy claro.  Es nuestra obligación.  No había una información 
[del MAE] y me sentí molesto porque 2016 nos quitaron un incentivo porque dijeron que no 
presentamos el documento certificado de graban.  No es por el descuido…nos olvidamos.  Nos 





documento, que si reconocemos que es nuestra responsabilidad, nos quitaron el incentivo.  Reclamamos y 
no dieron el oído de escuchar”. 
While the community was eventually told by MAE representatives that their 2016 payment would be 
reimbursed, at the time of conducting field research, the community had yet to receive the payment 
and explained that they were worried the payment would not come.  Community members reiterated 
the need for more active communication between MAE and the communities. “If they don't 
communicate, we don't know that we need to fulfill our responsibilities” (Si no comunican no sabemos 




The empirical evidence presented above shows that PES programs are heavily governed by rules and 
norms that institutionalize a predictable and measurable performance regime which is itself 
imbedded in a historical context of unequal power relations between communities and the state.  As 
Socio Bosque has become increasingly institutionalized, so have the rules and norms that outline 
entrance into the program and monitor the implementation and success of the program.  These rules 
and norms structure behaviour between communities and Pachamama and between communities and 
the state. Furthermore, the rules and norms embedded in market-based environmental governance 
programs like Socio Bosque structure and constrain local actions, decisions and participation, which 
runs counter to the free market ideology of market-based environmental governance instruments, 
such as REDD+, that claim to promote inclusion and participation of marginalized groups.  The 
larger conclusions that can be drawn about the effects of an institutionalized Socio Bosque  program 
on Kichwa Indigenous communities in Chimborazo can be divided into the following headings: 1) 
Market-based environmental governance programs are highly governed through norms and rules; 2) 
The burden of new institutional arrangements and bureaucratic rules and requirements reinforce 
unequal power relations between the state and local communities; and, 3) An institutionalized Socio 
Bosque  program changes local land use practices and governance regimes. 
 
1) Rules and norms of environmental governance 
The rules and norms put in place for Socio Bosque structure interactions and behaviours of local 





state responsibility that, in turn, constricts and marginalizes local communities.  At times, the 
framework creates a dichotomy between state control over natural resources and the market-based 
incentive programs like Socio Bosque.  As Article 74 of the Constitution indicates, ecosystem services 
are not susceptible to appropriation, but in order for PES programs to function, they require 
appropriation and privatization of ecosystems.  This privatization and appropriation can run counter 
to Indigenous use of communal land that, while privately owned by the community, is viewed as a 
resource for all to access and use. The rules and norms of restricting access to communally owned 
páramos changes community and individual behaviour which can deepen inequalities between 
community members, separating those who have access to their own private land and those who 
more heavily rely on communal land for animal grazing and agricultural production.  In spite of the 
inter and intra communal inequalities deepened by Socio Bosque, data presented later in Chapter 6 
suggests that, in spite of these differences and inequalities, communities choose to participate in and 
benefit from Socio Bosque. 
 
Rules and norms in the form of requirements to enter the program, the monitoring and evaluation 
of progress and community compliance, and the measurable success of the program constrain local 
activities and restrict access to the program.  The Ecuadorian state has obligated communities to 
conform to strict requirements to be considered for the program and to measure success within the 
program.  These measurements fit a prescribed mold of international climate change adaptation and 
mitigation strategies and goals.  As a result, local land use and resource management practices have 
changed and unequal power relations between the state and Indigenous communities are reinforced, 
resulting in meaningful inclusion and participation of Indigenous communities being restricted to a 
framework outlined by the state.  The hierarchy of territorial organization and planning, which 
includes environmental governance policies and programs, clearly places the central state and its 
National Development Plans and climate change strategies as the authority figure to which all other 
levels of government are subject.   
 
2) New institutional arrangements and bureaucratic burdens: A changing role of the state 
As argued throughout this chapter, the creation of Socio Bosque brought new institutional 





of the program and to maintain their status as participants.  On the surface, these new arrangements 
and requirements may seem simple, but the burden placed on Indigenous communities to meet 
them is immense. Furthermore, these arrangements are in place to achieve goals and results that 
demonstrate Ecuador’s efforts to combat climate change and meet international requirements of 
programs like REDD+.  However, by conforming to international rules and regulations outlined in 
programs like REDD+, local populations’ cosmovisiones, values and livelihoods are marginalized in 
exchange for results.  The burden placed on achieving results is unequally born by local communities 
who must demonstrate to MAE officials their obedience to rules, norms and regulations laid out by 
MAE.  Communities interviewed stated that the exhausting procedures they must fulfill place 
financial and organizational strain on local organizations and leaders in order to meet the annual 
requirements of MAE.  
 
The new institutional arrangements and bureaucratic requirements indicate an unequal power 
relation between the state and Indigenous communities as the expectations for communities are 
much higher than those of the state.  While the state can break expectations, as indicated by the 
delay in incentive payments in 2016 (Ortiz, 2017), communities do not have the same luxury when 
presenting documents to MAE, and MAE does not have a long-term, institutional, or financial 
commitment to the Ministry of Environment and environmental conservation programs like Socio 
Bosque  (Paz Cardona, 2020).  As a result, a change in government or policy direction could threaten 
the long-term sustainability, of the program.  The fact that MAE can terminate the contracts at any 
moment without sanction or consequences, combined with the unequal list of obligations and the 
limiting or prohibiting of traditional land use practices suggests a disproportionately unfair 
agreement for communities.  On top of termination, the constant threat of financial sanctions looms 
over the communities. 
 
The sanctions enforced by Socio Bosque appear little different from the hacienda system that 
dominated political, economic, and social relations in the province of Chimborazo until the early 
1990s (Bretón, 2012; Lyons, 2006, 2016; Tuaza, 2014). While the sanctions of the landowner vis-a-
vis the Indigenous communities may have been more brutal under hacienda rule, a similar punitive 





populations worked for the hacienda landowner in exchange for a small piece of land (huasipungo) 
and, at times with benevolent landowners, various favours, such as gifts during times of holidays 
(fiestas).  These gifts were used by landowners to create a form of clientelism where the Indigenous 
peoples would support an abusive landowner who was directly infringing on their rights because he 
provided for them (Lyons, 2006, Bretón, 2012, Tuaza, 2014).  These forms of “gifts” are rooted in 
the Indigenous cosmovision surrounding reciprocity and the institutionalized hacienda system, as well 
as the Incan empire before it, which has provided the framework for state-community interaction 
(Murra, 1980; Estermann, 2003; Lyons, 2006).  As a result, the state has simply taken the place of the 
benevolent landowner who supplies the gifts and provides goods in exchange for loyalty (Tuaza, 
2014). Similarly, the benefits and incentives that have been provided by Socio Bosque  are not really 
seen as a right that can be possessed by local communities, but rather as a gift or a favour that is 
provided on the condition that communities comply with certain requirements, one of which is 
changing current land use patterns, such as animal grazing, to conform with Socio Bosque  
conservation requirements which do not allow agricultural or livestock activity.  The incentive 
payments, or gifts as seen by the communities, form part of the coercion, consent, and persuasion 
that forms an integral part of hegemony and the implementation of a dominant ideology.   
 
Not only does the Socio Bosque agreement between communities and the government structure state-
community interaction, but it also alters local governance institutions that now must respond to a 
centralized structure within the Ministry of Environment (MAE).  Local autonomy is held within a 
framework of accountability set out by MAE bureaucrats who respond to a centralized hierarchy 
within the Ministry that is concentrated in Quito, the capital.  On a positive note, communities are 
involved in monitoring the use of the páramo at the local level, for which advocates and scholars like 
Ostrom have long argued.  However, information, data, and monitoring and evaluation run up the 
administrative ladder from the community level to Socio Bosque representatives at the MAE offices in 
Riobamba, the capital of Chimborazo.  From there, government officials collect data that is sent 
further up the chain to Quito where the central offices of Socio Bosque are the final authority.  While 
the program does provide for some local autonomy and flexibility in environmental governance and 
management of the páramo, communities are extremely limited in their ability to manage the program 
as they want.  An example of this was found in various interviews where community leaders and 





program exactly as they had wanted and that they were obligated to carry out various voluntary 
monitoring activities of their land as part of their agreement with MAE.  One community hoped to 
set up a local micro-finance loan system, but this initiative was denied by MAE since it fell outside 
of the parameters of how the funds could be spent, and many community members stated that they 
are obligated to monitor the páramo without remuneration, taking away precious time that could be 
committed to other sources of income generation, such as agriculture or manual labour in 
construction.  The rules and norms set up by MAE to monitor and evaluate community spending 
stem from official concerns that money was being misspent by community leaders and members.  
However, when viewed in light of the local context of the Kichwa Indigenous people of Chimborazo, 
these monitoring and evaluation requirements are, once again, not entirely different from the labour 
and social requirements forced upon Indigenous communities in the hacienda regime.  While 
requirements of the landowner vis-a-vis the Indigenous people for many have been different in the 
hacienda system, a similar control, monitoring and organization of the communities is employed by 
the state in Socio Bosque .   
 
Highly bureaucratic processes such as those outlined above have also contributed to a sense of 
conflict and distrust towards the government implementing body, the Ministry of Environment, 
highlighting the role of local leaders in mobilizing community support for the program. During the 
initial phases of Socio Bosque in Chimborazo, Indigenous political and economic elite entered 
communities to oppose the program.  Various communities that participated in this field research 
commented on the fact that Indigenous political representatives explicitly told them that Socio Bosque 
was a state-led attempt to dispossess them of their land.  While this opposition can be explained by 
an ongoing rift between Indigenous political parties and the ruling government, Alianza PAIS, it also 
indicates power relations within Indigenous communities as Indigenous political and economic elite 
exert power and manipulate communities for their own personal gain. These complex relationships 
are rooted in vestiges of the hacienda system where Indigenous overseers, or jipus, abused their own 
community members and were subservient to the hacienda landowner.  Upon the dissolution of the 
hacienda system, many jipus took up prominent political and economic positions within the 
communities (see Tuaza, 2014). As a result of these complex relationships in communities, during 
our interviews a number of local leaders expressed difficulty in communicating the benefits of the 





awareness of the benefits of the program within the community, something that will be explored in 
greater detail in the following chapter. On the other hand, community members reported feeling 
fearful and distrustful about losing land for which they had struggled and fought to obtain basic title 
during the dissolution of the hacienda system. According to one community leader interviewed, 
“some community members physically hit/struck me when they heard of the decision to join the 
program, but today the people understand and are aware of the benefits,” highlighting the possibility 
that the arrival of Socio Bosque has unleashed dormant fears and conflicts within the community. 
 
3) An institutionalized Socio Bosque has changed local land use practices and governance regimes 
Finally, my observations of Socio Bosque in Chimborazo suggest an administrative field of practice 
that changes local environmental governance perceptions and practices (including ones rooted in 
highly spiritual beliefs) for national and (more ambitiously) global climate policy goals and agendas. 
In order to achieve global goals and agendas, the Ecuadorian state has institutionalized Socio Bosque 
by linking it to the concepts of Pachamama and sumak kawsay, instilling a moral regulation and 
obligation that persuades Indigenous communities to engage with and participate in the program 
under the guise of achieving sumak kawsay or caring for Pachamama.  For Lyons (2006), persuasion is 
“symbolic actions (including verbal communication, ritual expression, and other transactions in 
meanings) that (when successful) brings the dispositions and subjectivities of others into a closer 
alignment with the desires or interests of the persuader (222-223).  On the other hand, coercion is 
“the threat of imposition of undesirable consequences for undesired behaviour” (Lyons, 2016: 223).  
In this sense, the state’s use of Indigenous concepts does not coerce, but acts as a tool of persuasion 
for Indigenous communities to bring their ways of living and knowing into alignment with state-led 
goals for environmental governance and resource management.  As a result, this moral regulation 
and obligation produces and reproduces social and cultural identities and subjectivities and shapes 
Indigenous communities’ relationships to land and place, as well as the state.  As such, the moral 
regulation and obligation embedded in Socio Bosque is similar to the hacienda system which created a 
“domain of mutually constituting meanings and relationships embedded in linguistic, disciplinary, 
and religious practices” (Lyons, 2016: 221).   The creation of these meanings and relationships form 
part of the discipline, coercion, persuasion, and consent that all form an integral part of the 
implementation of a hegemonic ideology that subsumes and erases traditional Indigenous 






This shift away from traditional resource practices and governance institutions causes fundamental 
changes in Kichwa communities in Chimborazo.  First, changing land use and resource management 
practices under the guise of environmental conservation can also be seen in the use of Indigenous 
concepts as justification of continued, and even increasing, resource extraction priorities and 
policies.  In many cases, the implications of achieving the goals of sumak kawsay outlined in 
institutions like SENPLADES can run counter to the preservation of ecosystem biodiversity and 
change local land use and resource governance.  For example, mining is one of the most 
environmentally destructive extractive industries and has detrimental social and cultural impacts (see 
Bebbington, 2012), and the case of Community 2 provides an example where national development 
through mining functions in the same páramos as Socio Bosque.  Second, in order for PES programs 
like Socio Bosque to function, land must have ownership, be it communal or individual.  While private 
property within Kichwa communities exists, much of the land that became a part of Socio Bosque is 
communally owned.  Historically, this land has been used by the entire community for a variety of 
social, economic, and cultural activities, such as agriculture, livestock grazing and sacred ritual 
practices.  
 
The Socio Bosque contract obligates communities to change these traditional land use practices by 
stating that communities can under no circumstances modify the conservation area or the soil use, 
including agricultural and pastoral activities and any type of resource extraction.  As a result, 
traditional land use is prohibited and Indigenous forms of livelihoods are delegitimized and 
prohibited.  According to one local project, the Proyecto Páramo Andino in Chimborazo, local 
communities regularly burn the páramo in the belief that the smoke from the fire will “call” in the 
rain during times of drought, thereby facilitating the regeneration of vegetation (resulting from the 
release of nitrogen) for animal grazing.  But from the state’s perspective, burning the páramo is seen 
as an environmentally-damaging cultural practice that contributes to climate change. However, 
controlled burning has been shown to prevent wildfires caused by lightning or other natural or 
human-induced factors. By contrast, leaving the páramo allows the grasslands to grow excessively, 
choking out other forms of vegetation that are essential for biodiversity and ecosystem health 
(Flores et al., 2012: 225).  It goes without saying that pre-existing resource practices and insights of 





and grassland conservation with the global fight against climate change.  Communities are no longer 
able to interact with the páramo ecosystem as they have in the past.  While this change may be seen as 
a positive in the realm of environmental conservation, communities are losing livelihoods that 
sustain their way of living and the money received from PES programs like Socio Bosque is an 
























Chapter 6  
“Nuestros Páramos no Cuestan Esta Miseria”: The 




















The previous chapter explored the ways in which an institutionalized Socio Bosque program creates 
norms and rules that structure the inclusion and participation of Indigenous communities and 
restrict local communities’ engagement with the páramo ecosystem and with the Ecuadorian state.  
The evidence in the previous chapter suggests that the institutional constraints placed on Indigenous 
communities exclude and marginalize them from meaningful participation and places the state at the 
centre of environmental governance and climate change policies and strategies, creating norms and 
rules that further reinforce hegemonic forms of state-community relations.  The exclusion and 
marginalization of Indigenous communities from Socio Bosque reinforces unequal power relations 
between Indigenous communities and the state.  However, in spite of exclusion, marginalization, 
and unequal power relations, Indigenous communities still choose to participate in Socio Bosque.  
Indigenous participation in Socio Bosque suggests that active consent and participation of subordinate 
groups is an integral part of the concept of hegemony.  Indigenous peoples are not bystanders who 
are passively dominated by elite rulers, but they find ways to interact with state-led initiatives in 
complex ways.   
 
This chapter will explore the economic aspect of Socio Bosque as an influence for Indigenous 
participation in the program.  The chapter will also explore the ways in which value is assigned to 
nature within Socio Bosque and, as a result, some of the effects surrounding the distribution of 
incentive payments at the local level in five Kichwa communities that form part of the Socio Bosque 
program in Chimborazo.  The chapter will begin by drawing from secondary sources to discuss the 
overall distributional effects of Socio Bosque at a national and provincial level.  The principal aim of 
this analysis is to understand the national, provincial, and local breakdown of the Socio Bosque 
contracts, the areas conserved, and the distribution of incentive payments.  This analysis will frame 
the overall discussion around incentive payments and the local participation and decision-making 
power within the incentive payment plan process.  It will also provide a greater understanding of the 
spending priorities for the local communities that participated in this study in contrast to those of 
the provincial and national level.  Various MAE and Socio Bosque sources were used to gather the 
statistical information found in each level of analysis.  These documents were combined with 






In order to achieve the goals mentioned above, the chapter will be guided by the following 
questions: 
• How does the distribution of incentive payments within Indigenous communities in 
Chimborazo affect local environmental governance and conservation efforts? 
• How have these five communities spent their incentive payments and, as a result, what 
conclusions can be drawn about community priorities? 
• How are the incentive payments representative of distribution within Socio Bosque at the 
national level and other individual cases? 
• How do economic payments constrain or induce local participation? 
By answering these questions, this chapter suggests four main findings: 1) that communities have 
materially benefitted from Socio Bosque ; 2) this material benefit, and the institutional arrangement 
that facilitates distribution, was set up in a way that clearly benefits individual landowners, resulting 
in a continuation of colonial legacy that marginalizes Indigenous communities; 3) even with the 
seemingly unequal incentive payments, Indigenous communities have chosen to participate in Socio 
Bosque ; and, 4) while the distribution of incentive payments encourages local communities to 
conserve the páramo ecosystem, findings indicate that it is not the primary force in motivating 
communities to conserve communal lands.  Furthermore, conservation of the páramo ecosystem is 
limited to the conserved area where Socio Bosque is implemented while surrounding land and 
communities continue to move up the páramo ecosystem with agricultural and livestock production, 
demonstrating that a conflict exists within Indigenous communities between páramo conservation 
and livelihoods. 
 
6.2 National Level Contract Analysis 
Since beginning in 2008, Socio Bosque has grown from a small incentive program to a national level 
PES program that has expanded to all regions of the country.  This section will provide statistical 
information regarding Socio Bosque contracts at the national level.  The aim is to provide a macro-
level understanding of the distribution of Socio Bosque contracts and incentive payments, the various 
Indigenous communities participating in Socio Bosque, and the total area conserved at a national level.  
According to 2016 data, there are a total of 2,736 contracts signed with the Socio Bosque program in 





or communally owned land.  This means that nearly 93% of all contracts signed at the national level 
are with individual landowners.  However, the number of beneficiaries that are part of collective 
contracts make up nearly 95% of the total beneficiaries.  The individual contracts make up only 11% 
of total hectares conserved, yet these individuals receive over 36% of the total incentive payments.  
Meanwhile, community contracts make up 89% of the conserved area but receive only 64% of the 
total incentive payments.   
Figure 4: National Area Conserved and Payment of Socio Bosque  
         
The contrast in incentive payment between individual and collective contracts is even more stark 
when the incentive payment is broken down per beneficiary.  Beneficiaries who are part of collective 
contracts receive an average of $36.32 USD per beneficiary, while those who form part of individual 
contracts, which can include extended families of the participant, receive $362.24 per beneficiary. 
Table 17: Socio Bosque National Statistics 














Collective 1,300,913 6,399,222 174,746 36.32 191 
Individual 166,037 3,645,326 10,091 361.24 2,454 
Total 1,466,950 10,044,548 184,837 54.34 2,736 
MAE 2016 Data Sheet 
Total beneficiaries include men, women and children.  The totals also include the Socio Manglar portion of the program 
















At the national level, Kichwa Indigenous people make up the largest ethnic group in Socio Bosque, 
followed by the Shuar, Zapara and Shiwiar.  The majority of these ethnic groups are found in the 
Amazon region of Ecuador, including the Kichwa who are also found in Chimborazo.   
Figure 5: Socio Bosque Conservation per Nationality (Hectares) 
 
 
The graphs below, taken from Socio Bosque’s Monitoring Manual, show the increase in individual and 
collective contracts signed.  Since 2016, due to financial constraints, there have been no new 
participants accepted into the program.  What becomes clear from the graph below is that individual 
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Figure 6: National Socio Bosque Contracts  
 
Even with the large gap between the number of collective and individual contracts signed, collective 
or community contracts clearly protect more ecosystem surface area than individual contracts, 
1,299,565 hectares to 167,709 hectares. 
Figure 7: National Socio Bosque Area Conserved (Hectares) 
 
Not only is the total area conserved much lower with individual participants, but the number or 
hectares conserved per participant is also lower than that of collective contracts.  The majority of 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Collective 21 37 58 85 127 153 187 190
Individual 38 361 881 1,418 1,818 2,184 2,550 2,562
21 37 58 85















2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Collective 168,665 359,074 546,474 866,102 1,043,911 1,108,903 1,254,768 1,299,565
























individual participants (70%) have only 1-50 hectares in the Socio Bosque program, while 33% of 
collective contracts have between 510-1,800 hectares and 25% have between 1,801-5,000 hectares. 
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The fact that Indigenous communities conserve considerably more hectares of land within the Socio 
Bosque program compared to individual landowners reinforces the importance of engaging with 
Indigenous communities as large landholders in climate change and mitigation strategies, as studies 
have shown (Campbell et al., 2008; EDF, 2015).  The disproportion between community and 
individual hectares conserved also speaks to the fact that individual landowners are able to divide 
larger landholdings into smaller parcels, while the Article 57 of the Constitution states that 
Indigenous communal lands are “inalienable, unattachable and indivisible”.   Similar statements can 
be found in the Rural Lands and Ancestral Territories Law and the Organization and Regime Law of 
the Communes.  As a result, Indigenous communities are prohibited from dividing communal land 
into smaller plots to take advantage of Socio Bosque’s sliding incentive payment scale which pays 
higher amounts for smaller plots of land. 
 
6.3 Incentive Payment Scales  
One of the difficulties of PES programs is assigning the exact economic value, as well as the real and 
opportunity costs of conserving local ecosystems, to be paid to participant communities.  The 
following section will use the case of the Socio Bosque incentive payment scale to assess the extent to 
which the program is implemented and paid out in a uniform, top-down fashion.  In Ecuador, MAE 
developed a sliding scale that determines the amount of incentive payments participants receive.  
This scale was developed in 2011 after the original payment scheme did not differentiate between 
ecosystem, type of landowner (individual or community), or the number of hectares in the program.  
During an interview a former MAE director stated that the “payment amount was largely arbitrary 
and based on the budget constraints of the state” and did not reflect any actual economic calculation 
of the ecosystem services within each community. The fact that the 2019 MAE budget was reduced 
significantly, with the Socio Bosque program experiencing a 71% reduction in available funds ($22.8 
million to 6.62 million), puts the long-term financial sustainability of the program in severe jeopardy 
and could affect the price paid to local communities (El Comercio, 2019).  According to Krause and 
Loft (2013), the sliding scale was implemented as a political decision to maximize the limited budget 
available, as well as a means of incentivizing smaller landholders, particularly those of the páramo 
ecosystem, who found the original incentive payment insufficient when compared to other 
economic alternatives provided by the páramo, such as agriculture and livestock.  In contrast, large 





not used for the generation of income and went largely unused. The new payment scheme doubled 
the original incentive payment ($12.34 per hectare to $25.86) for collective contracts for páramo 
participants. 
Table 18: Original Socio Bosque Incentive Payment 
Original Incentive Payment Scheme 
 Individual Contract Collective Contract 
Hectares Amount (USD) Amount (USD) 
1-50 30.00 30.00 
51-100 20.00 20.00 
101-500 10.00 10.00 
501-5,000 5.00 5.00 
5,001-10,000 2.00 2.00 
>10,000 0.50 0.50 
Table 19: Current Socio Bosque Incentive Payment Scale 
Current Socio Bosque Incentive Payment Scale 
Individuals with more 
than 20 hectares in their 
total land title 
Individuals with less than 
20 hectares in their total 
land title 
Communities in forests Communities in páramos 
Hectares Payment Hectares Payment Hectares Amount Hectares Amount 
1-50 $30.00 1-20 $60.00 1-100 $35.00 1-50 $60.00 
51-100 $20.00   101-500 $22.00 51-100 $40.00 
101-500 $10.00   501-1,800 $13.00 101-900 $20.00 
501-5,000 $5.00   1,801-5,000 $6.00 901-3,000 $10.00 
5,001 – 
10,000 





> 10,001 $0.50   > 10,001 $0.70 > 10,001 $1.00 
MAE, 2013 
 
Individuals or communities do not have any input on the amount of the payment, nor are they able 
to negotiate with the government to receive a better price.  While many communities interviewed 





me that criticism of the program and its payments were an underlying issue in each focus group and 
interview.  Of the five communities that participated in this study, all recognized the importance that 
the extra income provided to both individual families and larger community development initiatives.  
However, the price of the payments was often criticized, with many people interviewed stating that 
the páramo ecosystem has much more economic value, but that they are resigned to accept the 
incentive payment price of the program even though they feel the price is unfair.  “We would like 
them to pay more” (Quisiéramos que paguen mas) and “that they raise the price a little bit…it is very 
little” (Que suban un poco…es muy poco), were comments I heard often during focus groups and 
interviews in various communities.   
 
These comments indicate that the economic value, as well as social, cultural and spiritual values that 
the communities place on the páramo ecosystem is more than the current price that MAE is willing 
to pay.  One Tayta discussed the value of the payment in the following manner, “We should charge 
much more. Instead of us establishing the price, they put the price on us. The páramos cost much 
more than the meager payment they are giving us” (debemos cobrar mucho más, en vez de poner el precio 
nosotros, ellos nos pusieron el precio.  No es que nuestros paramos cuestan esta miseria) (Tatya interviewed in 
Community 4, 2018-03-12).  However, there was an evident conflict in this Taytas view of Socio 
Bosque as he went on to say, “Also, I should thank [President] Correa because no other president has 
recognized paying for conserving [the páramo]” (también debo agradecer a Correa porque ningún presidente se 
ha reconocido esto a dar por conservar).  This specific quote shows the conflicting value that communities 
and the state place on nature, as well as a recognition within local communities that the state, in 
some way, through Socio Bosque values the historically marginalized and forgotten rural communities 
and the important páramo ecosystem.  Local communities are not against placing an economic value 
on the páramo, which is illustrated by their comparison of the Socio Bosque payment to other 
economic activities carried out in the páramo.   
 
The main reason community members expressed their dissatisfaction with the value of the payment 
was due to the fact that other activities, such as agriculture and livestock, provide more income over 
a shorter period of time.  As one community member stated “What would be a fair price [for the 





good times we have harvested and made profit…all the community, not just one person.  The land 
is productive here and the price we receive from Socio Bosque is unfair” (Que sería un precio más justo?  
$100 por hectárea sería justo. Eso es lo ganamos cultivando, aún más.  En tiempo buenos si se ha cosechado y 
ganado…toda la comunidad no solo uno) (Tayta interviewed in Community 4, 2018-03-12).  This last 
quote captures local perceptions regarding the opportunity cost of protecting the páramo.  Even if 
communities value the páramo more than the current price they receive, they are resigned to 
accepting the terms of the incentive payment even if they do not agree with the price since 
communities are unable to negotiate prices of the ecosystems they conserve.  This lack of 
negotiation power of communities represents an exclusionary process within MAE that does not 
allow for community participation or inclusion of their views and values on incentive payments. 
 
The prices listed above are imposed by MAE, and, while MAE does take into account the different 
ecosystems present in Ecuador, little flexibility or regional specificity of the incentive payment is 
present across the country. However, the case of the Shuar in the Ecuadorian Amazon suggests that 
some Indigenous actors do have the ability to negotiate.  The Shuar have nearly 90,000 hectares in 
the program and receive over $450,000 in annual incentive payments for their contract of 20 years 
(Socio Bosque, 2019).  This works out to approximately $5.00 per hectare, which is well above the 
$0.70 payment outlined in the payment scale.  In contrast, the Záparo community of the same 
Amazonian rainforest region receives only $114,879 for their 83,542 hectares.  Although the Shuar 
seems to be an isolated case that is not representative of overall negotiating power of communities, 
it does indicate that Socio Bosque seems to be open to adjusting the incentive payment based on the 
negotiating power of a community. The Shuar are the only community that seems to have been able 
to negotiate a higher payment.  The Shuar’s ability to negotiate a higher pay scale could be due to the 
location of the community in the strategic Amazon jungle that is home to large supplies of crude oil 
and minerals, as well as the Shuar’s contribution to the 1995 Cenepa War between Ecuador and 
Peru, being called the “Warriors of Cenepa” (Long, 1995; AmazonWatch, 2017).  Ecuador viewed 
the strengthening of the Shuar as a strategic way to protect their territory against Peruvian incursion 
and, since the Shuar had a sense of Ecuadorian identity, the Shuar settlements were important 






According to MAE, the current payment scheme focuses on solidarity between those who have 
more land and those who have less.  Furthermore, MAE says that by using this payment scheme,  
“the incentive provided is calculated in the same way for everyone, without 
differentiating geographical location, the ethnicity of the owner, the type of ecosystem, 
the type of environmental service that the area provides, the type of land tenure, be it 
individual or collective.  The only variable that determines the amount of the incentive is 
the number of hectares that an interested party is willing to place under conservation” 
(MAE, 2013: 23).   
El incentivo que entrega está calculado de la misma forma para todos, sin diferenciar su ubicación 
geográfica, la etnia del propietario, el tipo de ecosistema,  el  tipo  de  servicio  ambiental  que  el  área  
brinda,  la  figura  de  tenencia  de  tierra  sea individual  o  colectiva;  la  única  variable  que  
determina  el  monto  del  incentivo  es  el  número  de hectáreas que un interesado está dispuesto a 
colocar bajo conservación. 
This comment seems to contradict the reality of the payment scheme since MAE does differentiate 
between forests and páramo as well as individual and collective contracts in their current payment 
scheme.  MAE goes on to state that this payment scheme “responds to a vision of solidarity 
between the different areas; those who, due to some market condition, have a greater option of 
receiving external financing, under the Socio Bosque  approach, contribute in solidarity with other 
areas that do not present these opportunities, therefore, if this solidarity does not exist, their risk of 
disappearance increases” (Esto responde también a una visión solidaria entre las distintas áreas; las que por 
alguna condición de mercado  tengan  mayor  opción  de  recibir  financiamiento  externo,  bajo  el  enfoque  de  Socio  
Bosque éstas contribuyen solidariamente con otras áreas que no presentan esas oportunidades,  por tanto, de no existir 
esta solidaridad su riesgo de desaparición aumenta) (MAE, 2013: 23). 
 
It is not only Indigenous communities that realize the payments they receive do not compensate for 
their perceived or even real value placed on the páramo due to alternative economic activities.  One 
higher level Socio Bosque official recognized that the program does not “signify much economically 
for the communities…we [Socio Bosque] have done little to reduce poverty” (Socio Bosque no significa 
mucho para las comunidades en lo económico. Poco hemos hecho para reducir la pobreza) (MAE Official 
interviewed 2018-03-22).  Furthermore, the same official stated that community organizations must 
be strengthened, and Socio Bosque needs to become a platform for them to speak about 
environmental governance and climate change.  However, the relationship with the state gives 





During one interview conducted, a high-level, national Socio Bosque representative stated, Indigenous 
communities “do not have the capacity to be able to discuss public policies to negotiate tariffs or 
resource use.  They are passive subjects, not actors in public policy” (No tienen capacidad las 
comunidades para poder discutir las políticas públicas para negociar las tarifas o el uso de los recursos.  Son sujetos 
pasivos, nos son actores de las políticas públicas) (MAE Official Interviewed, 2018-03-22).  The lack of 
participation of Indigenous communities in environmental conservation and local resource 
governance policies was evidenced in the various local solutions that were proposed in focus groups 
where communities discussed novel ideas for the financial stability of the Socio Bosque program or 
environmental conservation and long-term solutions to the continuing deterioration of the páramo.  
In two separate communities, members floated the idea of charging neighbouring towns and cities 
for protecting the páramos, making the case that the city of Riobamba receives benefits free of charge 
from their protected páramos and that the local water and sewage company - Empresa Pública - 
Empresa Privada de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado de Riobamba – should distribute profits to the 
community.  Other communities expressed concern over the use of the water by a local cement 
company, Cemento Chimborazo, and suggested that the company provide more than just caramelitos 
(candies) for the children, but that they provide payment for using the water sources of the 
surrounding páramos that form part of the land title of the community and the Socio Bosque  program.  
One community member expressed the state’s devaluing of local opinions and alternatives in the 
following way, 
“More than the money that the Ministry gives, it would be good to create alternatives, 
such as small businesses or tourism.  If there is no publicity for tourism, for example, 
how will people come? We can use the incentive, but it isn’t much.  It is not enough for 
the things necessary to start a sustainable, small business for when the help of the [Socio 
Bosque] program ends.  We need to increase local alternatives, such as tourism and 
small business…this way we can counteract migration from the communities to bigger 
cities” (Tayta interviewed in Community 5, 2018-04-30). 
 
“Mas que la plata que da el ministerio sería buena que creen algunas alternativas, como microempresas.  
Si no hay publicidad para el turismo, por ejemplo, ¿cómo vendrán?  Podemos usar el incentivo, pero no 
es mucho.  No alcanza para hacer estas cosas necesarias de emprender microempresas al largo plaza que 
ayuda cuando el programa deja de funcionar.  Necesitamos fomentar alternativas locales, como turismo y 
microempresas.  Allí podemos contrastar la migración hacia las ciudades” 
 
Communities clearly see the Socio Bosque incentive payment as an option that complements 
long-term, sustainable alternatives for community development and progress.  However, 





community development alternatives.  Furthermore, some communities do not see the 
payment received from Socio Bosque as the main reason why they entered the program.  As one 
Tayta explained, “we improved a bit [from the incentive payment] but we did not enter the 
program for money, but to conserve the páramo.  We have realized that it is good to care for 
the páramo” (Mejoramos un poco pero no lo hicimos por interés ni dinero. Metemos en el programa por cuidar 
el páramo.  Hemos dado cuenta que es bueno cuidar el páramo) (Tayta interviewed in Community 5, 
2018-04-30).  The evidence above suggests that state control over ecosystem pricing does not 
create the market-based system of incentives that free-market environmentalism propagates in 
theory. Socio Bosque, under the guise of a so-called economic policy and environmental 
conservation instrument, is the result of clientelism and arbitrary, bureaucratic prices, 
mandates, and regulations.   
 
The evidence presented above shows that, in general, Socio Bosque incentive payments are 
implemented in a uniform manner.  The communities that form part of this study were paid strictly 
according to the sliding scale.  However, a number of observations about the incentive payment can 
be made.  First, the difference in the payment between the Socio Bosque participants and the Socio 
Páramo participants is evident.  Clearly, the Ecuadorian government places different economic value 
on the páramo ecosystem as compared to that of forests, and/or they see the opportunity costs of 
those living in and using the páramo ecosystem for livelihoods as higher than that of the Amazonian 
communities.  When interviewed, a MAE employee stated that the incentive is higher in the páramos 
because “water sources come from there…there are all of the water reserves of the country and it 
captures more carbon.  In the forests, there are not as many water sources, but there is more 
oxygen”.  This comment reflects what Krause and Loft (2013) suggest, in that Socio Bosque incentive 
payments are insufficient to cover the opportunity costs of untouched páramos because these areas 
are easily accessible to communities and offer fertile land for agriculture. 
 
Second, the above incentive payment scale indicates that large amounts of land receive smaller per 
hectare payments, which seems to favour smaller landholders providing larger per hectare payments 
to smaller conserved areas as compared to larger, communally owned lands.  This payment scale is 





recognizes the collective rights of Indigenous communities and states that they must “preserve the 
imprescriptible property of their community lands, which will be inalienable, indefeasible and 
indivisible” (conservar la propiedad imprescriptible de sus tierras comunitarias, que serán inalienables, inembargables 
e indivisibles. Estas tierras estarán exentas del pago de tasas e impuestos).  Also, in section five it emphasizes 
that Indigenous peoples have the right to “maintain possession of ancestral lands and territories and 
obtain their free adjudication” (Mantener la posesión de las tierras y territorios ancestrales y obtener su 
adjudicación gratuita). This means that under the Constitution, communal Indigenous lands cannot be 
divided or separated into smaller parcels.  The communal land in Indigenous communities speaks to 
a larger historical and cultural aspect that Socio Bosque encounters in these communities. Since the 
time of the hacienda, plots above 3,700 meters above sea level where the páramos are not distributed 
individually are considered a common good, which any member of the communities, even 
Indigenous people from other communities, can use. When buying the hacienda lands after the first 
and second agrarian reforms, the Indigenous communities divided the lower part, that is to say, the 
land used for crops and the raising of cattle, but they kept the properties of the higher areas 
undivided. Despite numerous attempts to divide the communal property, the idea of community 
preservation has been internalized among the members.  "Some of the comrades want to distribute 
the lands of the higher areas. Advantageously, we are the majority that want to keep this common 
good intact,” stated one community leader interviewed.   Based on the communal idea of land and 
the fear of state appropriation various communities expressed concern that Socio Bosque was a 
government scheme to take away land.  As one tayta explained, “many community members were 
against Socio Bosque, saying ‘the leaders are going to sell the páramo to the state who is going to take 
the money’.”  Since communities are prohibited from dividing land and view communal land as an 
important part of environmental and cultural conservation and preservation, many of the 
communities involved in the Socio Bosque program received smaller amounts per hectare since most 
of their land consists of large communal plots.  In the five communities that participated in this 
study, an average of 882 hectares of páramo per community formed part of Socio Bosque.  In 
comparison, three individual Socio Bosque contracts that were analyzed had an average of 25 hectares.  
Using the incentive payment scale above, the average incentive payment per hectare would be $20.00 
for the communities and $30.00 for the individuals.  Data drawn from the actual contracts with the 
communities and individuals shows that the five communities and three individuals received an 
average of $24.57 and $37.34 respectively, with the highest individual being paid $60.00 and the 





These statistics show a clear difference in the compensation being paid to small individual 
landowners compared to large communally owned lands of Indigenous communities.   
 
6.4 Controlled Spending – Planes de Inversion 
Since Socio Bosque began, MAE has implemented various measures to control the distribution and 
spending of incentive payments.  Why have these measures been implemented and how are these 
measures perceived by both MAE/Socio Bosque officials and indigenous communities?  This section 
seeks to understand how officials in MAE perceived risk and measures for reducing risk within Socio 
Bosque.  Also, this section will explore how indigenous communities perceive the incentive control 
measures. As discussed in the previous chapter, planning and monitoring are important 
requirements within MAE’s accountability framework.  Part of the planning and monitoring 
requirements for participant communities is a plan de inversion (PDI) or investment plan.  Socio 
Bosque requires investment plans from all communities and individuals that are involved in the 
program as a means of tracking spending of incentive payments at the local level.  However, the 
requirements for individual landowners and communities are drastically different.  The individual 
plan is a survey where the partners explain how they will spend the incentive.  In contrast, 
communities are required to provide a detailed investment plan in a participatory manner where, 
through a general assembly, all community members approve the plan.  This plan must elaborate on 
previous work that demonstrates clear needs, problems, stakeholder analysis, and alternative 
solutions analysis (MAE, 2013: 25). Investment plans were not part of the first year of Socio Bosque, 
but in 2009 MAE saw a need to create a financial accountability framework.  Over the years, these 
plans have become more complex as MAE has attempted to clamp down on misspent and missing 
funds.  In recent years, the Ecuadorian government has asked the Comptroller General’s office to 
investigate Socio Bosque  and “non-transparent actions” surrounding the use of funds paid to partners 
(El Universo, 2019c).  This investigation, which has been brought about by community complaints, 
suggests a lack of transparency, possible community conflict within the Socio Bosque participant 
communities, and a clear need for a financial accountability framework for incentive payments.   
 
MAE has certain safeguards in place to prevent such corruption, but these requirements have not 





stated, “there were communities where the leaders took the money and did not give it to the people 
and the community had to report it to the proper authorities” (había comunidades donde los lideres llevaron 
el dinero y no entregaron a la gente y la comunidad tuvo que llamar a las autoridades) (Interview, 2018-03-26). 
However, the result of corrupt community leaders’ mis-spending Socio Bosque funds meant increased 
bureaucracy and red tape for the communities as MAE implemented mechanisms to control the use 
of incentive payments.  While more responsibility was placed on the communities in developing 
investment plans, very little assistance was offered by MAE in recovering stolen funds.  After these 
cases came up, the same representative stated, “we carried out a technical review and we 
demonstrated to the communities that we deposited the funds and the result was the communities 
had to resolve the problem themselves through lawsuits” (Nosotros hicimos una revisión técnica y 
mostramos los depósitos y resulta que la comunidad tenía que resolver el problema ellos mismos a través de demandas.  
Salimos a verificar, pero decimos a ellos que depositamos y no es nuestra responsabilidad tienen que hablar con los 
dirigentes) (Interview, 2018-03-36).  These quotes represent a situation where suspicion over 
community corruption has resulted in an overly-burdensome responsibility placed on Socio Bosque 
participants.  This burden disproportionately affects indigenous communities who receive different 
treatment within government institutions.  On numerous occasions, I was able to observe treatment 
of Indigenous communities by MAE officials in the Socio Bosque office.  Community leaders who 
would sometimes travel for hours to submit required documents were met with short answers and 
even disdain from Socio Bosque officials.  At times, leaders were made to wait for hours to have a brief 
meeting with Socio Bosque officials only to be told that they lacked the required documents and must 
return to the community or go to other government institutions to obtain the required documents.   
 
Furthermore, the financial burden MAE’s requirements place on a rural community stretches already 
limited resources and communities.  A high-level MAE representative stated that the funds 
distributed to communities were intentionally called “incentives” and not “money” because 
Indigenous communities need to be incentivized.  This representative also stated that “the 
communities wanted to spend the incentive on cultural programs and parties…if you give money to 
indigenous communities, nothing will happen.  Now they are accountable to show what they have 
spent the money on.  It is a monitoring mechaqnism that Socio Bosque has” (Había aspectos culturales 
en que querían gastar la plata y fiestas…Si vos das dinero inmediatista a una comunidad no va a surgir nada.  





(Interview, 2018-03-26).  This quote suggests that Indigenous communities are lazy and need 
financial motivation to engage in environmental conservation efforts.  It also shows that, from the 
state’s perspective, Indigenous communities cannot be trusted with funds and will spend incentive 
payments on frivolous fiestas.  As a result, from the state’s perspective strict accountability measures 
must be in place to monitor incentive spending.  While corruption within Indigenous communities 
and cases within Socio Bosque incentive payment system are present, this quote represents a general 
view within state institutions of the problems that can be created by injecting money into Indigenous 
communities without having accountability measures in place.  In my experience of working with 
Indigenous communities, many communities have strict local accountability measures in place to 
ensure transparency and prevent corruption; like any other global ill, it is present within Indigenous 
communities but it is far from endemic. 
 
On top of the above-mentioned investment plans, communities are required to provide legal 
receipts for every expense, which can be difficult for many communities who oftentimes operate 
under an informal economy, and when receipts are required, prices are increased due to the taxes 
owed.  Participants are aware of these requirements at the local level and the extra burden they place 
on community members to track spending.  As one individual stated, “the project obligates us to 
have receipts…accounting must be done, and these papers go to Quito” (El proyecto nos obliga las 
facturas…hay que hacer rendición de cuenta y este papel va a Quito) (Tayta interviewed in Community 2, 
2018-03-18).  One mamita in Community 5 explained that “we would earn more working the land 
because there are no receipts or taxes required and 1 dollar goes to the pocket.  All of the Socio 
Bosque funds do not reach the family.  We have to buy food with receipts and we can’t do this at the 
local markets since they do not provide receipts.”  (Ganariamos mas haciendo producir la tierra con ganado 
porque no hay facturas y un dólar va al bosillo.  No llega 100% a la familia con el Socio Bosque.  Tenemos que 
comprar comida y tenemos que mostrar factura…esto no se puede hacer compras en los mercados, porque no emiten 
facturas) (Mamita interviewed in Community 5, 2018-03-26).  Communities are also required to hire a 
third-party, registered accountant to officially submit their accounting documents to MAE.  During 
my field research, I observed interactions between accountants, community members and MAE 
representatives while waiting for many of my visits with MAE representatives in the Socio Bosque 
offices.  I could observe that most of the accountants were not local, Indigenous people, but 





trained and registered accountants in the communities and, as a result, the communities are forced 
to contract accountants from the city.  Risk management practices that are part of Socio Bosque, such 
as those outlined above, undermine the interests of local Indigenous communities, stretching the 
financial and human resources and capacities of these communities. 
 
Provincial Level Analysis 
6.5 Provincial Contracts: Collective vs Individual 
With the previous sections providing a general understanding of national level statistics of the Socio 
Bosque program, this section will seek to understand similar statistics at the provincial level of 
Chimborazo.  The statistics will help to provide a contextual understanding of Socio Bosque in the 
province.  Chimborazo has 129 total contracts, 20 collective and 109 individual.  These totals 
represent 4.6% of the number of total number of contracts signed in Ecuador, 4.2% of individual 
contracts and 10% of collective contracts.  Chimborazo has the second largest number of collective 
contracts in the country, second only to the province of Esmeraldas.  Chimborazo’s 14,051 hectares 
represent 0.9% of the total countrywide hectares, while the 11,065 collective hectares and the 2,986 
individual hectares represent .85% and 1.8% respectively.  The 19,862 beneficiaries are only 11% of 
the national total and the 437 individual contract beneficiaries and 19,425 collective contract 
beneficiaries represent 4% and 11% of national totals respectively. 
 
The provincial level statistics of the incentive payments in Chimborazo present similar patterns as 
those found at the national level.  Community contracts represent 98% of beneficiaries, 79% of 
conserved hectares and 66% of payments.  Meanwhile, individual contracts represent 2% of 
beneficiaries, 21% of conserved hectares and 34% of payments.  Clearly, the individual contract 
participants represent a significantly lower number of beneficiaries, yet receive a much higher 
percentage of incentive payments. The difference in per beneficiary incentive payment results are 
even more dramatic than the national results.  In Chimborazo, individual contract beneficiaries make 
over 20 times more than collective contract beneficiaries, $12.24 to $227.40. 
Table 20: Chimborazo Socio Bosque Statistics 
















   Families Total Families Total  
Collective 11,065 237,849 4338 19,425 54.82 12.24 20 
Individual 2,986 121,227 116 437 1,045.06 227.40 109 
Total 14,051 360,076 4454 19862 80.84 18.12 129 
MAE-Chimborazo 2016 Statistics 
Total beneficiaries include men, women and children 
The difference in the number of individual contracts compared to collective contracts indicates a 
number of underlying points of analysis.  The fact that individual contracts make up 84% of the 
total number of contracts in Chimborazo shows the importance of the historical context of the 
hacienda and subsequent land reform which resulted in unequal land distribution, the 
marginalization of Indigenous communities, and the continuation of clientelist State-community 
interactions.   Land reform in the 60s and 70s was beneficial to large landowners since they did not 
give up the more fertile lands and were able to keep large swaths of land for their own benefit.  
Meanwhile, Indigenous communities were sold the more difficult mountainous terrain that is less 
productive.  While communities have been able to produce in higher altitudes, production through 
monocropping and overuse of land has resulted in the exhaustion of soils and the need to move 
continually up the hillside, infringing on the páramo ecosystem.    
 
The relationship between the Ecuadorian state and Kichwa communities is rooted in a clientelist 
relationship that serves economic and political elites at the expense and further marginalization of 
rural communities.  This relationship has caused Indigenous communities to become suspicious of 
the motives behind government programs that, in the eyes of many communities, have underlying 
political, social, and economic goals that benefit those outside of the community.  The differential 
treatment of Indigenous communities compared to individual participants in Socio Bosque can be seen 
in the fact that collective contracts conserve more hectares while, at the same time, being paid less 
than individual contracts who conserve fewer total hectares.  This is the result of the sliding scale 






Furthermore, the large number of individual contracts suggests, at the very least, that in its initial 
phases in the province of Chimborazo, the program favoured individual landholders over 
communities.  Individual landowners held an advantage over communities in a number of ways, but 
the most significant advantage can be found in their ability to interact with the bureaucracy of the 
Ecuadorian state. While the requirements for entry into Socio Bosque are similar for both individual 
and collective contracts, the ability either to have or to obtain the documents for Indigenous 
communities can be difficult.  Furthermore, as previously mentioned, communities must have 
approval in the form of an assembly where a majority of community members approve entry into 
the program.  This process can be long and drawn out and, often times, further complicates internal 
conflicts and power struggles within communities.   One community interviewed complained of the 
internal conflict created by the decision to join the program, a decision that caused physical violence 
between community members.  While this conflict has since been resolved, it exemplifies that Socio 
Bosque unearthed and even exacerbated underlying inter and intra community conflicts. 
 
The disproportionately low number of collective contracts also shows the initial fears of Indigenous 
communities to join Socio Bosque when the program was rolled out in the province of Chimborazo in 
2009 through Socio Páramo.  The first individual contracts were signed in 2009, while the first 
collective contracts were signed in 2010.  The chart below indicates that while a large influx into the 
program happened in 2012-2014, it is evident that in the initial phase of the Socio Páramo program 
of Socio Bosque, Indigenous communities were reluctant to join. 
























The initial hesitancy of Indigenous communities, specifically those in Chimborazo, to join the Socio 
Bosque program is rooted in a suspicion that Indigenous communities hold towards the state and 
state-led initiatives, as well as a strained relationship that Indigenous communities had, and continue 
to have, with many state institutions. One community interviewed expressed serious concerns with 
MAE and their interaction with the women of the community in the Chimborazo Fauna Production 
Reserve, a national park.  This conflict will be explored in greater detail below in the community 
analysis section.  In the five communities that participated in this study, each community, to varying 
degrees, reported feeling fearful and distrustful about losing land for which they had struggled and 
fought to obtain basic title during the dissolution of the hacienda system. According to one 
community leader, “we nearly fought in the meetings.  Some community members physically 
hit/struck me when they heard of the decision to join the program, but today the people understand 
and are aware of the benefits” (Casi nos pegamos en las reuniones. Algunas personas me golpearon cuando 
escucharon la decision del Socio Bosque, pero hoy la gente entiende y se dan cuenta de los beneficios) (Tayta 
interviewed in Community 4, 2018-03-12), highlighting the possibility that the arrival of Socio Bosque 
has unleashed dormant fears and conflicts within the community.  Another mamita expressed the 
community’s hesitancy to enter Socio Bosque because she thought it would eliminate livelihoods based 
on livestock, such as cows and sheep.  We had livestock and sheep in the paramo and from this we 
lived…..what will we eat if we enter Socio Bosque.  That is why we did not want to, but now we are 
content” (Sabíamos tener ganado y borregos en el páramo y con eso vivíamos…De que vamos a comer si entramos al 
SB.  Por eso no quisimos.  Pero ahora estamos contentos) (Mamita interviewed in Community 3, 2018-03-26).  
“What will we eat if we enter Socio Bosque” was her initial concern, a valid concern considering that 
communities enter into a 20-year contract with the state which, according to the rules discussed in 
the previous chapter, cannot be broken. 
 
Furthermore, communities saw Socio Bosque as another political project of the state.  During 
interviews communities expressed this concern in various ways with comments such as, “the 
President is in charge of Socio Bosque” (El presidente de turno se encarga del programa Socio Bosque).  When 
discussing how industries that use the páramo do not pay for its use, one community member stated 
the following,  
“because many times these acknowledgments go through [government] 





of the páramo, we take care of the water sources that go to the cities. Not even 
city authorities recognize us. If the authorities were aware, they could get votes 
and recognize the conservation of the páramo, but it doesn't happen. Go see the 
roads we have because the authorities don't want to help us. Management does 
not help us. Why? On the one hand it has become politicized, if [a community] 
does not belong to [President] Lenin or [Ex-president] Correa, there is 
nothing”. (Tayta interviewed in Community 4, 2018-03-12). 
“Porque muchas veces estos reconocimientos pasan por medios de instituciones 
(gubernamentales) y a las comunidades no llega nada.  No solo cuidamos la paja y las 
plantas, cuidamos las fuentes de agua que van a las ciudades.  Ni las autoridades de las 
ciudades nos reconocen.  Si fueron consientes las autoridades, podrían captar votos y reconocer 
la conservación del páramo.  Pero no sucede.  Anda a ver los caminos que tenemos porque las 
autoridades no nos quieren ayudar.  Gestiones no nos ayudan.  ¿Por qué?  Por un lado, se 
ha politizado, si no pertenece a [Presidente] Lenin o a [Presidente] Correa, no hay nada.”   
This comment indicates an underlying clientelism that is part of Ecuadorian social and political life 
and, for this particular individual, clientelistic mechanisms failed to achieve the state’s goal of 
political manipulation. Furthermore, the quote shows that communities have an awareness of the 
clientelistic relationship they have with the state and that they view it as part of the political process 
in which they are resigned to work to achieve their goals as individuals and communities. However, 
communities do not always accept the incentive pay scale begrudgingly, but they do so voluntarily 
and, frequently, thanking local and national leaders.  “we thank our community leaders because 
sometimes we do not believe” (agradecemos a nuestros dirigentes porque a veces sabemos no creer) (Mamita 
interviewed in Community 3, 2018-11-22), stated one mamita during a focus group.   The state-
community relationship and the clientelism that is rooted in the hacienda system helps to explain 
why communities interviewed would disagree with the price of the incentive, while at the same time 
thanking then President Correa for “his initiative (Socio Bosque) because no other President has paid 
attention to the páramo” (tambien debo agradecer a Correa porque ningún presidente se ha reconocido esto a dar 
por conservar el paramo) (Tayta interviewed in Community 4, 2018-03-12).  This comment epitomizes 
the view of the state that Indigenous communities have, one where the benevolent landowner (the 
state) is bestowing undeserved blessing upon them which they do not deserve and to which they 
have no right.  The community must simply smile, be thankful, and accept the gift without question.  
As Lyons (2005) notes, state hegemony and governance are not limited to violent or physical 
coercion; rather, often consent, persuasion, and coercion are indistinguishable as communities 
engage with state-led initiatives in search of viable economic livelihoods.  In the case of Socio Bosque, 





community development projects.  As a result, they choose to engage in projects that, in their own 
words, are unequal and unjust, suggesting that Indigenous communities are not passive subordinate 




6.6 Distribution of Incentive Payments 
Even with the seemingly unequal incentive payments, Indigenous communities have chosen to 
participate in Socio Bosque.  The following section’s main objective is to understand how communities 
spend their incentive payments.  I will begin with a macro-level, provincial analysis of incentive 
payment spending in the province of Chimborazo and subsequently turn to the specific spending of 
the five communities that participated in this research.  Each community investment plan must 
clearly outline how the community will spend the incentive payment under four specific categories: 
conservation, productive economic development, social and cultural development and 
organizational strengthening.  Individual contracts are not held to the same standards, but MAE has 
quantified their spending in the following categories: conservation, family consumption, productive 
investment or savings, debt cancellation, and asset acquisition.  The chart below indicates how 
individual landowners involved in the Socio Bosque program in Chimborazo have spent their money.  
Family consumption is the main expense for individual participants, while conservation is also highly 
prioritized. 
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In comparison with individual participants, communities spent their incentive payments in different 
areas.  The following graph from MAE has divided the spending of incentive payments into more 
specific categories to include transport, education, health, territorial consolidation, and 
infrastructure/assets.  This provides an even further understanding of how communities are 
spending their incentive payments at the provincial level. 
Figure 11: Incentive Payment Spending Distribution: Collective 
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Social and cultural development has been broken down into five different categories.  However, 
based on the investment plans analyzed, health, education, territorial consolidation, and other would 
be considered cultural and social development.  Transportation would be considered part of 
organizational strengthening and depending on the exact expense, infrastructure/assets would be 
either productive economic development or cultural and social development.  Therefore, productive 
economic development was 20% of incentive payments, social and cultural and development was 
20%, conservation was 20%, organization strengthening was 23%, and infrastructure/assets was 





For example, the construction of a church building with Socio Bosque funds, which happened in one 
community, would be considered social and cultural development, while the construction of a milk 
processing plant, which also happened in another community, would be considered productive 
economic development.  These statistics indicate a relatively even distribution of the incentive 
payments in all categories at the provincial level.  However, when factoring infrastructure/assets, 
both productive economic development and social and cultural development would increase. 
 
 
6.7 Community Level Analysis 
I will now turn to a micro-level analysis of each community that formed part of this research to 
understand how the five participant communities prioritized the spending of their Socio Bosque 
incentive payment. The largest number of hectares conserved in the five communities of the study 
was Community 3 with 2,573.  Community 3, along with Community 1, offers unique cases since the 
land that is part of the Socio Bosque program is also part of the Reserva de Producción Faunística de 
Chimborazo (RPFCH – Chimborazo Wildlife Reproduction Reserve) which is part of the Sistema 
Nacional de Áreas Protegidas (SNAP - National System of Protected Areas).  Created in 1986, this 
reserve covers more than 58,000 hectares in three different provinces – Chimborazo, Bolivar and 
Tungurahua – and protects the area surrounding the mighty Chimborazo Volcano.  Since 
communities owned the land well before the creation of the reserve, they have rights to land and 
resource use within the park.   
 
However, during interviews in both communities, participants expressed a tenuous and strained 
relationship with MAE in regard to their participation in the management of and benefits received 
from the reserve.  As one participant explained,  
“sometimes MAE works against us.  The women in our community sold 
handicrafts in the reserve and MAE puts clauses and limits on their work 
saying they could not sell.  Then, MAE brings people from other provinces to 
sell their goods in the reserve.  They bring other people to sell in the reserve.  
They bring others to compete with our women…they made our women clean 
[the bathrooms].  It is an abuse of the women that go to sell” (Tayta 






“A veces los funcionarios del MAE nos sirven en contra.  Porque nuestras mujeres vendaban 
arriba en la reserva.  Y MAE pone las cláusulas y los limites diciendo que no pueden vivir.  
Trae otras personas de otras provincias para vender en la reserva.  Traen otras personas para 
competir con las ventas de nuestras mujeres… hacen que nuestras mujeres limpian.  Es un 
abuso a las mujeres que van a vender”. 
These comments portray a strained relationship between the community and MAE surrounding the 
management of the Chimborazo Reserve and to the benefit of the community from the organized 
conservation of their land as a nationally protected area.  The examples of Community 3 and 
Community 1 show the complexities of environmental governance and conservation among varied 
set of local, provincial, and national actors and stakeholders.  The table below shows the incentive 
payment, hectares conserved, and number of beneficiaries for each of the five communities.  This 
information was gathered from incentive payment plans and original contracts between MAE and 
each community. 
Table 21: Five Participant Community Incentive Payment Analysis 









Beneficiaries Incentive per 
Beneficiary (USD) 
    Families Total Families Total 
1 683.57 16,671.4 24.39 17 65 980.67 256.4 
2 316.31 9,326.2 29.48 42 100 222 93.26 
3 2,573.7 37,735 14.66 57 118 662.01 319.78 
4 418.95 11,379 27.16 120 350 94.82 32.51 
5 420.71 11,414 27.13 18 72 634 158.52 
Total 4,413.24 86,525.6  254 705 340.65 122.73 
The average annual incentive per family of the five communities is $340.65 USD, while the average 
per beneficiary is $122.73 USD.  There is discrepancy with Community 4 receiving the least amount 
per beneficiary and Community 3 receiving the most with respect to the others.  Community 3 has 
the most hectares invested in Socio Bosque  and an explanation for this could be that, due to its 
proximity to the Chimborazo Volcano and the national reserve, this community has had extensive 
interaction with MAE and international finance from external NGO programs and projects.13  
 
13 Community 1 and 3 have participated in various state-led and international development projects, such as a 
school building, livestock rearing, agricultural production, woman’s enterprise (weaving), and community eco-






Compared to the provincial level, these communities received substantially more per family and per 
beneficiary - $340.65 (Provincial) to $54.82 (National) and $122.73 (Provincial) to $12.24 (National) 
respectively.  
 
One benefit of the incentive payment plan is the flexibility that MAE allows within this scheme.  
While there are certain restrictions, communities have significant freedom on how they can spend 
their incentive payment.  The five categories that MAE uses to lump community incentive spending 
through investment plans leave room for interpretation and within the communities studied there 
was a variety of items that were purchased, ranging from cows and pigs to televisions and stoves.  
Some communities decided to divide the yearly incentive payment among themselves and spend 
their individual money as they see fit within the parameters set by MAE.  However, even in this 
model, individual families are restricted to the above-mentioned categories and must provide 
receipts for every purchase, be it clothing, school supplies, or the purchase of animals or seeds for 
agriculture.  The tables below outline the investment plans (PDI) over an eight year period for each 
of the five communities who participated in this study.14  
 
As the table indicates, during this time period, activities and spending under social and cultural 
development was nearly 60% of the incentive payment totals, while productive economic 
development was close to 33%.  Organizational strengthening and conservation lagged far behind 
with 5.5% and 2.4% respectively.  For an environmental conservation program, it is interesting to 
note that the conservation category has not been a priority for incentive payment spending, but for 
individuals interviewed, both in the state and in Indigenous communities, conserving the 
environment through Socio Bosque was a priority. Until 2017, communities did not often spend funds 
within the conservation category.  From 2011 to 2016 only $6,400 was spent under the category of 
conservation, representing 1.7% of the total incentive payments paid to all five communities in this 
same time period.  The community that has spent the most on conservation is Community 5 with 
approximately 10% of their overall budget from 2011-2018 spent on conservation. Combined with a 
 
through Scarborough Missions and CECI (Canadian Centre for International Studies and Cooperation), provided 
$78,000 CDN to help the centre. https://www.scarboromissions.ca/study-guide-1-the-struggle-for-freedom 






lack of spending in the category of conservation, I did not observe fencing or signs clearly 
delineating the conservation area in any of the 5 communities we visited, suggesting that none of 
these communities have followed Socio Bosque’s urging in this matter.  In recent years, MAE has 
begun to impose spending within the “conservation” rubric, which has been spent on signage and 
clearly delineating the conservation area.  Exactly how this constitutes conservation is unclear, but it 
does suggest that MAE sees conservation as an untouched ecosystem or environmental space that is 
clearly privatized and not to be used for any other activities. 
 
This evidence would suggest that communities have not valued the conservation of the páramo, at 
least the category as it is described by Socio Bosque as formal delineation and signage, as a valid 
channel or expense for their incentive payments, but communities did not violate the terms of the 
agreement with MAE.  In various conversations with community members and leaders, protecting 
and conserving the páramo was clearly a priority and no evidence of community members violating 
the terms of the Socio Bosque contract was found. Since 2017, Socio Bosque pushed communities to 
spend more of their incentives in conservation of the páramo with activities such as enclosure of the 
conservation area with fencing, signs posted in and around the area stating that this section of the 
páramo is part of the Socio Bosque project, and, in a few cases, providing access to firehoses near the 
conservation area in case of wildfires.  However, during interviews, focus groups, and community 
visits, there was very little evidence of the communities violating the terms of the Socio Bosque 
agreement by engaging in prohibited behaviour in the conserved area, meaning that communities 
may not view a formally designated conservation area as important, but they continue to conserve 
the páramo. Even with increased pressure from Socio Bosque to spend more on conservation by clearly 
outlining the conserved area with fencing and signs, the conservation category was only 3.89% of 
the total incentive payments in 2017 and 2018.  Therefore, it would seem as if Indigenous 
communities do not prioritize conservation as an area of spending and see their incentive payments 
as ways in which they can increase their social, cultural, and economic capital and well-being ahead 
of further, more formal ways of conserving the páramo. 
Table 22: Incentive Payment Distribution of 5 Participant Communities (2011-2018) 





Conservation 13783 2.44% 
Social and cultural development 334666 59.36% 
Economic development 160093 28.40% 
Organizational strengthening 30988 5.50% 
Total 563792 
 
Figure 12: Incentive Payment Distribution of 5 Participant Communities (2011-2018) 
 
These statistics differ from the provincial figures in that the five communities of this study spent the 
incentive payment on social and cultural development more than any other category.  However, this 
difference can also be attributed to how MAE categorizes incentive payments.  When incentive 
payments are spent on things like televisions, stoves, or other household items, these are considered 
within the social and cultural development category.    
 
Below a detailed analysis of each community spending plan will be provided.  This information was 
gathered from various Socio Bosque documents given to me from MAE.  These documents included 
individual community investment plans and monitoring and evaluation reports.  It is important to 
note that in some instances the information was gathered from a number of different documents.  
On a few occasions, it was difficult to gain a clear understanding of when payments were made and 
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exactly how those payments were spent.  However, most of the information below provides a clear 
understanding of how the yearly incentive payments were spent. 
Table 23: Community 1 Incentive Payment Spending 
Community 1 
Category 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018   
Conservation       100 500 600 1% 
Social and cultural 
development 
 8335   15671 17  8335 32358 33% 
Economic 
development 
 8335 8250 7070  8400 8135 24307 64497 65% 
Organizational 
strengthening 
  85 1300   100 200 1685 2% 
Community 1, divided only by a highway with Community 3, entered the program in 2011 and 
began to spend its incentive payments in 2012.  Many carry-forward payments make it difficult to 
comprehend exactly how and when the incentive payments were spent.  Therefore, there may be 
some cross-over in the spending outlined below from year to year.  In 2012, the payments were 
spent on agriculture ($8,335) and “funds for food and the elderly” ($8,335).  As one elderly mamita 
explained, “I don’t have a husband.  He died 29 years ago.  We as women, God pay you, have 
livestock and feed for animals, clothes, and whatever small things we can buy.  We also have food.  I 
am happy with the money.  It helps me to supplement my income” (no tengo marido ya se murió y me 
quede 29 años viuda.  Nosotros como mujercita Dios le pague teníamos ganaditos, hierbitas, pasto para los 
animalitos, ropita, cualquier costia ya compramos.  También para alimentos.  Estoy feliz con esa platita) (Mamita 
interviewed in Community 1 2018-04-30).  The 2013 payments were spent on a caja comunal (micro-
credit fund) where 15 individuals received $550 loans.  However, a detailed account states that these 
loans were used to purchase cattle for each of the participants.  In 2014, the incentive payment was 
spent on purchasing “household materials for community members”.  However, under the receipts 
for that same period, $7,070 was used to purchase ($7000) and transport ($70) wood, while the 
$1,300 was used to purchase a laptop and camera for the association.  In 2015, the same purchase of 
household materials was made.  During focus groups, it was explained to me that these funds were 
used to purchase specific materials, such as wood, that were needed to make basic repairs to various 
houses in the community and that the entire community had agreed upon this purchase.  The same 
can be said about the purchase of cattle.  The community explained that they prioritized the most 





seeds, as well as food/health/clothing expenses for community members.  In 2016, 15 community 
members received $560 which was used to purchase cattle for a total of $8,400.  In 2017, $8,135 was 
spent on pasture, such as alfalfa, for community members to plant as future food for their cattle.  A 
further $8,335 was spent on household goods for community members.  The plan de inversion for 
2018 provided expenses for signs to delineate the area under conservation, the purchase of 
household items, and the purchase of cattle, pasture, and fertilizer as the main expenses. 
Table 24: Community 2 Incentive Payment Spending 
Community 2 
Category 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Total  
Conservation     100  105 501 706 1% 
Social and cultural 
development 
    9306  1510 17796 28612 62% 
Economic 
development 
 9326 9326    1920 1436 22008 37% 
Organizational 
strengthening 
    120  170 200 490 1% 
Overall, Community 2 spent their incentive payments in similar fashion to the previous communities 
with most being spent on either social and cultural development or economic development.  
However, they were the community that spent the most on social and cultural development.  The 
reason for this is that the main expense was construction materials used for a community centre.  In 
2012, Community 2 bought improved dairy cattle and forage for animals, which included seeds and 
organic fertilizer.  The purchase of cattle is somewhat contradictory to conserving the páramo since 
raising these animals can be highly damaging to the unique ecosystem.  In 2015, signs were bought 
to place around the area under conservation, resulting in the $100 cost.  The $9,306 under social and 
cultural development was spent on construction material, materials for an irrigation system and 
more cattle, as well as sheep.  An interesting cost during this year was $2,400 for víveres (provisions 
or food) for community members. During discussion with Socio Bosque employees, I was told that 
these types of individual expenses were not permitted; however, it is clear that communities saw 
these types of expenses as valid and necessary.  Various receipts were found that show a $1,000 for 
“professional services to elaborate reports” paid in 2015 to an accountant, while another amount of 
$3,723 was paid for “professional services rendered in 2014, 2015 and 2016 from the same 
accountant.  This expense was not planned in the investment plan. In 2017, Community 2 received 





food and clothing for community members, construction materials, and cattle.  The amount spent in 
2017 was well below the amount received and, in these cases, communities are able to carry forward 
any balance and spend it in the following year.  The planned expenses for 2018 include food, 
clothing, a camera, construction materials, cattle, and administrative/accounting costs.  
Table 25: Community 3 Incentive Payment Spending 
Community 3 
Category 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Total  
Conservation       1933  1933 1% 
Social and cultural 
development 
 37515 17100 34200 17100 15743 54915  195424 89% 
Economic 
development 
      12693  12693 6% 
Organizational 
strengthening 
  1767 1767 1767 2100 2077  9478 4% 
In 2012, Community 3’s first PDI outlined the creation of an emergency fund for the 19 founding 
members of the association.  This emergency fund was to be used for medical, food, or other 
emergency expenses.  The majority of the funds for 2012, $34,500, was to be put towards the 
emergency fund.  Detailed receipts show that these funds were spent on the purchase of chickens, 
furniture, clothing, food, construction materials, agricultural inputs, mattresses, kitchenettes, 
medication, and livestock.  The individual costs for some of these items ranged from as little as $5 
(agricultural inputs) to as much as $900 (cows).  From 2013 - 2015, the incentive payment was spent 
in a similar fashion ($34,200 per year), which is placed under social and cultural development.  This 
expense was confirmed in focus groups where community members stated that the funds were 
evenly distributed to each family in order to buy basic needs, such as food and other household 
items.  The 2016 plan de inversion had a carry-over amount and details the specific amount received 
per founding member that year, $2,695, with the rest of the funds being spent on accounting and 
administrative costs.  However, because of the lack of funding from Socio Bosque for 2016, these 
expenses were carried over to 2017, resulting in the large amount above.  Other expenses in 2017 
include vehicle repairs ($3,399), construction materials ($4,520), and home appliances ($8,308).  The 
2018 plan de inversion shows similar expenses for the year.  Community 3 was the only community 
where expenses, such as home appliances and furniture, were found.  The community stated in 
focus groups that the funds were divided equally among each community member and they were 





MAE representatives if this was or should be the case, they stated that the incentive payments 
should not be handed out as cash to be spent as community members wish, so it would seem as if 
communities have taken liberties with the norms laid out in the PDI expenses and that MAE has 
been lenient on purchases as long as communities provide receipts. 
Table 26: Community 4 Incentive Payment Spending 
Community 4 
Category 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Total  
Conservation       1000  1000 1% 
Social and cultural 
development 
  5651 9498 12583 3161 2150  33866 38% 
Economic 
development 
13068 16716     18872  48656 55% 
Organizational 
strengthening 
2000 542 131  538 430 840  4481 5% 
Community 4 entered Socio Bosque in 2011, but the earliest investment plan is from October 2011 to 
October 2012.  In the first investment plan from 2011, the community proposed a caja comunal 
(micro-credit fund), the restoration of the local church, and an administrative emergency fund.  In 
2012, money was carried forward from 2011 and the community was able to provide $16,716 in 
micro-credit to thirteen individuals ranging from $150 to $4,940.  There is no indication on the 
specific expenses for which the credit was used by each individual.  In 2014, the community began 
construction on the local church.  While $9,498 was planned, only $5,651 was spent on construction 
materials.  In 2015, with the carry-over from 2014, the community had excess funds and had main 
expenses of construction materials for the church and more micro-credit loans to community 
members.  On this occasion, 71 community members received an equal credit of $284.33.  The 
report also states that to date, the church was 70% completed.  From 2016-2018, it is difficult to 
determine the exact amount of incentive payment received and spent, demonstrating the complexity 
of the implementation and monitoring of the plan de inversión.  There were various copies of the plan 
de inversión and the rendición de cuentas (accounting) documents.  What can be determined is that the 
community planned to spend their incentive payment on the construction of a milk collection centre 
and processing plant, which was still under construction when field research was conducted in 2019.  
Community members stated that more funds were needed to complete the building and that the 





purchase signs to delineate the area under conservation which is a cost that is placed under the 
conservation category. 
Table 27: Community 5 Incentive Payment Spending 
Community 5 
Category 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Total  




7414 5,707 5,707  11414 8704 3717 3717 34966 37% 
Economic 
development 
1800 5,580 5.580 11,400 11414    35,774 38% 
Organizational 
strengthening 
1600 73    380 687 12114 14854 16% 
Community 5 joined Socio Bosque in 2011.  In that first year, the objectives outlined in the investment 
plan were the following: 1. Maintain and protect the conservation area; 2. Improve the sanitary 
conditions of the members of the community association; 3. Promote and improve livestock 
production in the association; and, 4. Improve the administrative and financial management of the 
association.  Two specific activities were planned under objective number 1, which falls under the 
Conservation rubric.  These activities included enclosure of the conservation area and cleaning of 
firehoses in the area.  Objective 2 had the specific task of building latrines for association members.  
Objective 3 included the purchase of various seeds, such as clover and pasto azul (bluegrass), while 
objective 4 included training, the purchase of a table and chairs, and various administrative costs.  In 
2012, the major expenses for the year were $5,580 for livestock and $5,707 for food purchases, 
which were divided among community members.  The same purchases were made in 2013 while in 
2014 and 2015 the entire incentive payment was spent on purchasing cattle.  In 2016, Community 5 
began to pay community members for monitoring the conservation area.  While each community 
member was obligated to monitor before, in 2016 they began to be remunerated for their work.  
Under Conservation, funds were also spent on signage for the conservation area.  The $8,704 spent 
under Social and Cultural Development was used to purchase materials for an ongoing irrigation 
system that the community was building, which could be argued as economic development and not 
social and/or cultural development.  In 2017, the main expense was the purchase of materials for 
the construction of an irrigation system.  The construction and costs of the irrigation system 





association” to the Banco Nacional de Fomento (BNF), a state-owned bank.  It was explained to me that 
the funds used to pay the debt with the BNF dated back to the late 1990s where the communities 
used the loan to purchase land from the Riobamba Diocese, the owner of the hacienda.  The loan 
was still outstanding and funds were used to pay the final payments to the BNF. 
 
6.8 Conclusions 
This final section will draw from the empirical data outlined above to draw broader conclusions 
about the distributional effects of the Socio Bosque program in Kichwa Indigenous communities of 
Chimborazo.  From a methodological standpoint, associating expenditures with community 
preferences and priorities presented a number of challenges. First, community-based reporting 
varied significantly; “Community #1,” for instance, received the highest payment per hectare (Table 
5) but provided little in the way of detailed financial reporting. Second, ambiguous line items made it 
difficult to discern whether the purchases were being made on behalf of certain individuals or on 
behalf of the community. Food and víveres (provisions), for instance, may have been provided for 
certain groups of individuals, external visitors, community celebrations or a combination of all three. 
Finally, all of the communities had carry-overs, making it difficult to discern whether the 
expenditures were being reported for current or previous years.  However, the data above does 
provide a rich account of how communities spent their incentive payments and conclusions can be 
drawn from this information. 
 
The injection of money into local communities through PES programs does not operate within a 
vacuum with respect to the local context; power dynamics shape community agency, inclusion and 
participation.  On top of local complexities, state-community power relations frame interactions and 
the distribution of funds further limits meaningful inclusion and participation of Indigenous 
communities.  The findings of this chapter will be grouped into the following: 1) Socio Bosque  does 
provide material benefits to participating communities, but those benefits happen within a wider 
context of inequality; 2) given the historical state-community relationships, the Socio Bosque  incentive 
payment is seen as a “regalo” (gift) by communities instead of a derecho (right); and, 3) communities 
have spent most of the incentive payments on social, economic and cultural development, 






An Unequal Payment 
As discussed previously, the hacienda system in Chimborazo created social and economic 
inequalities that oppressed and marginalized Indigenous communities, making Chimborazo 
one of the poorest provinces in the country, with some counties reaching 90% poverty 
(INEC, 2014).  These inequalities are inherently part of the Socio Bosque program, evidenced by 
the sliding scale payment which is disadvantageous to Indigenous communities and leaves 
little room for agency or negotiation in determining the price of their land and ecosystems, 
while at the same time benefiting individual landholders and marginalizing Indigenous forms 
of communal land ownership.  The implementation of the incentive payment suggests little 
room for community resistance to the imposed payment scheme of Socio Bosque, in what can 
be deemed a “take it, or leave it” approach from MAE, with the exception of the Shuar 
community described above.  Furthermore, community ideas about ways in which payments 
and incentives could be increased by charging larger cities, such as Riobamba, and national 
and international corporations for the use of water and the conservation of the páramo seem to 
be largely ignored as alternatives, suggesting that Indigenous perspectives around the private 
use of nature, land and resources do not form part of larger policy discussions at the local, 
provincial or national level. 
 
Provincial data and statistics from the specific communities of this study indicate that 
Chimborazo and the five communities are representative of larger, national statistics in that 
community contracts represent a higher number of hectares conserved but receive a lower 
percentage of the incentive payment.  However, in the case of Chimborazo and the five 
communities, the inequality between individual and community contracts is further 
exacerbated, highlighting the importance of social and economic historical contexts when 
implementing PES programs.  The incentive payments in the five communities of this study 
show a variation in per beneficiary results.  In general, all of the communities receive more 
than the provincial average of $54.82 (Family) and $12.24 (Individual).  The disparity in 
average incentive payment within the five communities indicates that local historical context 
has positioned some communities more favourably than others, such as the case of 






Furthermore, the Socio Bosque  payment scale clearly benefits individual landowners over 
communities, which raises the following question: if poverty reduction and improved 
livelihoods are goals of PES programs, why do individuals form part of the program since 
they conserve fewer hectares and the impacts of receiving the incentive payment are limited to 
a family unit?  In contrast, Indigenous communities conserve a larger number of hectares and 
the impact of the incentive payment reaches many more beneficiaries; yet these communities 
participate less frequently in the program and receive a reduced amount of incentive payments 
due to communal land ownership.  As the overall data from Chimborazo suggests, the 
majority of incentive payments to individual contracts were spent on family consumption.  
Individual family consumption represents, at the very least, a demonstration of prioritizing 
individual or family needs over the needs of a larger community, which can run counter to 
Kichwa values that will be discussed in detail in the following chapter, as well as the idea that 
PES programs will help to alleviate poverty within Indigenous communities.  That is not to 
say that Kichwa communities always act in an altruistic, communal manner, but that certain 
values underpin the interactions of Kichwa communities and a prioritized spending of incentive 
payments on an individual/family level seems to contradict these values.  However, a greater 
understanding of the meaning of individual/family level spending and the economic and 
poverty alleviation impacts of Socio Bosque on participating communities goes beyond the 
scope of this analysis and leaves room for future research.  It is also too early to determine if 
Socio Bosque has had a larger impact on alleviating poverty and improving Indigenous 
livelihoods.  
 
The sliding scale payment scheme of Socio Bosque also ignores the cultural importance Kichwa 
communities ascribe to keeping lands communally owned, as indicated by the quotes from 
taytas and mamitas maintaining that the communal land of the páramo be kept intact.  On top of 
the laws that prohibit division of communal land, maintaining communal land is highly 
symbolic for communities as it represents the culmination of a unified struggle that families 
and communities faced to gain title to their land in taking land from the hands of a single 
family or landowner in the times of the hacienda and returning it to the larger community.  





sliding scale like that of Socio Bosque fails to recognize and fairly compensate the importance of 
maintaining communally owned land in indigenous communities, further relegating 
Indigenous peoples to the margins of meaningful inclusion and participation in PES 
programs. 
 
“Derecho” or “Regalo” 
Each community that participated in this study stated that Socio Bosque has been economically 
beneficial, both individually and communally.  While the communities recognize the incentive 
payments do not represent the true value they place on nature, those interviewed are grateful 
to be receiving any compensation at all for conserving the páramo. As indicated throughout 
this chapter, the state controls various aspects of the price placed on nature and the payments 
that participant communities receive through the Socio Bosque program.  The price paid to 
communities is determined by the central state authorities and, as one ex-government official 
that was interviewed revealed, there was no exact calculation of the price to be paid based on 
actual ecosystem services. Rather, the price was established based on the existing MAE budget 
allocated to the Socio Bosque program.  The way in which payments are calculated does not 
follow neoliberal notions of cost/benefit or a true valuation of ecosystem services that are 
part of free market-based environmentalism, suggesting that Socio Bosque is confined to larger 
constraints driving the price of nature.   
 
The state’s imposition of the price paid to communities does not represent a passive 
acceptance and participation of Indigenous communities that are forced into participating in 
the program.  In fact, Indigenous communities actively choose to participate and demonstrate 
a significant amount of communal and individual agency in deciding to join the program.  The 
five communities of this study each went through its own process of internal acceptance to 
enter the program, while neighbouring communities, sometimes offered the same terms from 
Socio Bosque, chose not to participate.  This internal process varied among communities, but 
generally included an official presentation about Socio Bosque by MAE officials, usually with the 
support of local leaders; various internal community meetings to discuss and to answer 





approval to participate in the program.  From there, communities and leaders would begin the 
application process with MAE.   
 
However, participation of Indigenous communities within Socio Bosque is done within a 
historically unequal relationship between Indigenous communities and the Ecuadorian state, 
as well as the mestizo population.  The imposition of the price by the state represents a 
hegemonic imposition of the state’s valuation of the páramo in that the state’s approach is not 
one of simple coercion, but it is embedded in practices and relationships that are material, 
social, and cultural (Lyons, 2006).  These relationships establish or maintain domination by 
reproducing unequal power relationships between indigenous communities and the state.  The 
work of Burgos (199715) provides insight into the historical context of “take it or leave it” 
market prices imposed by urban, mestizo populations on rural, Kichwa indigenous people.  
 
Both the state and Indigenous view the payment within the context of their relationship with 
one another, a context of inequality, marginalization and, often, oppression of indigenous 
worldviews and opinions. Perceptions of the state within Indigenous communities have been 
shaped by the hacienda system (Lyons, 2006; Bretón, 2014; Tuaza, 2014), while the state has 
continued patriarchal and clientelist relationships with Indigenous communities. The 
relationship between the Ecuadorian state and Kichwa Indigenous communities in Chimborazo 
is based on a social and historical context that devalues Indigenous worldviews and reinforces 
unequal power relations in the form of loyalty, hierarchy, and patronage, as seen in the context 
chapter.  This relationship is best seen in the continuation of the practices of domination and 
marginalization that were present in the hacienda system.  Instead of creating incentives, cash 
 
15 Hugo Burgos’ work, Relaciones Interétnicas en Riobamba, provides an excellent exposition of the complexities of 
intercultural relations and the underlying racial and ethnic tensions between the mainly Mestizo urban centre of 
Riobamba and the Indigenous, rural communities.  These tensions are very much present within programs like 
Socio Bosque through an exclusionary process of accountability that marginalizes the participation of Indigenous 
communities to one of inferiority and obligates them to accept the social and political framework of the Mestizo 
city centre.  Burgos demonstrated aspects of “internal colonization” of the mestizo population over Indigenous 
communities in Ecuador.  The move from the colony to independence signified a change of master for the 
Indigenous where the mestizo population took the place of the Spanish. Burgos uses markets to demonstrate the 
scenario in which Indigenous-mestizo relations are evidenced in mercantile transactions where the price of goods 





payments from Socio Bosque in this particular context take the form of “gifts”.  As discussed in 
detail in the context chapter, communities viewed hacienda owners as benevolent landowners 
who provided them with “regalos” for their labour, such as alcohol and a small plot of 
indebted land (Lyons, 2006).  
 
In the Indigenous imaginary, a relationship based on “regalos” and reciprocity is rooted in the 
socio-historical context of not only the hacienda system, but the Incan empire that preceded it 
(Lyons, 2006, 2016; Estermann, 1998, 2015; Murra, 1980).  Often, Indigenous workers would 
support strict and abusive landowners and miserable, slave-like work conditions in exchange 
for a small plot of land where they could live and farm (Lyons, 2006; Tuaza, 2014).  In the 
context of state-led programs like Socio Bosque, the state has simply taken the place of the 
hacendado/landowner who supplies the gifts in exchange for loyalty (Tuaza, 2014).  As a 
result, communities view the incentive payments that form part of the state-led Socio Bosque 
program as a gift, not a right or deserved compensation for conserving nature.   
 
Sustainable Livelihoods: A Community Priority 
The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that communities have prioritized economic, 
social, and cultural development when spending their Socio Bosque incentive payments. Within 
these categories, incentive payments went to purchase livestock, such as sheep and cattle.  
These investments provide an attractive livelihood option for families, but sheep and cattle 
can be extremely destructive to the páramo ecosystem (Hofstede et al., 2014b; Flores et al., 
2012), suggesting a possible contradiction between the discursive commitment to protecting 
Pachamama by both the state and the communities and the way in which funds were being 
spent.  Furthermore, the case of Community 4 indicates the difficulty of projects built by Socio 
Bosque incentive payments to provide long-term sustainable livelihoods to communities.  
Community 4’s desire to build a milk processing plant came at a time (2018) when milk 
production and demand was at its peak and the government committed to a fair price 
structure, but COVID-19 has caused instability in the dairy sector, with many local producers 
dumping milk into the sewer (Ecuavisa, 2020).  With the current difficulties of the dairy 





areas that they feel provide long-term, sustainable livelihood solutions, are highly susceptible 
to economic fluctuations, making these investments  a short term injection of funding that 
























Chapter 7  















The previous two chapters explored the institutional and distributional effects of Socio Bosque  and 
document that an institutionalized Socio Bosque  has changed land use and resource management 
practices within Kichwa communities. While the distribution of incentive payments has provided 
material and economic benefits, these benefits take place within a context of inequality and the 
continuation of hegemonic ideologies that subsume and marginalize Indigenous communities.  
When I first started investigating the role of Socio Bosque in Kichwa communities, it became apparent 
that I needed to develop a clearer understanding of the cultural, religious, spiritual, and symbolic 
meanings of “resources” and “landscapes” in the Andean context. To understand these aspects of 
resources and landscapes, this chapter will explore the epistemic foundations of PES programs and 
contrast and compare those foundations with Kichwa cosmovisiones and connections to land and place. 
 
The central aim of the chapter is to understand how PES programs interact with local 
understandings of Pachamama.  This aim will be achieved by 1. describing the high-modernist/state 
bureaucratic epistemology of land use in PES programs; and, 2. describing local/community 
understandings of Indigenous Ecological Knowledge (IEK) and relationships with nature, 
specifically Kichwa perspectives.  To accomplish these ends, I use interviews, focus group 
discussions, and participant observation, combined with secondary literature on Andean Indigenous 
cosmovisiones, to explore the intricate relationship the Kichwa peoples have with nature through living 
concepts, such as Pachamama and sumak kawsay.  This chapter will analyze how these concepts 
reassert ties to land and place and, at the same time, contest colonial and capitalist capture of place 
in the form of “green grabbing” (Fairhead et al., 2012) through environmental governance programs 
like Socio Bosque.  This Indigenous perspective will be compared to that of PES programs which, I 
will show, are based on a Scientific Forest Governance (SFG) perspective.  The chapter will also 
explore the epistemic tensions between international institutions and environmental governance 
programs’ definitions of ecosystems and local, Indigenous ways of living, being and doing found in 
the interconnected relationship between runa (man) and Pachamama.  The following questions and 
sub-questions will help guide the analysis below: 
1. What meaning and value do Kichwa communities assign to nature and natural resources 
2. How does this meaning and value inform land use and resource management practices, and 





3. How do the ways in which international environmental conservation efforts and state-led 
institutions define and describe ecosystems affect and interact with local, Indigenous, place-
based understandings of nature? 
a. What policy changes have been implemented as a result of government definitions of 
ecosystems and how have these changes affected land use and resource management 
in Kichwa communities in Chimborazo? 
The purpose of this chapter is not to create an imaginary dichotomy between different worldviews, 
those of Indigenous Environmental Knowledge (IEK) and Scientific Forest Governance (SFG), or 
to simplify either perspective. The two forms of knowledge are intricately linked and, at times, 
inseparable.  As Agrawal states, “it is difficult to adhere to a view of indigenous and Western forms 
of knowledge being untouched by each other” (Agrawal, 1995: 415).  The lines between the two 
ways of knowing and understanding the environment are not always clear and some aspects of 
modern-day scientific knowledge grew from local, Indigenous forms of living in and understanding 
the world (Berkes, 2018; Ellen et al., 2000). As Berkes notes, both Western science and Indigenous 
knowledge are based on observations of the environment, interpreting and knowing these 
observations and, finally, creating order out of disorder (Berkes, 2018).  
 
A key area of focus for the chapter is the apparent contradiction between market-based approaches 
of environmental governance that emphasize separation of land and society, individual incentives 
and collective action and Indigenous worldviews that ascribe meaning to “resources” and landscapes 
- e.g. Pachamama - that emphasize responsibility and tradition and conceptualize alternative 
understandings of history, time, and community.  Therefore, the goal of this chapter is to explain the 
epistemic underpinnings of each perspective in order to analyze the complex interactions between 
IEK and SFG and, more specifically, how these interactions affect the inclusion and participation of 
Indigenous communities in the implementation of PES programs.  The questions above will guide 
the discussion by analyzing various ways in which Kichwa communities engage with their surrounding 
ecosystems that represent a relationship based on an epistemological understanding of nature 
(Pachamama) that connects ecosystems to individual beings who inhabit those ecosystems and the 
larger cosmos.  By answering these questions, this chapter will indicate that the epistemic 





contradict Indigenous Environmental Knowledge (IEK), but have, in fact, eliminated and erased 
traditional ecological knowledge and relationships with nature and natural resources.   
 
7.2 Epistemic Assumptions of Scientific Forest Governance 
This section will explore the epistemology of land use that underpins the Scientific Forest 
Governance perspective on nature.  The section seeks to understand how this epistemology 
classifies and redefines landscapes and nature, specifically the páramo ecosystem, in order to 
legitimize various environmental conservation efforts, such as forestation, reforestation and PES 
programs.  The section will show that state-led PES programs embody a high-modernist (Scott, 
1998) epistemology which fundamentally changes local perceptions and use of land and resources 
and (re)classifies complex relationships between Indigenous communities and nature. 
 
SFG redefines landscapes and nature through the framing of the natural world which “is influenced 
by our thoughts, concepts, ideas, ideologies and worldviews and these in turn are shaped through 
language” (Stibbe, 2015: 2).  For Stibbe, the compilation of various discourses creates the “stories we 
live by” that are not “transparent descriptions of reality, but instead shape how we perceive reality” 
(Stibbe, 2015: 23).  The stories told within the SFG frame nature around the basic elements that 
make up diverse ecosystems, elements that have, or can be made to have, specific economic value to 
humans.  For example, SFG replaces the “term ‘nature’ with the term ‘natural resources’, focusing 
on those aspects of nature that can be appropriated for human use” (Scott, 1998).  As a result, 
natural resources are reduced to quantifiable, measurable units that can be organized, managed, and 
governed by state institutions.  Nature is seen as something that must be dominated and governed 
through measurable programs and policies that can demonstrate success.  Part of the administration 
of ecosystems and ecosystem-dependent communities is carried out through environmental 
conservation programs that monetize and commodify nature through utilitarian underpinnings of 
SFG (Kopnina, 2017; Bayrak and Marafa, 2016; Gudynas, 2016; Dryzek, 2013).  As discussed in the 
theoretical chapter, PES programs seek to provide financial compensation to local communities for 
safeguarding the ecosystem which provides a variety of services to the larger global community.  In 
order for PES programs to conserve nature, they must first reclassify complex local ecosystems and 






7.3 Classifying Nature, Land, and Resources: Seeing the Forest for the Trees and the Páramo Problem 
One of the ways in which SFG redefines land and resources and the relationships communities have 
with each is how ecosystems are defined and classified, specifically defining the páramo ecosystem as 
a legitimate place for Socio Bosque and other environmental conservation and climate change 
programs.  Páramos are defined as ecosystems where seasonal climates and soils favour the 
dominance of perennial grasses and other graminoids, occurring “mainly in the middle latitudes and 
also in areas of tropical and temperate high mountains above the regional tree line where generally 
similar environments and temperate biogeographic affinities occur” (Peart, 2008).  For the most 
part, páramo ecosystems have little to no forest cover and the specific páramos of Chimborazo have 
limited natural forests.  However, these unique ecosystems provide a variety of services, such as 
carbon storage and water regulation (Ross et al. 2017; Buytaert et al., 2012be; Célleri and Feyen al., 
2009).  Páramos also have significant cultural and spiritual meaning for Indigenous communities and 
provide income and livelihoods for them (Lyons 2006, 2016, Estermann 2012, Tuaza 2014, Ross et 
al. 2017). For international climate change and environmental conservation programs and goals that 
focus on curbing deforestation, increasing reforestation, and conserving forest ecosystems, the 
páramo ecosystem presents a unique challenge (Gibbens, 2018; Bastin et al., 2019; Carrington, 2019; 
Hoare, 2020). 
 
While the term forest brings to mind a number of different images, it is important to understand 
how this term is defined within different global climate change and environmental governance 
strategies and institutions.  The United Nations Framework on Climate Change (UNFCCC) defines 
a forest as a  
“minimum area of land of 0.05-1.0 hectares with tree crown cover of more 
than 10-30 percent with trees with the potential to reach a minimum height of 
2-5 meters at maturity” (UNFCCC, 2001).  The United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP) defines a forest as an “area of land of more than 0.5 
hectares, with a tree canopy cover of more than 10%, which is not primarily 
under agricultural or other specific non-forest land use” (UNEP definition 
found in FAO, 2019a).   
REDD+ uses the Food and Agriculture Organization’s definition of forests which states that a 





percent and area of more than 0.5 ha. Forests are determined both by the presence of trees and the 
absence of other predominant land uses. The trees should be able to reach a minimum height of 5 
meters” (FAO, 2019a).  Some authors have noted that these definitions are problematic when 
discussing REDD+ and PES strategies in páramo ecosystems like the ones found in Chimborazo 
(Parr et. al., 2014).  According to the definitions above, the páramo is not considered a forest and, as 
a result, does not enter into official REDD+ interventions.  Considering the importance of the 
páramo ecosystem to Ecuadorian watersheds, the exclusion of páramos from REDD+ is problematic. 
Although REDD+ recognizes the importance of the páramo ecosystem in contributing to emissions 
reduction and carbon storage, the UNFCCC negotiations on REDD+ have focused exclusively on 
forest ecosystems, placing the páramo outside of the short-term scope of REDD+ (FONAFIFO, 
CONAFOR and Ministry of Environment, 2012).   
 
While the conservation of forests, such as those found in the Amazon, is important for global 
environmental governance, excluding páramos from REDD+ shows a clear use of specific language 
by international NGOs and governments.  It is easier to sell forest conservation to a public audience 
when easily understood terms, such as forest, are defined and understood.  Therefore, the páramo 
and the communities that depend upon this ecosystem are being erased from the debate about 
environmental governance and sustainable development.  Although these communities and 
ecosystems are being erased from the larger discourse on environmental governance, they form part 
of the Socio Bosque program in Ecuador, raising questions as to why they are included in the first 
place? 
 
The exclusion of the páramo from the discourse of global environmental governance strategies like 
REDD+ can be described as the “erasure of nature” (Stibbe, 2014).  Discursive erasure denotes “the 
absence of something important – something that is present in reality but is overlooked or 
deliberately ignored in a particular discourse” (Stibbe, 2014: 585-586).  Stibbe argues that the 
elements of erasure include an area of social life, such as environmentalism, a hegemonic discourse 
that encodes a particular worldview that is exclusionary, and a counter worldview that insists in 
including the erased aspect of their worldview (Stibbe, 2014: 586).  By using the term forests as 





PES strategies operate within a SFG framework that prioritizes market-based, utilitarian perspectives 
about nature, using terms like forest, trees, and coverage to define ecosystems reduces diversity to a 
singular, measurable stock or resource for human consumption and benefit.  By treating living 
ecosystems as simple objects, “what is unique about life such as interaction and interdependence” is 
removed from the discourse surrounding environmental conservation (Stibbe, 2014: 590).   
 
The most glaring example of the erasure of diverse ecosystems like the páramo can be seen in 
Ecuador’s REDD+ action plan – Bosques para el Buen vivir (Forests for Living Well).  The title itself 
indicates the discursive focus on forests, eliminating diversity in nature and replacing it with a 
uniform definition.  While other ecosystems, such as páramos and mangroves, are mentioned in this 
document, they are used under the general category of forests and, as a result, create what Stibbe 
calls a discursive “mask” where diverse ecosystems  have been erased and replaced with a distorted, 
more simplified version of themselves – forests and trees, etc..  Scott’s (1998) work demonstrates 
the way in which the state has played a principal role in this discursive erasure through “high 
modernist” projects that organize complex systems, such as nature, into easily administered and 
quantifiable objects through scientific and technical processes (Scott, 1998). Socio Bosque ’s 
monitoring manual epitomizes the state’s attempt to organize nature through quantifiable definitions 
and clearly states that a “basic element to develop monitoring processes consists in characterizing 
the group that is going to be evaluated across time” (Socio Bosque, 2016: 8). The manual defines 
various ecosystems, such as “native forests” and páramos, without which the program is unable to set 
measurable and demonstrable goals to international conservation organizations.  Furthermore, by 
using the term forest, international organizations, governments, and funding institutions are 
excluding or downplaying Indigenous cosmovisiones that see nature as a living, interconnected, and 
interdependent ecosystem. The word forest reduces nature to its most basic element of trees and the 
materials that can be produced from this commodity, discursively reducing nature to an 
anthropocentric view and placing nature under the domination and benefit of humans.   
 
7.4 Policy Implications of a Forest Definition 
Defining diverse ecosystems as forests has practical policy implications.  The implications of 





by Rainforest Alliance CEO, Han de Groot (2019), where he advocates that world leaders ramp up 
their “investment in proven, natural solutions…more trees in the ground” (para. 7).  The article goes 
on to state that “reforestation projects can also intersect neatly and positively with human systems—
restored forests provide a renewed resource base and new economic opportunities for communities” 
(para. 9).  Obviously, forestation and reforestation projects have become a mainstay in the climate 
change discourse.  However, this view of combating climate change can have detrimental effects on 
unique ecosystems like the páramo.  A systematic review of existing government policies and 
international conservation projects on forests and the environment reveals that how the state defines 
and, as a result, measures ecosystems has implications for subsequent environmental governance 
policies and programs. Forestation and reforestation projects can lead to the forestation of healthy 
grasslands (páramo) that were not forests to begin with.  REDD+ prioritize this type of 
environmental governance strategies as they provide easily measurable results in the form of newly 
planted trees (Giller, 2014).  Government institutions have implemented various forestation and 
reforestation projects in Chimborazo.  These projects have planted eucalyptus and pine trees that 
have clear detrimental effects on the natural páramo ecosystem (Hofstede et. al., 2002, Vásconez and 
Ochoa, 2008).  These projects represent what Jepson refers to as a “rewilding” narrative within 
environmental discourse which seeks “to restore ecosystem dynamics and functions at various scales 
often through the introduction of functional species” (Jepson, 2019: 126).  In Ecuador, these types 
of projects are now taking place under a narrative surrounding the “re-greening” of Ecuador 
through a specific project REverdecer Ecuador which seeks to invest 330 million USD in conservation, 
bio-economy, sustainable cities, environmental education, forest management, and land use and 
reforestation (Secretaría General de Comunicación de la Presidencia, 2019). 
 
The National Reforestation Plan represents a key state-led strategy that sees forestation and 
reforestation as a driving force to combat climate change, while MAGAP (Ministry of Agriculture, 
Livestock, Aquaculture, and Fishing) provides financial incentives to communities and private 
plantation businesses who plant pine and eucalyptus as reforestation.  The MAGAP program, 
Programa de Incentivos para la Reforestación con Fines Comerciales (Incentives for Reforestation with 
Commercial Purposes), provides financial incentives to individuals and communities to generate 
primary material for the lumber industry, to reduce the dependence of communities on imported 





promote product exports with greater added value, to contribute in the reduction of the 
indiscriminate use of the native forest, to incorporate lands with forests into the productive sector of 
the country and to stimulate and incorporate peasant communities in the establishment and 
management of forest plantations (MAGAP, 2014).  Clearly, the priority of this project is to 
commodify forests for the generation of local incomes of forest dependent communities.   
 
Forestation projects like the one promoted by MAGAP are not permitted above 3,500 metres above 
sea level where the fragile ecosystem of the páramo is found.  However, there has been significant 
debate and empirical evidence surrounding the altitude where the páramo begins (Coello, 2012), and 
MAE’s own definition of the páramo ecosystem begins at 3,300 metres and as low as 2,800 metres in 
some southern areas of the country (MAE, 2012: 30).  The Proyecto Páramo Andino (Andean Páramo 
Project) states that forestation should not be done above 3,000 metres (La Hora, 2010), suggesting a 
contrast between the “official” classification and other local understandings and definitions of the 
páramo, while other research suggests that páramos are at increased risk due to forestation projects 
(Bond, 2016).  Statements from the Proyecto Páramo Andino, such as the one above, show the 
complications surrounding the definition of the páramo ecosystem: “for effects of the forestation and 
reforestation program, the limits are 3,500 metres above sea level in the North and 3,200 metres in 
the South of Ecuador….all of this is páramo” (Coello, 2014: 139).  Even when native species of trees 
are used, such as the polylepis racemose, they can have negative effects of water sources and function 
(Segovia-Salcedo, 2011).   
 
The debate surrounding forestation in the páramo ecosystem is clearly ongoing, but in the meantime 
forestation projects continue. In 2014 in Chimborazo alone, 2,300 hectares of pine, eucalyptus, and 
cypress were planted (El Telegrafo, 2014).  However, these forestation projects have caused conflict 
within Indigenous communities who argue that these types of projects have negative environmental 
impacts on the páramo ecosystem and have filed lawsuits citing a violation of the “rights of nature” 
enshrined in the constitution (El Comercio, 2014).  According to Ross et al. (2017), more than 75 
per cent of páramo ecosystems in the surrounding Chambo Basin were converted to agriculture and 
forest plantations between 1979 and 2014 (Ross et al. 2017). Most of these were the result of import 





eucalyptus) and commercial agriculture during the 1970s, 80s and 90s (Ross et al. 2017). They were 
also the result of a agrarian reforms in the 60s and 70s that pushed small-scale farmers and herders 
into higher elevations (over 3500 meters above sea level).   
 
The use of the term “forests” as a blanket definition for the diverse ecosystems in Ecuador, such as 
the páramo, creates environmental governance and forest and reforestation strategies that focus on 
measurable results related to this definition.  As a result, the páramo ecosystem and communities that 
depend on this ecosystem are negatively impacted.  Due to the negative effects of pine and 
eucalyptus plantations and forests, the land becomes unusable since the thin layer of arable soil 
quickly dries up and entire communities have become desertified. Areas that were previously 
dedicated to agricultural and livestock practices have been reduced to blowing sand scattered with 
the occasional pine or eucalyptus tree.  This became evident to me in one community I have often 
visited during my time in Chimborazo.   
 
San Miguel de Pomachaca is a community that formed part of the former Totorillas Hacienda16 that I 
first visited in 2010.  Upon entering the community, I noticed that the amount of arable land in the 
lower hills was minimal.  Various community members have explained to me throughout the years 
that a combination of monocropping, use of agricultural inputs and chemicals and forest and 
reforestation projects have left previously arable land surrounding the community in a desert-like 
state.  Many elders in the community talk of a small lake that existed in a now dry area close to the 
community. In many other communities, the agricultural and livestock frontier has pushed higher 
into the páramo ecosystem due to a number of factors, but the factor of desertification of land linked 
to (re)forestation projects and over-cultivation is clear.  The community of Chismaute, a community I 
first visited in 2009, is an example of the increasing demand and pressure agricultural activities have 
on the páramo.  When I first visited Chismaute, which is situated between 3,600-4,000 metres above 
sea level, the majority of the land surrounding the communities of Chismaute was uncultivated.  In 
the following years, I have noticed crops at higher altitudes until my visit during this field research 
 





where I observed crops being cultivated in areas that were previously untouched páramo above 3,800 
– 4,000 metres. 
 
While community members recognize the positive economic impact that (re)forestation projects 
have on the community, many individuals were quick to point out that the benefits were minimal 
and considering the negative environmental impacts, such as drying up of water sources, they will no 
longer continue with such projects.  In a community that formed part of MAGAP’s forestation 
program of community land, one Tayta interviewed during my time in the field recognized the 
positive economic impact that forestation programs had on his community, but, at the same time, he 
was quick to point out that the trees have negatively impacted water sources, recognizing that some 
sources had even dried up.  Furthermore, he noted the lack of institutional support from MAE or 
MAGAP when the community attempted to sell the trees that were planted; moreover, reduced 
prices of lumber on the national level caused the community to lose out on significant amounts of 
money.  A second Tayta interviewed gave the following account of his community’s experience with 
forestation programs: 
“At first, it was hard work.  The first planting took three months work every day.  We 
even hired people from outside to help, but I am saddened by all the effort that was 
made [and] the buyers are offering very little…$3,000 dollars per hectare and we have 
hardly benefited much. Twenty years of waiting, so much sacrifice sowing, then in the 
pruning of the branches, spraying to avoid plagues so that they can come to pay us very 
little is not fair.” (Tayta interviewed in non-Socio Bosque community, 2019-07-10) 
“Fue duro el trabajo. En la primera siembra demoramos tres meses trabajando todos los días.  Incluso 
contratamos gente de fuera para avanzar con la siembra, pero me entristece por todo el esfuerzo que se 
hizo [y] vienen los compradores ofrecen muy poco $3.000 dólares por hectárea y casi no hemos 
beneficiado mucho. Veinte años de espera, tanto sacrificio sembrando, luego en la poda de las ramas 
terminando machetes, fumigando de las plagas para que nos vengan a pagar muy poco no es justo.” 
Other communities reported similar problems related to forestation projects and water sources, 
while some communities denounced the corruption of community leaders and an unequal 
distribution of the money earned from reforesting trees.  It is clear that a reductionist definition of 
diverse ecosystems that is connected to a utilitarian, market-based perspective that views ecosystems 
through their economic value first has negatively impacted various communities in Chimborazo.  
The program also represents a market instrument that uses community labour to generate a 





would harvest entire forests, further reducing the price the community received and benefiting the 
buyer. 
 
7.5 An Epistemic Struggle: Kichwa Environmental Knowledge 
Environmental conservation and PES programs linked to REDD+, such as Socio Bosque, have been 
criticized by Indigenous and civil society leaders for promoting what has been characterized as a top-
down environmental agenda that does not take into account local knowledge and understanding 
about the environment. Shortly after it was first introduced, the Confederation of Indigenous 
Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE) and CONFENIAE (Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities 
of the Ecuadorian Amazon) both denounced Socio Bosque  as a threat to Indigenous peoples’ right of 
territorial sovereignty and to the equilibrium between Pachamama and the beings, both human and 
non-human, that inhabit local ecosystems.  In a letter to UN General Secretary Ban Ki Moon in 
2011, CONAIE also expressed concern about the “capitalist marketization of [Indigenous] forests, 
water and biodiversity” done through “private hoarding initiatives of land and environmental 
services” (CONAIE, 2011). The concerns expressed by CONAIE represent a tension between 
Indigenous cosmovisiones (worldviews) about space, place, and nature and market-based notions of 
environmental conservation and resource governance.  However, amidst the seeming tension and 
negative stance of national Indigenous organizations, local Indigenous communities have decided to 
participate in the state-led PES program Socio Bosque .   
 
In spite of participating in a program that umbrella Indigenous organizations claim runs counter to 
Indigenous cosmovisiones and livelihoods, these communities maintain a complex connection and 
relationship with Pachamama, a relationship that has survived in spite of continually changing land 
use and resource management practices.  This section seeks to understand how Kichwa communities 
perceive land and resource through their relationship with Pachamama.  To achieve this 
understanding, secondary sources that offer insights into Kichwa cosmovisiones are combined with 






Indigenous communities’ continued, complex relationship with Pachamama is a relationship that has 
survived over 500 years of discursive marginalization and destruction, or what Stibbe (2014) calls 
discursive erasure.  However, where erasure exists, a discursive struggle of the marginalized is also 
present in opposition to the hegemonic discourses that dominate and oppress (Stibbe, 2014).  The 
discursive struggle within Ecuador can be seen with the inclusion of Indigenous concepts in the 
Ecuadorian Constitution.  As previously discussed, on the surface, the inclusion of Indigenous 
concepts in mainstream social and political discourse represents a monumental achievement for 
Indigenous peoples.  However, the inclusion of these concepts into state-led discourse has allowed 
the Indigenous political and economic elite, non-indigenous peoples, and the state to control and to 
define these concepts.  From a local, Indigenous perspective sumak kawsay and Pachamama are living 
concepts whose definition is based on continual intra and inter-communal relationships combined 
with a complex relationship between individuals, communities, and Pachamama - deeply spiritual 
relationships framed by reciprocity, relationality, complementarity, correspondence, and cyclicity and 
defined by the normative practice of these concepts.  However, even within Indigenous 
communities, there are varied understandings and definitions of these concepts, demonstrating the 
complexity of universal explanations of deeply individual and highly spiritual meanings ascribed to 
lived experiences.  The discursive and epistemic struggle over the definition of Indigenous concepts 
represents a site of resistance where Indigenous peoples engage with vestiges of colonial and state 
ideological, political, social, and cultural encroachment that, at the same time, have practical 
implications that involve changing land use and resource management practices within Indigenous 
communities.  This section will explore how the Kichwa of Chimborazo interact with and understand 
Pachamama, and how their understanding of and interaction with their surrounding ecosystems 
informs their everyday life and participation in PES programs like Socio Bosque. 
 
7.6 Runa and Pachamama: A complex cosmovision based on relationality, complementarity, correspondence, 
reciprocity, and cyclicity 
In contrast to the epistemic foundations of SFG that classify and redefine nature as places fit for 
market-based environmental conservation and livelihood programs, Indigenous communities refer 





humans, as well as everything contained in the cosmos.  The Sarayaku of the Central Amazon 
submitted a proposal to the 2015 Paris Climate Conference where it stated the following: 
“Kawsak Sacha (The Living Forest) is a proposal for living together with the natural world 
that grows out of the millennial knowledge of the Indigenous Peoples who inhabit the 
Amazonian rainforest, and it is one that is also buttressed by recent scientific studies. 
Whereas the western world treats nature as an undemanding source of raw materials 
destined exclusively for human use, Kawsak Sacha recognizes that the forest is made up 
entirely of living selves and the communicative relations they have with each other. These 
selves, from the smallest plants to the supreme beings who protect the forest, are persons 
(runa) who inhabit the waterfalls, lagoons, swamps, mountains, and rivers, and who, in turn, 
compose the Living Forest as a whole. These persons live together in community (llakta) 
and carry out their lives in a manner that is similar to human beings.” (2015: 1) 
 
This statement suggests an Indigenous view of nature as interconnected with all forms of life and 
part of a larger economic and social system. In Indigenous cosmovisiones, or worldviews, “nature is 
conceived as an organism where each individual part is linked to the whole” (Estermann, 2014: 65).  
Nature as a living being and part of the larger community became evident to me during my time in 
various Kichwa communities.  I observed a clear connection between individuals and communities, 
many times eating meals and conducting interviews and focus groups outside on the grass of the 
páramo instead of inside a nicely built community centre.  The following quotes taken from various 
interviews in Chimborazo provide a small window into the Kicwha perspective on Pachamama as a 
living being connected to the community and the provider of life. 
“Pachamama for the community is our mother where we are. We understand that we are 
formed from the earth, therefore, we live from the earth physically and materially. No 
one can live, we are the earth, for more scientists and intellectuals [we may be], 
absolutely everyone lives from the earth” (Tayta interviewed in non-Socio Bosque 
community, 2019-08-08. 
La Pachamama para la comunidad, es nuestra madre donde nosotros. Entendemos que somos formado 
de la tierra, por tanto, vivimos de la tierra física y materialmente. Nadie puede vivir son la tierra, por 
más científicos e intelectuales, absolutamente todos vivimos en la tierra. 
 
“Pachamama for the community is life.  Without the earth we cannot live. The earth is 
important to develop as a community…. Speaking of buen vivir, we must be people who 
value our culture and our ethics, that is called buen vivir. With Pachamama we must live in 
respect and care, but if we do not care for Pachamama, she becomes skinny/weak. It is 
like being a malnourished person if we do not take care of the Pachamama.  [Currently] 
we are malnourishing [Pachamama], so we must take care [of her] with native plants” 





La Pachamama para la comunidad es vida. Sin la tierra no podemos vivir. La tierra es importante 
para desarrollar como comunidad…. Hablando del Buen Vivir, nosotros debemos ser personas que 
valoran nuestra cultura y nuestra ética, eso se llama en buen vivir. Con la Pachamama debemos vivir en 
respeto y cuidando, sino cuidamos la Pachamama se flaquea. Es como ser desalimentado una persona 
sino cuidamos la Pachamama, mejor vivimos desalimentando, por eso debemos cuidar con plantas 
nativas. 
 
“For us, Pachamama, as is the same for Indigenous peoples, is the source and our mother 
who gives us life and food. That is why we are always saying that we must take care, that 
we must protect, that we must not mistreat the land and that we must not mistreat the 
resources we have on our soil in Pachamama. That is our very clear approach from the 
thinking of the Andean people and our nationalities” (Tayta interviewed in non-Socio 
Bosque community, 2019-07-10) 
“Para nosotros, la Pachamama igual para el pueblo indígena es la fuente y nuestra madre que nos da la 
vida y la comida. Por eso siempre estamos diciendo que hay que cuidar, que hay proteger, que no hay 
que maltratar la tierra y que no hay que maltratar los recursos que tenemos en nuestro suelo en la 
Pachamama. En eso muy claro nuestro enfoque con el pensamiento del pueblo andino y de nuestras 
nacionalidades.” 
These quotes indicate a deeper connection between runa (man) and Pachamama that transcends a 
purely utilitarian and materialistic perspective.  In other words, the pacha (earth) is not bound by 
mechanical laws, but a living organism where all parts are related in a constant interdependence and 
exchange.  Therefore, natural resources, such as land, air, and water are not simply at the disposition 
of human beings, but living beings themselves, or, as Estermann calls them, “organs in the great 
cosmic organism, life, and sources of life” (Estermann 2015: 144).  According to Estermann, for 
Kichwa Indigenous peoples, the idea of privatization or ownership, even in the communal sense, is 
considered a sacrilege that is rooted in an Occidental separation of humans and nature which leads 
to the commodification and exploitation of natural resources within a capitalist economic system 
(Estermann 2015:144; de Sousa Santos 2007: xxxvi).  Estermann recognizes that “operationalizing” 
buen vivir in the form of environmental governance strategies is difficult because the Indigenous 
cosmovisión is incompatible with the Western-modern model.   
“the ecology or better ‘ecosophy’ is not a question of environmental protection, but a 
holistic paradigm of life and economy that is in tune with the forces and network of 
relationships of the cosmos. The Andean conception of the universe as an ‘organism’ 
considers any deterioration of cosmic equilibrium as a ‘disease’ that becomes, in the case 
of unlimited capitalist growth, cancer in generalized metastases (Estermann, 2015: 191). 
Achieving buen vivir and an eco-friendly coexistence requires a fundamental reordering of power 





first dismantle Indigenous forms of organization to construct capitalist market economy solutions 
(Estermann, 2015).   
 
To better understand this complex relationship between nature and Indigenous communities, a 
further explanation of the values of relationality, complementarity, correspondence, reciprocity and 
cyclicity that underpin this relationship is required. First, relationality is the “fundamental axiom of 
Andean philosophy” (Estermann, 2014: 65).  Relationality in the Andean context means that 
everything is connected and that there are no disconnected realities.  This way of relational thinking 
is expressed in the Andean Cross.17  The importance of relationality is seen in the interdependent 
relationship between Indigenous communities and Pachamama.  Second, complementarity in the 
Andean cosmovisión is expressed in the fact that Indigenous communities believe that every entity and 
event has its complementary opposite pole as its essential condition to be complete and to exist and 
act (Estermann, 2014: 67).  Complementarity is seen in nature with the sun and moon, sky and earth, 
man and woman, day and night, dark and light, and good and bad – all go together and need each 
other.  Practically, this means that an isolated individual is considered incomplete and deficient.   
 
This view is reflected in a story told to me during my time in one community about a priest who was 
sent to live in a rural, Indigenous community.  One day the priest left his house and while he was 
out a woman visited his home.  Since the priest was out, his neighbour, who was an elderly 
Indigenous woman, told the woman that he had left.  When the priest arrived home, the elderly 
woman told him that his “wife” had come to visit him.  The priest laughed and stated that he was 
not married and because he was ordained in the Roman Catholic Church, he could not be married 
and had taken a vow of celibacy.  Puzzled, the elderly woman looked at him and said, “Ok, but your 
wife stopped by to see you”.  To the elderly woman, it was inconceivable that even a priest would 
live without his complementary “other” and, therefore, the woman that visited him had to be his 
wife.  As this story suggests, the Indigenous imaginary about relationships is rooted in 
complementarity, a complementarity not only seen in human relationships but also in relationships 
with nature.  For example, various Kichwa legends tell of the relationships between mountains and 
volcanos.  The Tayta (Father) Chimborazo Volcano is seen as male and has its complement in the 
 





Mama (Mother) Tungurahua Volcano seen as female.  Similarly, the El Altar (the Altar) Volcano has 
its complement in Mama Isabela (Sangay Volcano).  Third, correspondence is expressed through an 
interconnectivity between the micro and the macro or, in other words, each act or event has its 
respective response.  Therefore, the human being “represents, through symbolic acts, what happens 
on a large scale to ensure in this way that the universe and the cosmic order continue to exist” 
(Estermann, 2014: 70).   
 
Fourth, according to Estermann, reciprocity is the ethical and social application of complementarity.  
Every human and divine act arrives at its end when an equivalent reciprocal and complementary act 
is received.  Therefore, “a unilateral action distorts the delicate equilibrium between actors in the 
economic, organizational, ethical, and even religious spheres” (Estermann, 2014: 70).  Reciprocity is 
a concept that has been thoroughly studied in the context of Andean peoples, particularly the work 
of John Murra.  Murra states that reciprocity and redistribution in Andean civilizations “is to ask 
when you are sure to get” (Murra, 2017: 25).  In other words, reciprocity is part of the social fabric 
of Andean Indigenous communities and, according to Alberti and Mayer, is the nucleus of social 
and economic organization.  The same authors provide a more detailed description of Andean 
reciprocity by stating that it is “the normative and continuous exchange of goods and services 
between well-known persons, in which, between a service and its return, a certain time must elapse, 
and instead of being an open bargain the process of negotiation between the parties is rather 
concealed by forms of ceremonial behavior” (Alberti and Mayer, 1974: 21).  In many cases, the 
exchange in the reciprocal process is not always equal and represents symmetric and asymmetric 
relations, often acting as a mechanism of redistribution.  Therefore, purely economic measurements 
to quantify the relative value of the goods and services exchanged do not always capture the entire 
meaning of Andean reciprocity (Ferraro, 2004).   
 
The concept of reciprocity is epitomized in the practice of randi randi was explained to me during 
interviews as “giving…this word expresses the sense of offering our knowledge, help and experience 
to all of our community” and “a mutual exchange…it is reciprocity but a mutual exchange that is 
not limited to time.  ‘I offer you my hand, but you also offer me yours.  This can be in a while or at 





term “Dios te pague” or “May God pay you”.  As can be seen, reciprocity is expressed even when a 
person cannot repay by stating that, if I cannot pay you, “God will do it in my place”.  Therefore, 
reciprocity is not only expressed in corresponding exchanges, such as money for money or work for 
work, but it can be cancelled in a symbolic or ritual form as well.  Practically, reciprocity can be seen 
in the hospitality shown in Indigenous communities, something that I have been privileged to 
experience on many occasions during my visits to the communities.  As Murra recognizes, “the 
beneficiary [of reciprocity] must provide hospitality…it isn’t, just, you know, a plate and a cold 
sandwich thrown in. This is hospitality you’re offering; this is a reciprocal thing, and the food should 
be elegant, the food should be better than what you would normally eat by yourself.  You offer 
more, and what is an appropriate reciprocal gesture at this level is very well understood by all 
parties” (Murra, 2017: 26).   
 
Finally, for the Andean Indigenous, time and space is cyclical, something that repeats itself.  Time 
and space are not seen as infinitely linear but as an unlimited spiral, “a periodic succession of cycles 
governed by astronomical, meteorological, agricultural and vital rhythms” where each spiral 
describes a cycle, ending with a cataclysmic event (pachakuti) that begins a new cycle (Estermann, 
2014: 70).  The principle of cyclicity calls into question a perspective that views development as an 
automatic advancement from a beginning to a supposed end.  In Kichwa, the word for time and 
space is the same (pacha), suggesting there is no separation between time and space for the Kichwa 
Indigenous people (Estermann, 2014).  As a result, the Kichwa expression for past literally means the 
“space/time that we have before our eyes”.  Meanwhile, the expression for future is the “space/time 
that is behind us”.  Estermann describes it in the following way: “the Andean man moves with the 
gaze fixed in the known past as a point of orientation, moving backwards towards a still unknown 
future” (Estermann, 2014: 72).  An example of the cyclical nature of Andean thinking is the calendar 
used by the Kichwa.  The Andean calendar is seen as a set of events that occur throughout the year. 
The major festivals also follow the rhythm of this calendar: the time of sowing with the capac raimi, 
the flowering with the paucar raimi, the harvests with the inti raimi, and the time of rest and 
preparation of the land in the months of August and September with kullak raimi.  While each of 






The relationship between Kichwa communities and Pachamama is rooted in interconnectivity between 
all living beings and based on Indigenous values of relationality, complementarity, correspondence, 
reciprocity, and cyclicity – values that are lived experiences that form the base of individual and 
inter-communal relationships and the relationship between runa and Pachamama.  In contrast, SFG 
prioritizes a utilitarian relationship between man and the environment, reducing nature to its most 
basic elements that are void of any spiritual and cultural significance. 
 
7.7 Understanding Indigenous Knowledge and Values through Storytelling 
Interconnectivity between all living beings is something that was apparent in the language used and 
stories told during interviews in Chimborazo.  Many Indigenous cultures use story-telling as a means 
of passing down beliefs and values to future generations, connecting both the story and the story-
teller to the future and the people with the land (Tuhiwai-Smith, 2012).  Bishop suggests that “the 
indigenous community becomes a story that is a collection of individual stories, ever unfolding 
through the lives of the people who share the life of that community” (Bishop, 1996: 169).  For the 
Kichwa of Chimborazo, community is built and sustained on the stories told by the elderly.  In other 
words, “the community is created and recreated, among other factors, thanks to the indigenous 
imaginaries contained in stories…[where] indigenous find the expression of their being and their 
place in the world through the auditory exercise of the teaching narrated by the elderly” (Tuaza, 
2017: 22).   
 
During my time in the field, storytelling became commonplace in focus groups and interviews and 
emerged as a way in which Kichwa communities express their relationship with Pachamama.  From 
fables to historical narratives about the hacienda, stories became a part of my interactions with 
communities and a rich methodological resource that allows individual voices to be heard through 
the narrative process. It became clear to me that Kichwa communities maintain ties to local place and 
space through stories that connect them and future generations to their immediate surroundings and 
the larger cosmos.  The following section will tell two stories that show the values described in the 
previous section.  The first story is a tale about the Chimborazo Volcano and its importance to the 
surrounding communities.  Versions of this story were told to me during various visits throughout 





from a community with which I was able to collaborate on the building of a new church in 2017.  
Both of these stories provide examples of relationality, complementarity, correspondence, 
reciprocity, and cyclicity. 
 
7.8 La Entrada Secreta del Tayta Chimborazo  
For the Kichwa, mountains, such as the imposing Tayta Chimborazo volcano, are seen as a living 
beings who both have and give life.  Mountains and volcanos display human emotions and 
characteristics, such as anger and jealousy.  They are male and female, mother and father, good and 
bad, and young and old.  During one interview in a participant community, a local leader stated 
“Who says mountains don’t cry?...Mountains cry when they love and are separated from those they 
love just like people cry when they are separated from their loved ones”.  During my time in the 
field, the story of Tayta Chimborazo was recounted to me on various occasions.  This story 
represents the intricate relationship that Kichwa have with their surrounding environment and was 
collected through interviews and the help of Pablo Sanaguano’s (2012) book La entrada secreta al 
Chimborazo (Father Chimborazo’s Secret Entrance).   
 
In a number of communities, the ever-imposing presence of the Chimborazo volcano loomed over 
the focus groups or interviews, which often took place outside.  The volcano is present in the 
everyday reality and stories of the communities.  While interviewing one Tayta, he explained how his 
grandparents told him that Chimborazo is alive and walks and that inside the volcano is a large, 
beautiful city that contains great wealth.  For Kichwa-speaking Indigenous populations, Chimborazo, 
the tallest mountain in Ecuador at 6,268m, is not only a natural resource and splendour of nature, 
but a living being who interacts with individuals and provides for the community.  The volcano is 
referred as Tayta (Father) Chimborazo, indicating the reverence held for the intimidating mountain, 
as well as the relationship between those living in the surrounding foothills and the giant volcano.   
 
As legend has it, Tayta Chimborazo has a secret entrance that only he reveals to those he wishes.  
Once inside, those who enter have access to all the riches Chimborazo can offer, riches such as gold 
and seeds.  However, if one takes from Chimborazo, he/she must thank the mountain by leaving a 
kukayo or gift.  Those who do not leave a gift to thank the mighty mountain will see their riches turn 





being and provider to the communities.  In one version, a man takes the gold offered by 
Chimborazo but fails to leave a kukayo, while his family members take seeds back to the community 
and thank Chimborazo with a kukayo.  When they arrive back at the community, the man who took 
gold realizes that his gold has turned to potato seeds, but these seeds do not produce a good harvest.  
Meanwhile, those who took seeds are blessed with a bountiful harvest and continue to thank 
Chimborazo with grand celebrations.  Chimborazo as a father figure and provider is evident in this 
story.  However, Chimborazo does not provide economic riches, but riches that are essential to 
human life, seeds.   
 
The mountain is not an abstract rock but a living being who provides and cares for the essential 
needs of the community.  In return, the community sees Chimborazo as part of a larger “ecosystem” 
on which they are all dependent. Therefore, communities not only thank, but also care for the 
volcano by showing respect and awe. This story is representative of the relationship between Kichwa 
communities and Pachamama.  In this context, the story of Chimborazo suggests that “all elements of 
landscapes are living beings with an ‘inner world’ expressed in a capability of intentionality and an 
‘outerworld’ expressed in the forms of stones, mountains, lakes, rivers, plants or animals. They form 
a ‘natural community’ in which each entity has life, spirit and agency, thus ‘humanizing’ the 
landscape” (Boillat et al., 2012: 670-671).   
 
The story of Tayta Chimborazo represents an example of the ways in which the Kichwa view nature 
and maintain an intimate, interconnected relationship with the living beings that form part of their 
surrounding ecosystems.  The values of relationality, complementarity, correspondence, reciprocity, 
and cyclicity can be clearly seen through the giving of gifts to Chimborazo and the subsequent 
bestowing of blessings by the volcano to the community.  Nature, for the Kichwa, is much more than 
the sum of its parts – trees, grass, mountains, and animals – but a living ecosystem that demands 
respect and, when respect is given, blessings flow.   
 
7.9 Una Mamita y su Cuchara 
The second story comes from a personal experience in the community that was not part of the Socio 
Bosque program, but a place where I have worked since approximately 2015.  This particular story 





Anglican Church of Chimborazo.  Church leaders met with the community to discuss the possibility 
of building the church, but they soon realized that neither the community nor the Anglican church 
had the funds to build the church.  The community had come to the resolution that the church 
could not be built when suddenly church leaders were approached by an elderly widow who was in 
attendance.  The woman presented them with her wooden spoon and told them that this was her 
contribution towards a new church building.  This woman was one of the oldest in the community 
and also one of the poorest.   
 
The gift of her large wooden spoon was not only symbolic, as it represented all that she had, but it 
also represented her willingness to commit her time and food resources to cook for the community 
while the church was being built.  Communal cooking is an important task in the community, as 
discussed above, representing randi randi and a way for even the elderly to contribute to communal 
labour.  The elderly widow was demonstrating the value of reciprocity by giving what she could, 
knowing that the benefit would be communal. The result of the widow’s quiet and humble display 
of generosity was that other families quickly stepped forward and pledged support in the form of 
promises of bags of cement, bricks, and aggregate for the new building.  In 2019, the church was 
finalized with the help of the community and some outside funding.  The widow’s sacrifice indicates 
the highly personal nature of the values of relationality, complementarity, correspondence, 
reciprocity and cyclicity, and how these values move community members to act in support of larger 
communal well-being.   
 
7.10 The Sacred and the Secular 
The story of Chimborazo in particular represents a divine element found within the Kichwa 
cosmovisión. The relationship between the Kichwa Indigenous and Pachamama is not simply one of 
normative practices that demonstrate an interconnectivity, but it is also expressed in a highly 
spiritual connection through reciprocity, complementarity, correspondence, and relationality 
between individual, community, God and nature.  This connection is expressed in a number of 
religious and spiritual practices that amalgamate ancient Indigenous spiritual beliefs and rituals with 
Catholic and Evangelical Christian doctrine and liturgical practices.  In some religious circles, 





communities and nature were and are seen as profane acts.  The work of 16th Century Jesuit Priest, 
Blas Valera, was highly criticized for his view that Andean religion was a precursor to Christianity 
and mirrored Christian beliefs and practices in many ways.  Valera was imprisoned on unknown 
charges, with many scholars believing that he was accused of heresy (Hyland, 2011).18   
 
According to many theologians, Andean Christianity can be accused of adopting what many critics 
would argue is syncretism – the blending of various elements from two diverse and distinct religious 
beliefs and practices.  In many cases, religious beliefs and practices clash with one another; however, 
Andean representations of Christianity have fused conflicting elements of traditional Andean beliefs 
with Catholic and Protestant traditions and have reinterpreted these elements to form a new 
harmony between belief and practice.  Many Christian theologians would argue that this syncretic 
mix needs to be avoided because the lines between the profane or secular and the sacred become 
blurred.  However, for the Kichwa Indigenous people, the secular and the sacred are inseparable.  
Estermann explains that for the Andean Indigenous communities the incorporation of exogenous 
religions, philosophies and worldviews into their own ancestral wisdom and form of living is not 
complicated or seen as a contamination of their pure worldview (Estermann, 2014; 2015)    
 
In fact, it could be argued that Andean religiosity is the result of a “selective process of 
complementation and interreligious convergence” and, an example of what the Apostle Paul stated 
in 1 Thessalonians 5: 21 to “test everything; hold fast what is good” (ESV).  For the Kichwa, the 
“good” expressed by Paul is everything that “contributes to life, the cosmic order, the ecological 
equilibrium and pachosophy, the intercultural and intracultural harmony, the ‘Good Life’, and the 
conservation of the fragile and complex network of relationships, while at the same time rejecting 
what damages this equilibrium and order” (Estermann, 2014: 105).  Examples of the combining the 
sacred and the secular within Kichwa cosmovisiones became evident to me during interviews and focus 
groups.  The following quotes taken from various mamas and taytas show the spiritual connection 
between Kichwa communities, Pachamama, and the divine, expressed through Tayta Dios (Father God).  
The majority of communities interviewed view Pachamama as a gift from Tayta Dios.  
 
18 Hyland’s work on Valera provides a detailed account of his life and main work “An Account of the Ancient 





“With respect to the earth, our Tayta Dios has given us the Pachamama, it is the most 
wonderful thing we have in life. Without the earth there would be nothing” (Tayta 
interviewed in non-Socio Bosque community, 2019-08-16) 
Con respecto a la tierra, nuestro Padre Dios nos ha brindado a la Pachamama, es lo más maravilloso 
que tenemos en la vida, sin la tierra no existiría nada.  
 
“The owner of everything is God. We are simple administrators and caregivers, so I 
thank Pachamama with all my heart. God created everything perfectly. We enjoy the 
earth, the air, the sun, the moon. Thank you to Mother Earth we get daily food, animals, 
plants and we have life. There is life in her [Pachamama].  On my behalf, I worry daily to 
care for and give thanks to God wherever I am” (Tayta interviewed in non-Socio Bosque 
community, 2019-07-26) 
Dueño de todo es Dios. Nosotros somos simples administradores y cuidadores, por eso agradezco con 
todo el corazón a la Pachamama. Dios creo todo perfectamente. Disfrutamos de la tierra, del aire, del 
sol, de la luna. Gracias por la madre tierra sacamos el alimento diario, los animales, las plantas y 
nosotros tenemos vida. Hay vida en ella. De mi parte preocupo a diario para cuidar y dar gracias a 
Dios en cualquier parte que me encuentro.   
 
“From Pachamama we live, we have food and we share the food thanking God” 
De la Pachamama vivimos, tenemos comida, carne y repartían a todos la comida agradeciendo a Dios 
(Tayta interviewed in non-Socio Bosque community, 2019-08-14) 
The deeply spiritual connection between nature, the divine and others indicated in these 
quotes creates practical ways in which thanks is expressed to Pachamama.  Focus group 
participants in Community 4 stated that “through working the land and producing, we deepen 
our relationship with Pachamama”.  As a result, one must ask Pachamama for permission before 
sowing and thank Pachamama after the harvest, practices that many proponents of “modern” 
Christianity would view as pagan and the secular world would view as animistic, even though 
Thanksgiving can be seen as the Christian version of thanking God for a good harvest.  
Various community members interviewed in Chimborazo expressed the incorporation of the 
sacred into their day to day lives.  One particular practice was the invocation of the names of 
ancestors during the sowing of the seeds in the fields, while at the same time asking Pachamama 
and Tayta Dios to bless the fields and future harvest.  “This is how we maintain our connection 
to our past, present, and future” one mamita told me.  As the following quotes show, thanking 
Tayta Dios and Pachamama is common practice during various activities of Indigenous life and 
is often part of larger communal celebrations that stem from traditional practices dating back 





“In gratitude to Pachamama, at carnival we all gather to spend time together. We gather 
all the tender grains, cook and eat all of them thanking God” (Mamita interviewed in 
non-Socio Bosque community, 2019-08-14) 
En agradecimiento a la Pachamama, en carnaval nos reunimos todos para pasar juntos. Juntamos todos 
los granos tiernos, cocinamos y comemos todos agradeciendo a Dios 
 
“Well, personally, to sow we always ask our God for one more day of life, work and 
daily labors. Because we cannot live far from God, we are always in contact with him to 
sow and reap” (Tayta interviewed in non-Socio Bosque community, 2019-07-31) 
Bueno, personalmente para sembrar siempre pedimos a nuestro Dios por un día más de vida, trabajo y 
labores diarios. Porque, de Dios no podemos vivir alejados, siempre estamos en contacto con él para 
sembrar y cosechar. 
 
“To sow, those who knew it prayed ‘Our Father’, but prayed on their knees entrusting 
in the hands of God and kissing Pachamama in view of the Chimborazo Volcano. The 
same was done for weeding, for everything asking permission and thanking Pachamama. 
In the times of the hacienda we sang the Jaway19, but not anymore, because those who 
directed the song died” (Tayta interviewed in non-Socio Bosque community, 2019-07-31) 
Para sembrar los que sabían rezaban desde Padre Nuestro, sino oraban de rodillas encomendando en 
las manos de Dios y besando a la madre tierra de vista al Chimborazo. Igual para hacer la deshierba, 
para todo pidiendo permiso y agradeciendo a la Pachamama. En los tiempos de la hacienda cantábamos 
el Jaway, desde ya no, porque ya murieron los que dirigían el canto 
 
In the days of my grandparents, they had celebrations.  When I asked why they 
celebrated, [they told me] it was to thank Pachamama. They had a week of celebrations, 
eating and dancing with the music of pingullu (flute) and drum…They went down to San 
Andrés, to the celebrations of San Pedro, San Pablo and the Nativity Virgin with cattle. 
At the building of the church they made a great altar with trees where they hung all 
kinds of fruits, numerous roasted guinea pigs and, in the middle, half a deer…Well, 
before they didn't say Pachamama like now, but they said Santo Piso (Holy Ground) and 




19 El Jaway is a song that was sung during the harvest to give thanks.  The purpose of the song is “to reflect and give thanks for 
each of the sacred elements that intervened to make the harvest possible” (El Comercio, 
https://www.elcomercio.com/tendencias/jaway-temporada-granos-cereales-chimborazo.html).  While the tradition of singing 
el Jaway is being lost, on various visits with Luis to Kichwa communities I have heard this song sung in the fields and in the 
church as a song of praise and thanksgiving.  However, Luis has explained to me that el Jaway is also thought to have been 






En tiempos de mis abuelitos hacían fiestas, yo preguntaba porque hacen fiestas, era para agradecer a la 
Pachamama. Hacían una semana de fiesta.  Comían y bailaban en la música de pingullu (flauta) y 
tambor, nada de banda como ahora…. A San Andrés bajaban, a las fiestas de San Pedro y San 
Pablo con el ganado bravo, también a las fiestas de la Virgen de Natividad. En la puesta de la iglesia 
hacían un gran altar con árboles, ahí colgaban toda clase de frutas, cuyes asados en cantidad y en la 
mitad un venado….Bueno antes no decían Pachamama como ahora, sino decían Santo Suelo y 
Allpamama, todo eso era para agradecer a la Pachamama. 
The following quotes are interesting since they indicate a loss of connection between Pachamama and 
Indigenous communities, specifically the younger generations, through the disappearance of 
traditional celebrations and practices related to Pachamama.  However, the second quote indicates 
that the Kichwa have maintained various ways to thank Pachamama by fusing tradition with Western 
church practices.   
“Respect through giving thanks to Pachamama and the community, in these years it has 
been lost. Young people no longer have respect, in vain they have studied in colleges 
[and] universities, but do not want to respect. If they feel like it, they greet you, if not 
nothing has happened. From all public and private institutions, we have to work to 
rescue our cultural and traditional values” (Tayta interviewed in non-Socio Bosque 
community, 2019-08-08). 
El respeto en agradecimiento a la Pachamama y a la comunidad, en estos años se ha venido perdiendo. 
Los jóvenes ya no tienen respeto, en vano son estudiados en los colegios, universidades, pero no quieren 
respetar. Si tienen ganas saludan sino no ha pasado nada. Desde todas las instituciones públicas y 
privada, toca trabajar en rescate de nuestros valores culturales y tradicionales. 
 
“Thanks to my parents who taught me to care and love Pachamama. Before they sowed, 
they always prayed to God and then apologized to the Pachamama to till. Once the crops 
were harvested, they were deeply thanking Pachamama. In these times it is where we have 
forgotten to thank Pachamama, but our children no longer want to know anything about 
this. When they don't have a good harvest, they get angry, so much work for nothing 
has been said” (Tayta interviewed in non-Socio Bosque community, 2019-07-26) 
Gracias mis padres me enseñaron a cuidad y amar a la madre tierra, ellos antes de sembrar siempre 
hacían una oración a Dios y luego pedían perdón a la Pachamama para labrar. Une vez cosechado los 
granitos igual iban agradeciendo profundamente a la madre tierra. En estos tiempos es donde hemos 
olvidado agradecer a la Pachamama, peor nuestros hijos ya no quieren saber nada de esto. Cuando no 
tienen buena cosecha mejor salen enojados, tanto trabajo para nada ha dicho. 
 
“The celebrations related to the Pachamama we do not do, but we always remember the 
Pachamama in the (church) mass” (Tayta interviewed in non-Socio Bosque, 2019-08-16) 






In contrast to the Kichwa infusion of the sacred and secular , Western society tends to separate 
religious belief and practice through a view of the sacred to that which happens between the walls of 
the church or religious institutions or in the reading of sacred texts, such as the Bible, thus creating a 
juxtaposition between the secular and the sacred20.  This separation is a gross misinterpretation of 
Christian, Biblical principles, particularly those expressed in Colossians 3: 17, 23-24 which states that 
“whatever you do, in word or deed, do everything in the name of the Lord Jesus, giving thanks to 
God the Father through him” (ESV).  For Andean Indigenous communities the “whatever” 
expressed in this passage extends well beyond church walls into their fields of harvest and daily lives 
and activities.  There is no rupture between the secular and the sacred and, for the Kichwa, their 
relationship with Pachamama, both communal and individual, is one rooted in a highly spiritual 
context that recognizes Pachamama as a living being that is interconnected to runa, Tayta Dios, and the 
larger cosmos. 
 
7.11 Spirituality and Nature: My Encounters of the Kichwa Cosmovision 
What interviews and participatory observation indicated to me is the clear spiritual connection found 
within the Kichwa experience with Pachamama.  On numerous occasions, I have experienced the 
connectivity the Kichwa people have between nature and the divine.  In a recent telephone 
conversation with a close Kichwa friend, he could hear the birds in the background chirping in the 
Canadian spring.  He commented, “Mateo, I hear birds chirping in the background.  They speak His 
[God’s] divine language to remind us that He is never far from us”.  This struck me as particularly 
insightful and something I would certainly agree with, but rarely bring to the forefront of my mind. 
The spiritual connection that the Kichwa people have with nature runs counter to the sacred-secular 
divide that can be seen in the market-based approach of PES programs that views nature as 
disconnected from human beings and from the larger cosmos or creator. Furthermore, PES 
programs fail to address the highly spiritual nature of Indigenous community relationships with 
nature and actively erase or eliminate the spiritual place that Pachamama holds in the hearts of Kichwa 
individuals and communities.  The Indigenous view of the divine aspect of nature is absent in SFG, 
whereas for the Kichwa, every interaction with Pachamama is an interaction with the divine. Sowing, 
 







plowing, and harvesting the fields is considered a religious act, a prayer or a communion with the 
mysterious and most intimate of life (Estermann 2014: 96).   
 
The grassland of the páramo is, for the Indigenous communities, a place to encounter the divine.  Up 
and down the Andean highland mountains, especially in the province of Chimborazo, the páramo 
contains various sacred places, known by the name huacas (Andrade, 2004).  Huacas were sacred 
places created by Illa Tecce [the Creator] and contained “particular and singular aspects…beyond 
what other sites of its type commonly had.  Thus, it would serve as a sacred place and as a sanctuary 
where he and the other gods were worshiped” (Valera in Hyland, 2011: 56).  Valera argued that the 
Incas did not partake in pagan worship of mother earth in these sacred places because “they did not 
speak with the mountain or spring or river or cave, but with the great Ille Tecce Viracoca, whom they 
said was in the sky or invisibly in that place” (Valera in Hyland, 2011: 56).  Today, these same sacred 
places are used for various ceremonies where Indigenous people burn animal fat and candles, place 
the hair of cow and sheep, and leave potato, corn, and lima bean seeds.  At the same time, 
communities drink, eat and dance in these sacred places and even take some of the dirt from the 
ground back to their homes because they believe that this land provides abundant blessings.  As 
Estermann states, “the indigenous population…visits the same place to worship and pays tribute to 
the deities of the hills (apus), so that there are good harvests and so that their cattle are fertile and 
healthy” (Estermann, 2014: 26).  One Tayta interviewed told the following story about a huaca in his 
own community: 
“My father told me about a story, where we now have the cultural centre building. 
Where it is now built, my father told me that when he was a boy, he was grazing animals 
with his friends. They made huts to sleep on the hill and to care for the animals. One 
night, sleeping at one o'clock in the morning, they heard a rooster sing, but they did not 
know where the rooster was.  During the day, he and his friends went looking for the 
rooster. During the search, they found a cross in a stone…sometimes many do not 
believe [it exists]. At that time, they had a celebration where they had bullfights and rode 
horses. As a result, the celebrations began and this place remained a sacred place. The 
cross is not very straight…but we know that nobody has done it. This cross is in a very 
fine stone, then on the stone they made a larger cross.  Now, every year the celebration 
is celebrated on May 3…people from all over come to this place. This place is in a flat 
[and] the cultural center is almost like a church. Over time we plan to build a church.” 
(Tayta interviewed in non-Socio Bosque community, 2019-09-20) 
Mi padre me comentó sobre una historia, donde ahora tenemos la casa cultural con el apoyo del dinero 





con baños y con un escenario; la casa es de hormigón armado. Donde ahora está construido, contaba mi 
papi que antes de muchacho anduvo pastando animales. Decía que ellos quedaban a dormir haciendo 
chozas en el cerro, cuidando a los animales. Una noche estando, durmiendo golpe de la una de la 
mañana escucharon cantar un gallo. Pero no sabían donde cantaba el gallo, de día entre muchachos 
anduvieron buscando al gallo. En esa búsqueda encuentran una cruz en la piedra, en realidad está en 
una piedra, a veces muchos no creen. Entonces en aquella época ellos, habían hecho una fiesta. Dicen 
que hicieron una corrida de toros, montaron en caballos. De ahí se inició la fiesta y este lugar se quedó 
como un lugar sagrado. La cruz no es bien recta, es medio agobiada, pero esta como una cruz, sabemos 
que nadie a hecho. Esta cruz esta en una piedra bien fina, después sobre la piedra hicieron una cruz. 
En aquella época habían hecho el 24 de mayo, después alguien entro de cabildo y cambió las fiestas a 3 
de mayo. Ahora todos los años se celebra la fiesta en esta fecha, es una fiesta grande, vienen gente de 
todo lado a este lugar. Este lugar está en una aplanada, el centro cultural es casi tipo de una iglesia, con 
el tiempo pensamos construir una iglesia. 
 
Personally, I have experienced the interconnectivity and exchange between sacred sites, Indigenous 
rituals, and Christian liturgy and practice in many visits to Chimborazo.  Having the privilege to 
accompany Luis on his many community visits has provided me a window into many Indigenous 
rituals and experiences that I, on my own, would never be able to see.  I have spent time in the 
mountains with communities that bring a portion of their harvest and lay it on the ground in 
offering to Pachamama, while at the same time taking part in highly liturgical Roman Catholic and 
Anglican communion services.  Upon first seeing these sacred places and acts, my upbringing in a 
strict evangelical environment screamed within me that this form of syncretism was a sign of an anti-
biblical heterodoxy.  What I now realize is that these events represent a highly interdependent 
spiritual connection between God, nature, community, and individual which is rooted in an 
extremely complex history of imposition, resistance, interpretation, and appropriation wrought 
through the organic processes which characterize the Kichwa Indigenous.  As Estermann so aptly 
states, “Andean elements are Christianized and Christian elements are Andeanized.  Even the most 
Andean of rites have been penetrated by what is Christian, and the most Catholic liturgy is dyed by 
Andean colors and reeks of Andean fragrance” (Estermann, 2001: 1).  Anyone who has had the 
opportunity to spend an extended period of time in these communities will no doubt sense this 
wonderful fragrance and possibly be changed by it. 
 
7.12 PES and Poverty Alleviation: Changing Communal Practices 
PES programs not only change interactions between communities and their surrounding 





communities have traditionally cared for those in need.  This section will contrast and compare PES 
forms of poverty alleviation with traditional Indigenous forms of caring for those in need within 
Kichwa communities.  Payment for ecosystem services programs are not only seen as ways to combat 
climate change by states and international organizations, but they are also viewed as an integral tool 
to reduce poverty levels in rural communities, specifically those that depend on ecosystems for their 
livelihoods.  The funds received from PES programs provide economic incentives for local 
individuals and communities to preserve nature and to replace or supplement incomes gained from 
resource exploitation or other economic activities that can have adverse effects on nature.  The 
UNDP states that while PES programs are not designed to reduce poverty, “they can be oriented 
towards the achievement of social objectives, including poverty reduction” (UNDP, 2019: 3).  A 
Report of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment shows that environmental degradation is a 
principal factor causing poverty and proposes PES programs as part of a holistic strategy to curb 
climate change and alleviate poverty (MEA, 2005).  In the case of Ecuador, a strategic objective of 
Socio Bosque is “to improve the life conditions of the rural populations” (MAE, 2014).  Furthermore, 
as discussed in the distributional chapter on incentive payments, the program has a strict set of 
guidelines and requirements that must be directed at lowering poverty and improving the lives of the 
participant communities and their surrounding ecosystems.  It is clear that a main objective of PES 
programs, particularly Socio Bosque, is alleviating poverty and improving livelihoods in participating 
communities.   
 
While poverty alleviation clearly remains a goal of most PES programs, the empirical link between 
the two is unclear and scholars are hesitant to endorse a win-win discourse of environmental 
protection and poverty alleviation.  Some authors argue that PES programs were not initially 
designed as a mechanism for poverty reduction (Pagiola et al., 2005).  According to Wunder (2013), 
a shift within PES programs to include poverty reduction objectives came about because state-led 
PES programs often move beyond environmental governance as a primary focus and tend to “drift 
into win-win spheres of multiple side-objectives, such as poverty alleviation, regional development, 
or electoral motives” (231).  Various empirical studies have shown that environmental conservation 
efforts such as PES have ambiguous results and show no consistent trends for poverty reduction 
(Pokorny et al, 2013; Jayachandran et al., 2017; Börner et al., 2017).  However, some scholars argue 





Pagiola et al., 2005; Engel et al., 2008; Wunder, 2008; Vira et al., 2012; Engel, 2016).  However, 
Samii et al.’s systematic review of the literature found “little reason for optimism for the potential of 
current PES approaches to achieve both environmental conservation and poverty reduction benefits 
jointly” (2014: 7).   
 
In the particular case of Socio Bosque in Ecuador, an Inter-American Bank study found no significant 
income differences between beneficiary and non-beneficiary indigenous households, suggesting a 
minimal economic impact (Arriagada et al., 2018a).  There is little research done on the effects that 
PES payments have on traditional forms of poverty alleviation within Indigenous communities. As a 
result, local meanings of defining and treating poverty, built upon historical traditions and 
communal ties, are broken down by market-based approaches to alleviate poverty, which deprive 
people of access to land, water and resources (Escobar, 2012: 22).  
 
Within Kichwa communities the concept of poverty and how those in need are helped in a communal 
setting differs greatly from that of the market-based approach to poverty alleviation inherent in PES 
programs.  As Escobar (2012) notes, Indigenous societies have developed unique forms of providing 
for those in need and “that massive poverty in the modern sense appeared only when the spread of 
the market economy broke down community ties and deprived millions of people from access to 
land, water, and other resources” (22).  PES programs’ market-based approaches to alleviating 
poverty rupture communal relations and implement new mechanisms of state control based on 
“apparatuses of knowledge and power that took it upon themselves to optimize life by producing it 
under modern, ‘scientific’ conditions.” (Escobar, 2012: 23).  Under market-based approaches to 
poverty alleviation, the poor and poverty are seen as a problem that needs to be solved and, as a 
result, new discourses and practices were, and continue to be brought into existence and shape the 
reality to which they refer.  While Socio Bosque is not the first development program or poverty 
alleviation strategy to undermine local and communal ties, it is rooted in a market-based approach to 
poverty alleviation that subsumes and marginalizes communal ties and local responses to helping 
those in need.  The concept of the huagcha suggests that local communities continue to employ 






7.13 The Preferred Sheep: Local Strategies to Care for the Needy 
The Kichwa peoples do not have a word for poor person.  The word used to describe persons in 
need would be huagcha.  However, this word has a much deeper meaning than its English translation 
of “poor”.  To present this difference I will draw from the work of Dr. Luis Alberto Tuaza entitled 
Estrategias de resistencia Indígena en el contexto de la administración privada de poblaciones (in Bretón and 
Vilalta, 2017).  Tuaza points out that the word huagcha comes from the word huagchu which means 
the preferred sheep or the young llama let loose in the fields with the freedom to eat from any part 
of the land.  According to one community member interviewed by Dr. Tuaza, “each family has their 
huagchu…the huagchu is left untied to roam.  If it is lost, we search for it until it is found.  When it 
dies without growing enough, it is buried and its meat is not consumed”.  Huagcha, which comes 
from huacghu, refers to those in need in communities, specifically orphans, widows or widowers, and 
strangers to the community who do not have access to land.  The huagcha receives special rights 
within the community, such as the shalana and kutiar.  The right to shalana is the right of the huagcha 
to collect the fruits of the harvest of others in any field, even in other communities.  No one has the 
right to deny the shalana.  One community member explained shalana in the following way to his son: 
“do not collect all of the grains and leave some potatoes because later the children of Saint Peter 
[huagchas] are going to come…we believe that if we do not leave grains for the huagchas, the following 
year there will not be enough harvest because Mother Earth will be angry” (Tuaza, 2017: 187).   
Kutiar allows the huagcha to cultivate small patches of crop on another person’s land that is also being 
sown.  The act of kutiar is justified by the belief of the presence of deity in the person requesting 
kutiar.  John Murra describes the huagcha as “a person that has struggled getting the reciprocal 
services or the reciprocal resources due him….the widow…the orphan…the person that doesn’t 
have enough relatives to really make in loud tones and in an assertive way the claim to the 
reciprocity which is due them” (Murra, 2017: 27).  Therefore, the huagcha is connected to the concept 
of reciprocity in Kichwa communities. 
 
Once again, storytelling is used to understand the concept of the huagcha and reciprocity in Kichwa 
communities.  Tuaza (2017) interviewed an elderly mamita who spoke to the children of her 
community to tell the following story of a man who went to a distant town who observed some 
farmers by the side of the road. To the first farmer he said, "Friend what do you sow? Can you give 





The next day he found stones and thorns in his plot. The same man encountered a second farmer 
and asked, "Friend what do you sow? Can you give me a furrow?" The farmer replied, "welcome, 
you can sow. In this plot I am cultivating all the grains provided by the provident hand of God".  
The farmer returned the next day and saw that his whole farm was full of flowers and fruits. He says 
that the person who asked was God himself. This story shows the belief that the people [huagchas] 
who ask to deposit their grains on the property of the neighbours would be the representation of the 
deity.   
 
The Kichwa construct of caring for those in need is based on a set of assumptions that provides those 
in need with specific rights.  These assumptions run counter to a modern construct of poverty and 
poverty alleviation.  Furthermore, the concept of huagcha creates co-responsibility and 
interdependence between the community and those in need.  Nature is also seen as connected to 
caring for the poor in the provision of the kutiar and shalana and in the further benefit of those who 
participate in these ways of assisting the huagcha.  For example, the Pachamama will provide a better 
future harvest to those who care for the huagcha.  This local way of caring for those in need would 
fall into what Rahnema (1992) calls SPIMES (socio-cultural-space-times) that affect various 
perceptions and ways of dealing with the poor.  In contrast, the modern construct of poverty and 
poverty alleviation reduces people and places to a purely economic dimension and eliminates local 
responses and relations, stripping these spaces of all potentialities. As a result, society is reduced to 
its economic dimension alone and, furthermore, nature is reduced to the economic benefit it can 
provide a local community and is seen as a resource to alleviate poverty.  Modern responses to 
poverty seek to transform local spaces and places into a “mere economic machine…controlled and 
operated by others” (Rahnema, 1992: 189). 
 
For Rahnema, another fundamental difference between local and modern responses to poverty is 
that the modern response begins with preconceived ideas and recipes of what should be done.  This 
idea is developed and implemented by technocrats outside of the local space and place.  As a result, 
everything local, including local responses to those in need, must fit into the preconceived ideas and 
recipes. In contrast, what matters at the local level is the day to day responses to the challenges of 





“what finally decides [how to respond] is the living ‘nose’ of the people directly 
concerned for what is appropriate and sensible to do.  In the other, the 
technocratic approach, the deciding factor is the dead data of an alien, often 
ideologically based knowledge system” (189).  
 
When applying Rahnema’s critiques to PES programs, one can see how these programs come from 
an epistemological perspective that views both nature and humans through an economic lens.  
Therefore, the solutions presented include poverty alleviation strategies that reduce local 
communities and their places and spaces to a purely economic dimension.  As Rahnema states,  
“while the traditional answers to poverty were, in the past, often based on the 
pluralistic, culturally established and holistic perceptions of each particular 
space, the new programmes of action represented a universalist, one-track, 
income-based, and totally acultural recipe for abstract ‘patients’” (Rahnema, 
179).  
This reduction means that solutions are presented in an economic dimension that do not take into 
account local spaces or places.  The assumptions surrounding the concept of the huagcha “the 
modern economic construct of reality…assumes that natural resources are scarce [and] that human 
needs…are unlimited” (Rahnema, 187). Attaching PES programs to poverty alleviation becomes 
problematic and the analysis above helps to illustrate the limitations of classifying poverty as a 
quantifiable phenomenon that is devoid of local understandings and perceptions surrounding 
“poverty”.  As a result, contextualized ways of defining and treating poverty built upon local 
traditions and communal ties are broken down by market-based approaches to alleviate poverty 
(Escobar, 2012: 22).  In the Kichwa communities of Chimborazo, the concept and practice of the 
huagcha still exists today in spite of years of market-based poverty alleviation strategies.  However, 
the incorporation of poverty alleviation as a main pillar of Socio Bosque imposes an external, market-
based approach on top of local ways of dealing with the poor and, as a result, changes local 
perceptions of poverty and living-well by injecting a market-based approach to environmental 
governance and poverty alleviation. 
 
With local forms of dealing with those in need being pushed aside for larger national and global 
poverty alleviation initiatives, Indigenous communities are further marginalized from true and 





values of reciprocity, relationality, complementarity, correspondence, and cyclicity are disappearing.  
During interviews, many community members expressed concern over the changes that are 
occurring in their communal relations due to a loss of culture and sense of community in the 
younger generations. While this loss of culture is due to many factors, including migration and 
changes in education, PES programs like Socio Bosque contribute to this loss through a 
marginalization and disregard for communal ties that have, for centuries, been used to address issues 
of poverty and need in the communities.  While community members interviewed did express the 
financial contribution Socio Bosque made to local community projects and individual family budgets 
and needs, the ability of Socio Bosque to provide sustainable income as an alternative to other income 
generating activities, such as agriculture and livestock, is largely unknown due to the short time 
period of the program.  However, with community members continually stating that the incentive 
payment is insufficient and other activities generate more income, it could be only a matter of time 
before communities continue to move up the páramo, exploiting land for agriculture and/or livestock 
in search of sustainable livelihoods.  While programs like Socio Bosque can contribute to improved 
household incomes and community development projects, they need to be combined with broader 
policies and programs that improve education and rural infrastructure, increase access to markets, 
and diversify local economies. 
 
7.14 Conclusions 
This chapter has explored an epistemic dichotomy - the ways in which the Kichwa Indigenous people 
interact with their surrounding ecosystems as part of a larger cosmovision about the interconnectivity 
between nature, human beings, and the divine compared with the SFG, utilitarian perspective that 
monetizes and commodifies nature, reducing it to quantifiable, measurable units that can be 
organized, managed and governed (Kopnina, 2017; Bayrak and Marafa, 2016; Gudynas, 2016; 
Dryzek, 2013). There are three main findings that can be drawn from the evidence above: 1) The 
epistemic underpinnings of PES programs classify and redefine the páramo ecosystem to fit larger 
international definitions outlined by environmental governance and climate change institutions, 
resulting in a changing ecological landscape of the páramo and a reshaping and loss of community 
and individual interactions and relationships with Pachamama; 2) Kichwa Indigenous communities 
have highly spiritual connections and relationships with nature that PES programs ignore and 





in this chapter indicates an epistemic struggle over land, space, and place, as well as local 
understandings and meanings of nature and poverty. 
 
Classifying and Redefining Nature 
The Kichwa understanding of nature has been contrasted with that of Scientific Forest Governance, 
which places emphasis on the utilitarian aspects of nature, oftentimes reducing diverse ecosystems to 
their most basic elements that can be commodified and sold on global markets.  PES programs 
achieve this end by placing a price on the services provided by ecosystem which are used to 
compensate local communities for conservation efforts.  In contrast, Kichwa classify nature as a living 
being that forms part of the larger cosmos. This understanding of nature is expressed in individual 
and communal relationships of reverence with Pachamama.  These relationships are founded on 
values of reciprocity, complementarity, correspondence, and relationality.  PES programs do not 
capture these values and through their commodification and monetization of nature, actively 
marginalize them. The inability of PES programs like Socio Bosque to incorporate Indigenous 
understandings about the world and nature into their market-based approaches to environmental 
governance creates an exclusionary epistemological process that eliminates and erases Indigenous 
cosmovisiones.  This exclusionary process has operated within a local, historical framework of 
marginalization and oppression of Indigenous communities and ways of living, being and doing.  
Therefore, while some may applaud the inclusion of Indigenous concepts and cosmovisiones into 
mainstream, Ecuadorian political and social discourse, this inclusion has not contested the “colonial 
matrix of power” that continues to dictate the direction of environmental governance policies and 
programs. 
 
The SFG utilitarian perspective reduces nature to its most basic elements, creating subtle changes 
within Kichwa communities’ relationship with Pachamama demonstrated through state-led forestation, 
reforestation, and conservation projects that have changed community interactions and relationships 
with Pachamama.  These projects have changed local landscapes, with some areas becoming 
desertified, making land unusable for future agricultural or livestock activities.  As a result, 
communities push agricultural and livestock activities further up the mountains, infringing on the 





the sole explanation for changes in livelihoods and relationships with nature, the market-based 
approach of these programs does not allow for alternative forms of understanding and, ultimately, 
interacting with nature to form part of national or even local environmental governance programs 
and climate change strategies.  Instead, these strategies are rooted in high modernism that demands a 
specific structure, measurement, and achievement of national and global climate change goals, some 
of which run counter to Indigenous cosmovisiones.  Furthermore, PES programs by their very nature 
require appropriation and privatization of land, which can run counter to Indigenous cosmovisiones 
and communal views of land, creating changes in local land use from a communal use to a more 
individualistic or private use for the purposes of conservation. 
 
Divinity in Nature 
From the data gathered during interviews, focus groups, and observation, it is clear that the Kichwa 
Indigenous people have a deep, spiritual connection with nature. For the Kichwa of Chimborazo, 
their understanding of nature is not purely biocentric, but is centred around a complex, 
interconnected relationship that begins with runa (man) and extends to the community, the natural 
and the divine of Tayta Dios.  These relationships form the basis for the norms, rules, and regulations 
that inform everyday land use and environmental governance practices and are expressed in huacas 
(sacred places), such as mountains, volcanos and the páramos themselves, that have held their 
spiritual and cultural value for Kichwa peoples.  Unfortunately, PES programs like Socio Bosque are not 
equipped to capture these aspects of Indigenous relationships with nature.  While attempts have 
been made to provide a “cultural” aspect to Socio Bosque, nature as a spiritual entity with a connection 
to local communities has been ignored.  The question also arises of how, or even if, spiritual aspects 
of human-ecosystem relationships can be captured within PES programs?  Can a price be attributed 
to the spiritual connection between runa and Pachamama? If so, what would the introduction of a 
price on a living being (nature) do to the underlying Kichwa cosmovisión that currently informs 
communal practices and relationships?  The research above indicates that placing a price on nature, 
even the spirituality of nature, for Indigenous communities profoundly changes the ways in which 
they interact with their surrounding environment.  For example, even today sacred sites (huacas) that 
were previously untouched by regular human activity are now surrounded by agriculture and 
livestock which could possibly affect these sites and the spiritual connection between runa and 





practices may be changed, traditional ways of living and interacting with nature continue to exist, as 
is the case with many traditional practices within Kichwa communities that have been informed by 
modern practices but continue to this day. 
 
An Epistemic Struggle 
Finally, the evidence in this chapter suggests an epistemic struggle over land, space, place, and 
traditional ways of living and being - a struggle rooted in a "colonial matrix of power" (Quijano, 
2000).  The discussions in this chapter show an epistemic dichotomy between SFG and IEK.  This 
dichotomy is epitomized in how each perspective views and copes with poverty/needs, how nature 
is understood and perceived, and how environmental conservation is measured and quantified.  In 
rhetoric, the Ecuadorian state has included Indigenous cosmovisiones into its political and social 
discourse and even into key state documents, as the Institutional chapter discussed in further detail.  
However, with PES programs becoming a key instrument in environmental governance and climate 
change strategies within the country, it is clear that the state prioritizes a specific form of knowledge 
and understanding about nature and diverse ecosystems, one that is rooted in a Scientific Forest 
Governance perspective that excludes Indigenous cosmovisiones, relegating them to the sidelines of 
true inclusion within the debates about solutions to serious climate change threats and impacts.  As a 
result, while Indigenous communities are invited to participate in combating climate change through 
adaptation and mitigation strategies, these strategies are limited to a colonial framework to which 
Indigenous communities must conform both epistemically and, as discussed in the previous 
chapters, institutionally and distributionally.  Thus, Indigenous participation and inclusion is 
relegated to the ability of communities and individuals to conform as environmental subjects 
(Agrawal, 2005) who willingly conform to state-led discourses, rules and practices.  The ability of 
communities to conform as environmental subjects is institutionalized within a state-led framework 
that clearly delineates who participates, when they participate, and exactly how they participate.  
 
The epistemic struggle between SFG and IEK shows that the hegemonic ideology of SFG actively 
erases local land use, resource management, and communal practices.  The loss of traditional 
practices and connection to Pachamama was evidently expressed during numerous interviews and 





Socio Bosque, the program represents a market-based ideology that has separated Kichwa individuals 
and communities from land and place by disregarding the highly spiritual and cultural importance 











































This study explores the institutional, distributional, and epistemic effects that a national PES 
program in Ecuador, Socio Bosque, has on Kichwa Indigenous communities in the Highland province 
of Chimborazo.  The principal research question explores why Indigenous communities choose to 
participate in PES programs that, on the surface, seem to be detrimental to their current livelihoods, 
land use, and resource management practices.  In seeking to answer this question, the research 
explores the ways in which Socio Bosque changes Kichwa communities’ relationship with nature by 
implementing a PES program rooted in a hegemonic environmental governance ideology of 
Scientific Forest Governance, which not only contradicts but actively erases Kichwa knowledge about 
and relationships with nature.  Throughout the empirical chapters, the theoretical and practical 
underpinnings of PES programs were considered in relation to Indigenous understandings about 
nature, land, resources, and community.  In this concluding chapter, various insights will be offered 
that seek to provide answers to the main research question.  However, this study is not limited to the 
that question and can provide insight about Indigenous Environmental Knowledge, the rules and 
norms of supposed “free-market” environmental governance programs, the concept of hegemony, 
and the role of Indigenous agency, all of which will be explored below. 
 
What does the experience of the five Kichwa communities of this study contribute to a broader 
understanding about the implementation of PES programs in Indigenous communities?  It would be 
wrong to claim that the five communities of this study represent a “typical” experience of 
Indigenous communities with PES programs.  This is not only because of the small sample size of 
communities compared to the national number of Indigenous communities that participate in Socio 
Bosque, but also because of the methodological difficulties involved in a short-term study such as this 
one (see Chapter 4), as well as the historical differences between the Kichwa of the Highland region 
and other Indigenous peoples of the Amazon (see the various discussions on the hacienda system 
throughout the research) .  Therefore, I cannot claim that the words and behaviours of those 
interviewed in the five communities are typical of all Indigenous who participate in Socio Bosque, let 
alone global PES programs.  Nevertheless, there are a number of commonalities among the five 
communities that permit broader insights and conclusions to be made.  This concluding chapter 
explores these insights.  It does so with a modest understanding that each community has a unique 





that these experiences can allow for broader conclusions to be drawn about PES programs, 
Indigenous inclusion and participation, and the wider Andean political economy.  The first section 
provides an overview of the study and a summary of the principal findings that arise from the case 
of the Kichwa communities of Chimborazo and Socio Bosque.  Section two draws on this summary and 
returns to the existing theoretical debates outlined in Chapter 3 to discuss the contributions of this 
research to academic literature.  This section will be divided into three key insights about PES 
programs and their theoretical underpinnings.  Finally, the third section makes concluding remarks 
about the policy implications of the research, as well as briefly discussing the methodological 
contributions of the research to decolonial research and community engaged scholarship. 
 
8.2 Summary of the Study and its Findings 
The empirical analysis of this research was divided into the following: 1) institutional, which looked 
at the rules and norms of an institutionalized PES program (Socio Bosque ) and the effects these rules 
and norms have on Indigenous communities; 2) distributional, which analyzed the distribution of 
the Socio Bosque  incentive payment at the national, provincial, and community level to understand 
how the five communities of this study spend their payments; 3) epistemic, which compared and 
contrasted the epistemic underpinnings of PES programs to Indigenous Environmental Knowledge, 
specifically the cosmovisiones of the Kichwa Indigenous people and their relationship with Pachamama.  
The empirical research was framed within the social, political, cultural, and historical context of 
Ecuador and the specific reality of the Kichwa Indigenous communities of Chimborazo.  This social, 
political, cultural and historical context helps to understand the effects of Socio Bosque on Kichwa 
communities.   
 
The political environment in Ecuador during the last fifteen years presented opportunities and 
challenges for PES programs where new ways of envisioning environmental governance emerged.  
The 2008 Constitution provided both opportunities and challenges for Indigenous communities and 
their participation in the larger political sphere in Ecuador.  The inclusion of Indigenous concepts, 
such as sumak kawsay and Pachamama, in the Constitution and the broader political and social 
discourse in Ecuador gave Indigenous peoples a space in the creation of a “pluri-national” state.  





marginalization of Indigenous peoples remained through the struggle over the definition of these 
concepts and the subsequent implementation of policies that sought to achieve sumak kawsay and 
harmony with Pachamama (see Chapter 2).    
 
The inclusion of Indigenous concepts into the 2008 Constitution also ushered in an era where 
Indigenous participation was, at least in rhetoric, prioritized by the state, beginning the creation of 
national development plans that prioritized the achievement of buen vivir, albeit a statist version of 
the concept.  However, any study that takes place within the Kichwa communities of Chimborazo 
cannot ignore the historical context that has shaped the socio-political and economic life of these 
communities and their relationships with the Mestizo population, urban centres, and the Ecuadorian 
state.  While the huasipungo system was abolished in the 1970s, the social, political and economic 
effects this institution left behind exist today both in practice and in the imaginaries of Kichwa 
communities that were a part of that system (Bretón, 2012; Lyons, 2006, 2016; Tuaza, 2014).  As 
much as possible, this research takes into account the political economy of Ecuador and the socio-
historical reality of the Kichwa of Chimborazo as the evidence presented seeks to understand the 
institutional, distributional, and epistemic effects that Socio Bosque has made on Kichwa communities 
of Chimborazo. 
 
The institutional analysis of Socio Bosque explores the norms and rules laid out by MAE and indicates 
a clear governance framework that structures and defines individual and community behaviours.  
These rules and norms shape community interactions with the state and community and individual 
relationships with Pachamama.  In contrast to free-market environmentalist thinking, the case of Socio 
Bosque shows that PES programs rely heavily on regulation through norms and rules in order to 
shape and control behaviour.  Furthermore, an institutionalized Socio Bosque places the state at the 
centre of environmental governance through a constitutional framework that, while championing 
Indigenous values, fails to provide meaningful inclusion of Indigenous cosmovisiones and, as a result, 
meaningful participation of Indigenous peoples into the discussion and implementation of local, 
regional and national environmental governance and climate change programs and policies.  
Meaningful Kichwa community participation was relegated to the sidelines in favour of a top-down, 





program to the unpaid labour of community members.  Communities did have relative freedom in 
deciding how to spend their incentive payments, but evidence suggests that even these expenses 
were controlled by MAE.   
 
Finally, an institutionalized Socio Bosque introduces an administrative and regulatory field of practice 
that not only places a bureaucratic red tape burden on the shoulders of local communities but 
changes local environmental governance perceptions and practices (including ones rooted in highly 
spiritual beliefs) for national and (more ambitiously) global climate policy goals and agendas. 
Traditional means of interacting with and caring for Pachamama, such as controlled burning of the 
páramo, are deemed destructive and illegal through norms and rules that prohibit this activity. Moral 
regulation and obligation are instilled by linking Socio Bosque to the concepts of sumak kawsay and 
Pachamama that persuades Indigenous communities to participate, producing social and cultural 
identities and subjectivities that shape local relationships with nature and the state.  Recognizing 
that, at times, persuasion and coercion can be indistinguishable, the symbolic action of the state (the 
inclusion of Indigenous concepts and the linking of the concepts to the state-led Socio Bosque 
program) align the desires of Indigenous communities with the interests of the state (Lyons, 2006).  
As a result, the moral and regulatory obligations embedded in Socio Bosque are similar to the 
regulatory and disciplinary practices of hacienda system (Lyons, 2016). In some cases, the obligation 
to care for Pachamama through programs like Socio Bosque directly contradicts national state policies 
of the rights of nature and resource extraction, which was seen in the case of two communities that 
formed part of this study and experienced difficulties with state-led and private resource extraction 
on their land.   
 
The distributional chapter used national, regional, and local data gathered from MAE and Socio 
Bosque officials to understand how incentive payments are being spent.  The empirical evidence 
shows that while Socio Bosque does offer financial and material benefits to individuals and 
communities, these benefits happen in a wider context of inequality that is rooted in the social and 
historical context of the hacienda system and actively erases IEK and the Kichwa cosmovisión.  As a 
result, inherent in Socio Bosque ’s sliding-scale payment scheme is a bias that favours individual 





smaller portions to enroll in the program, resulting in a higher per hectare payment.  Furthermore, 
the communities and individuals interviewed do not see the incentive payment as a derecho (right), but 
as part of a clientelistic regalo (gift) from the state.  This type of clientelism can be traced back to the 
hacienda system and landowners that rewarded loyal Indigenous subjects with favours and gifts 
(Lyons, 2006).   
 
Finally, it would seem that communities were and are preserving the páramo without the Socio Bosque 
incentive payment and that the influx of money into the community does little to promote or 
increase further conservation.  In fact, the evidence from the distributional chapter suggests that 
Socio Bosque erases IEK and the Kichwa relationship with Pachamama by placing an economic value on 
nature, reducing a complex and highly spiritual relationship to a purely economic and utilitarian one.  
That is not to say that Indigenous communities place no economic value on the páramo ecosystem, 
but that their relationship with Pachamama goes beyond economic value, which PES programs fail to 
recognize and to incorporate into ecosystem service valuations.  Various quotes from community 
members indicate that the incentive payment from Socio Bosque  is insufficient in light of the value 
that Indigenous communities place on Pachamama, which is calculated by the possible economic gain 
from other activities, such as agricultural and livestock production, and the spiritual and cultural 
value that Kichwa communities place on nature, which is not reflected in the sliding scale incentive 
payment of Socio Bosque.  As suggested, the incentive payment calculation is arbitrary and based on 
the national budget and available funds, leaving no room for an increased value or an ability for 
Indigenous communities to negotiate the price of the payment.  As a result, the value Kichwa 
communities place on nature based on the economic, cultural, and spiritual connection to Pachamama 
is largely erased from the incentive payment calculation of Socio Bosque.   
 
At best, incentive payments serve as a stop-gap that prevents communities from using the páramo for 
other practices, such as agricultural and livestock production, but the ability for PES incentive 
payments to foster long-term, sustainable conservation and livelihoods is lacking. For example, once 
the Socio Bosque contract is finished, there is little to prevent communities from exploiting the once 
preserved páramo for economic gain.  With the economic strain faced by many Indigenous 





up and exploit virgin páramos, the prospect for long-term restoration and conservation of the páramos 
through PES programs like Socio Bosque is bleak.  While communities and individuals have seen 
economic benefits from the incentive payments through the purchase of household items, livestock, 
and agricultural inputs, and community construction projects, such as irrigation systems, churches, 
and community centres, the long-term effects of these benefits are largely unknown and require 
further research.  What the evidence above does indicate is that Kichwa communities see the financial 
compensation of Socio Bosque as insufficient in comparison to other activities, such as agriculture or 
livestock, suggesting that these communities are making economic sacrifices to participate in the 
program.  
 
Chapter 7 provides insight into Scientific Forest Governance and Indigenous Environmental 
Knowledge, using PES programs, specifically, Socio Bosque, and the Kichwa cosmovisión as examples to 
compare and contrast.  Overall, the evidence presented in this chapter indicates the complexity of 
assigning an economic value to nature in a context where the Kichwa’s relationship with nature does 
not exclude economic, materialist, or utilitarian values but also includes a highly spiritual relationship 
with nature framed by reciprocity, relationality, complementarity, correspondence, and cyclicity and 
defined by the normative practice of these concepts.  The Kichwa cosmovision is not only ignored but it 
is entirely excluded from the epistemic foundations of Socio Bosque, a PES program rooted in 
Scientific Forest Governance.  SFG actively erases Indigenous knowledge through a hegemonic 
environmental governance ideology that is guided by free market environmentalism, which seeks to 
reorganize and reclassify nature to fit global climate change goals.   
 
The evidence provided in Chapter 7 suggests that the epistemic underpinnings of PES programs 
actively erase local Indigenous Environmental Knowledge and fundamentally change communal and 
individual relationships with nature.  In the specific case of the Kichwa of Chimborazo, evidence 
indicates that Socio Bosque changes the individual and communal relationships that the Kichwa people 
have with Pachamama and alters historical land use and resource governance practices by ignoring the 
spiritual connection that the Kichwa communities have with Pachamama through the normative 
experiences of living concepts whose definition is based on continual intra and inter-communal 





Pachamama. While the literature on PES programs, such as REDD+, claims to respect and to 
incorporate Indigenous perspectives and values, the evidence presented in this research suggests 
that, in practice, PES programs do not offer meaningful spaces of inclusion and participation to 
Indigenous peoples and their cosmovisiones in their design, implementation, and evaluation.  Instead, 
an institutionalized Socio Bosque program creates an administrative and bureaucratic field of practice 
that marginalizes Indigenous cosmovisiones through norms and rules that change local land use and 
resource management practices. 
 
The evidence in the chapter also suggests that the implementation of Socio Bosque and other 
environmental governance projects, such as forestation and reforestation projects, change land use 
and resource management practices by redefining and reclassifying nature, leaving the páramo 
ecosystem discursively erased (Stibbe, 2015) from larger debates about the environment and 
adversely affected by damaging public policies, such as forestation, reforestation and resource 
extraction policies.  As a result, policies and programs, such as Socio Bosque and forestation projects, 
are implemented to achieve international climate change results and goals and not to satisfy the 
needs or the demands of local communities. These programs change the ways in which Kichwa 
communities interact with their surrounding páramo ecosystem.  The erasure of the spiritual aspects 
of the Kichwa relationship with Pachamama, a relationship based on the normative practice of 
reciprocity, relationality, complementarity, correspondence, and cyclicity, can be seen in the 
following ways: 
1. PES programs rely on redefining and reclassifying ecosystems like the páramo that change 
local ecological landscapes and reshape local interactions with and understandings of 
Pachamama. 
2. The highly spiritual connections and relationships that Kichwa communities have with 
Pachamama are ignored and actively erased by the market-based epistemic underpinnings of 
PES programs. 
3. Finally, the evidence of this chapter indicates an epistemic struggle over land, space, and 
place, as well as local understandings and meanings of nature and poverty. 
While the erasure of Kichwa cosmovisiones is not limited to projects like Socio Bosque and can be 





programs do very little to incorporate and to protect Indigenous worldviews and traditional land use 
and resource management practices. 
 
8.3 Insights for Understanding Indigenous Participation in PES Programs 
In view of the research findings, this section briefly recounts the contradictory arguments in the 
academic literature about PES programs and provides three main insights to the debates outlined in 
Chapter 3. 
 
Insight 1 – Rules and Norms Govern PES Programs 
The first debate discussed in Chapter 3 compared the laissez-faire approach of free market 
environmentalism with environmental governance regulatory measures created to change individual 
and community behaviour. Free-market environmentalists theoretically see regulation as 
impediments to the natural function of the market (Anderson and Leal, 2001, 2015; Dryzek, 2005).  
For FME, in order to achieve environmental conservation, the cost/benefit must be equal to or 
greater than other opportunities available to those who depend on ecosystems for livelihoods.  The 
empirical evidence of this study indicates that when implemented, PES programs are not free from 
rules and norms and the cost/benefit of PES programs do not outweigh the opportunities for many 
communities.  While some free-market environmentalist aspects are present in Socio Bosque, the 
program is highly governed by rules and norms.  When placed into an institutionalized, state-led 
framework, PES programs inevitably incorporate rules and norms which are part of the “high-
modernism” of the state (Scott, 1998).  Rules and norms guide behaviour but also provide 
measurable and quantifiable results that demonstrate the achievement of larger national and 
international environmental governance and climate change goals.  Furthermore, the evidence 
presented in this research indicates that the cost/benefit of Socio Bosque for the Kichwa communities 
of Chimborazo is not equal to or greater than other livelihood opportunities of the páramo.  FME 
programs champion the cost/benefit of conservation exceeding that of alternative uses of 
ecosystems, such as agriculture and livestock, but the evidence presented in this study indicates that 





ecosystem use.  This gap in cost/benefit is related to the price that is assigned to nature using PES 
programs. 
 
Insight 2 – Valuing Nature – Seeing Beyond the Forest for the Trees 
In theory, the market-based rationale behind free-market environmentalism advocates financial 
compensation to individual and community landowners for the conservation of ecosystems and for 
the global services that ecosystems provide.  However, assigning an economic value to ecosystem 
services is complex and the evidence in this study suggests that the economic value placed on nature 
inadequately reflects the variety of ways in which people, specifically Indigenous communities, value 
nature.  First, as stated above, the payment is insufficient in that other economic activities carried 
out on PES land can provide communities with higher incomes.  The evidence suggest that Kichwa 
communities can receive incomes from other livelihood activities, such as agriculture and livestock, 
greater than the incentive payments from Socio Bosque. Communities do recognize the detrimental 
effects these activities have on the fragile páramo ecosystem and that Socio Bosque is the first program 
to recognize the national importance of the páramos, but when compared to other activities Socio 
Bosque payments do not increase incentives to conserve.  Second, the spiritual and cultural value that 
nature provides to Indigenous communities is not captured in the economic value assigned by PES 
programs.  For the Kichwa, the páramos provide a sacred space for encounters with the divine and 
their ancestors.  The páramos are a place of mystery where huacas exists as spaces that are used to this 
day for various rituals and encounters with the divine.   Third, as the sliding scale of Socio Bosque 
indicates, incentive payments are rooted in and exacerbate historical inequalities between Indigenous 
communities and, in the case of Ecuador, Mestizo communities and large landholders.  Instead of 
bridging gaps of inequality, Socio Bosque privileges large landholders by paying more for smaller plots 
and marginalizes Indigenous communities who are legally prohibited from dividing large, communal 
land into smaller plots, thus receiving less per hectare.  As the statistics demonstrate, Indigenous 
communities that form part of Socio Bosque conserve more territory nationally than individuals, but 
they are paid substantially less, resulting in a highly unequal per-beneficiary economic benefit that 
favours individual landholders.  Finally, Socio Bosque shows that placing an economic value on nature 
is not calculated by using some formula created to assign value to nature, but is arbitrary and largely 
dependent on state budgets.  Little to no consultation is carried out with local communities and 





assigned to nature in PES programs is not based on a cost/benefit analysis, as suggested by free-
market environmentalism, but has become a state imposed price that communities can either accept 
or choose not to participate. 
 
Insight 3 – Hegemony, Moral Obligation and Indigenous Participation as an “Acto de sobrevivencia”  
A third insight that is gained from the evidence presented above indicates that Indigenous 
participation in PES programs can be seen as an “acto de sobrevivencia” (act of survival), which requires 
active participation of Indigenous peoples.  Indigenous participation in PES programs is more than 
mere garnishing for purely utilitarian and individualistic gain, but represents an understanding by 
Indigenous communities about the communal greater good and good of the larger cosmos.  
However, Indigenous participation is not limited to the realm of communal or cosmic good, but 
Indigenous peoples, specifically the case of the Kichwa who formed part of this study, recognize the 
economic opportunity presented in PES programs, an opportunity to improve livelihoods and 
increase both individual and communal well-being.  While stating that the Kichwa view Socio Bosque as 
an economic opportunity may seem contradictory to what was stated in Insight 2, the economic 
opportunity is viewed in an immediate, short-term gain that satisfies the immediate needs of the 
community, as demonstrated by the incentive payment expenses of the five communities.  In what 
can be described as an acto de sobrevivencia, Indigenous peoples participate in PES programs where 
they see opportunities to preserve land, to protect cultural and spiritual traditions, and to increase 
livelihood opportunities and economic development through incentive payments.  The Kichwa have 
found ways to implement their own agendas within the framework of PES projects as a means of 
sustaining livelihoods and maintaining ties to land, place and space, as well as continuing traditional 
connections to the communal, the natural, and the divine aspects of nature, as is evidenced by the 
continued importance and use of huacas and sacred sites for traditional customs and ceremonies.  
However, the Kichwa are still bound within a framework that, as demonstrated in Chapters 5 and 6, 
prioritizes individual landowners, imposes rules and norms that shape behaviour and interactions, 
and implements the state’s hegemonic environmental governance ideology.  Yet, the Indigenous are 
not passive receptors of Socio Bosque and its SFG ideology as a subordinate class who have no 
options or alternatives.  In contrast, the Kichwa weigh the positive and negative aspects of Socio 





the program while neighbouring communities view it as an attempt by the state to appropriate 
Indigenous land.   
 
While the evidence suggests that PES programs do erase IEK and local perspectives on nature, it 
would seem as if Indigenous communities, specifically the older taytas and mamitas, are able to 
maintain connections to Pachamama, suggesting, as Scott (1985) notes, that subordinate classes are 
able to maintain certain levels of autonomy and or “a social space in which the definitions and 
performances imposed by domination do not prevail” (326).  For example, the persistence of the 
care of the huagcha shows that traditional ways of individual and communal care exist and persist 
amidst state-led programs that run counter to such acts.  Furthermore, while PES programs 
disregard the spiritual aspect of Indigenous connections to nature, Indigenous communities are able 
to maintain these connections through practices, rituals, and huacas (spiritual sites).  It is in these 
spaces where Kichwa communities maintain ties to land, place, and space in actos de sobrevivencia and 
acts of resistance to the hegemonic, market-based ideology of environmental governance. Having 
said that, both the practice of the huagcha and the spiritual connection the Kichwa have with 
Pachamama run the risk of being lost over time due to policies and programs that are not limited to 
PES or environmental governance but extend to the fields of migration, economic development, 
and religious appropriation.  The erasure of ancient practices and spiritual connections within Kichwa 
communities is a topic which requires further research to determine exactly if and how these 
practices are being affected and the ability of these practices to persist and maintain relevance for a 
younger generation. 
 
The final insight which relates to the concept of hegemony is the moral obligation that can be part 
of PES programs which encourages Indigenous communities to participate.  For example, the 
Ecuadorian state’s portrayal of Socio Bosque as a way to achieve sumak kawsay or buen vivir suggests the 
creation of a moral obligation that encourages Indigenous communities to participate in the state’s 
hegemonic ideology about environmental governance and nature that run counter to their own 
cosmovisiones.  By incorporating Indigenous concepts like sumak kawsay and Pachamama into its political 
discourse, the Ecuadorian state exploits the highly spiritual and symbolic relationship Indigenous 





“understandings of and relations to forests [or ecosystems in general] change historically with the 
extension of centralized rule over forests [ecosystems]” (Agrawal, 2005: 16).  The creation of 
environmental subjects in the case of Ecuador has taken place through the incorporation of 
Indigenous concepts into state policies of environmental governance and resource use by 
positioning programs like Socio Bosque as policies that help to achieve sumak kawsay, to protect 
Pachamama, and to conserve the rights of nature.   
 
Much like the hacienda system which, in combination with the Roman Catholic church and the 
state, exploited Indigenous values of reciprocity and moral regulation to construct identities and 
relationships (Lyons, 2006), Socio Bosque has incorporated a moral component to the program that 
entices Indigenous communities to participate.  In the times of the hacienda, the gifts and favours 
extended by the landowner to the Indigenous huasipunguero were forms of hegemonic domination 
used to control and quell rebellion.  Similarly, the incentive payments of Socio Bosque are provided to 
coerce and to persuade Indigenous communities to participate in the implementation of a dominant 
ideology of environmental governance, while at the same time morally obligating communities to 
participate as a way to achieve sumak kawsay.  However, as discussed above, Indigenous communities 
are not passive agents in this hegemonic process; rather, they are actively engaging with state-led 
environmental governance initiatives, demonstrating that the hegemonic process is not coercion and 
consent alone, but the material, social, cultural, and religious practices and relationships that 
establish or maintain domination (Lyons, 2006).  As the evidence indicates, various communities are 
using Socio Bosque as a platform to justify demanding payments and restitution from local water 
companies and the transnational Cemento Chimborazo company. 
 
8.4 Contributions and Concluding Remarks 
This final section will explore some of the contributions this study makes to PES theoretical 
perspectives, the study of the Andean political economy/ecology, and decolonial methodologies and 
community engaged scholarship.  First, it is important to review the methodological limitations that 
were part of this study.  Due to time and resource constraints, this study was never intended to be a 
large scale, comparative study of Socio Bosque.  As a result, the limited scale of the research prevented 





Ecuador.  With a limited focus on Kichwa communities in Chimborazo, this research portrays a 
relatively small portion of participants of the Socio Bosque program.  The methodological focus of 
community focus groups and key informant interviews also has its limitations.  However, since 
much of the research on Socio Bosque in Chimborazo has focused on household surveys, this study 
provides a unique perspective and complement to the literature (Perafán and Pabón, 2019; Arriagada 
et al. 2018; Hayes et al., 2017; Murtinho and Hayes, 2017; Hayes et al., 2015).   
 
As previously mentioned, sample surveys offer one possible means of documenting people’s 
perceptions, but they are not particularly good at documenting the feelings and historical 
experiences that underlie people’s responses to standardized questionnaires.  Combined with 
decolonial methodologies and community engaged scholarship, the field research provided unique 
opportunities to engage with communities as active participants in the research through the sharing 
of meals and time together where participants were able to share extended stories that gave insight 
into various dimensions of daily life that would not have been captured in a survey format.  As with 
all research and methods employed, there is a trade-off in understanding various aspects of the 
research.  In the case of this study, information about intra-household impacts of Socio Bosque and 
longitudinal data are largely absent in exchange for an understanding of larger, community views 
about the program, community participation and inclusion, and communal and individual 
relationships with Pachamama.  Combined with a lack of data on intra-household relations and 
impacts, gender disparities are also not considered in great detail.  Further research exploring gender, 
intra-household relations, and longitudinal data would allow for a deeper evaluation of the impact of 
Socio Bosque on communities and households, providing insight into the factors that explain why 
some, but not all, communities decide to spend money on collective goods.   
 
Finally, opinion of the younger generations are missing from this research.  While young people 
were present at some of the focus groups, a large majority of participants were the elderly who may 
have different opinions about rural livelihoods, Pachamama, and state-community relationships than 
younger generations.  Since research was carried out in rural communities and many young people 
have migrated to larger cities in search of education and work, their input was limited.  However, 





some of the ideas and concepts explored in this research.  In spite of these limitations, inferences 
about larger community use of Socio Bosque funds, relationships between communities and state-led 
PES programs, and the relationship some Indigenous communities have with land, place, and their 
surrounding ecosystems can be made and the observation made throughout the research are still 
valid.  Of course, the observations and conclusions drawn from the evidence presented in this study 
require further research at a much larger scale to be able to compare and contrast the experience of 
the five communities of this study with those of other Indigenous communities. 
 
Theoretical Contributions 
It is important to reflect on what the Socio Bosque case study tells us about how we might theorize 
and conceptualize Indigenous participation and inclusion in PES programs, as well as Indigenous 
relationships with the state and international efforts to conserve land for global biodiversity and 
climate change.  First, few scholars have analyzed the implications institutionalized PES programs 
have on meaningful participation and inclusion of Indigenous communities in national climate 
change and environmental governance programs.   This study indicates that meaningful inclusion 
and participation of Indigenous peoples within PES programs is happening at the margins, meaning 
that Indigenous peoples are relegated to a form of inclusion and participation that is framed in such 
a way that their traditional land use and resource management practices are marginalized and erased 
by PES programs.  Indigenous relationships with the state are not void of any socio-economic and 
historical context that shapes the way in which environmental governance programs are 
implemented.  In the case of Socio Bosque and the Kichwa of Chimborazo, this context includes a 
historical marginalization and oppression of Indigenous communities framed by a clientelist 
relationship with the Ecuadorian state. 
 
In spite of the marginalization and erasure of Indigenous cosmovisiones caused by PES programs, this 
research makes contributions to our conceptualizing and theorizing of the concept of hegemony, 
showing the agency of Indigenous communities who participate in state-led environmental 
governance policies and programs.  Indigenous communities are not passive agents or subordinate 





costs and benefits of PES programs and make decisions, both individual and communal, about 
participating in these programs.   
 
Finally, the evidence presented in this study suggests that while PES theory’s epistemological 
underpinnings are in a free-market environmentalist perspective, in practice PES programs are 
highly governed by rules and regulations, bringing into question the practicality of true free-market 
environmental policies.  Theoretical understandings of PES programs must eradicate the false 
dichotomy between free-market and rule based environmental governance, recognizing, as this study 
shows, that PES programs operate within a framework of rules and norms that guide free-market 
principles.  Furthermore, this study suggests that free-market principles for assigning value to 
ecosystem services are not applied in practice.  In reality, PES programs are limited to socio-political 
and economic realities, such as state budgets, and do not necessarily reflect the true cost/benefit or 
value of ecosystems.  PES programs are also confined within relationships of power where, in the 
case of Chimborazo, ex-hacienda landowners still hold on to the most fertile valley land and cities 
do not compensate highland communities for using páramo water. 
 
Contributions to Andean Politics 
This study not only makes the theoretical contributions mentioned above, but it also helps our 
understanding of contemporary Andean livelihoods, land use and resource management practices, 
and the role of Indigenous cosmovisiones and relationships with Pachamama.  The study contributes to 
an ever-growing literature about the historical context of the Andean highlands, specifically in the 
Ecuadorian context (Lyons, 2006; Tuaza, 2014, 2017, 2018; Cameron, 2009; Bretón, 2012), by 
showing the past and current land use and resource management changes that Indigenous 
communities experience.  The study also contributes to our understanding of Indigenous ways of 
living, being, and understanding, specifically the intricate relationship the Kichwa have with 
Pachamama.  The study suggests that Indigenous concepts lack a clear, universal definition and are 
understood by local communities through lived experiences and relationships.  By gaining a better 
understanding of Indigenous cosmovisiones, academics, international policy-makers, and government 
officials will be better positioned to implement public policies that seek to incorporate these 





appropriate Indigenous concepts.  The study also contributes to a better understanding of the use of 
Indigenous concepts, such as sumak kawsay and Pachamama, in state political discourse by suggesting 
that the use of these concepts is superficial and, in the case of Socio Bosque, creates a moral obligation 
that coerces or encourages local communities to participate in the program.  Finally, the study shows 
that the historical inequality present in Kichwa communities affects the implementation of policies, 
specifically policies surrounding environmental governance and land use in Indigenous communities.   
 
Methodological Contributions 
The importance of engaging with communities and individuals in a collaborative and respectful 
research process is at the forefront of academic research.  In the particular case of Indigenous 
communities, incorporating what can be defined as decolonial methodologies into the research is 
paramount for Indigenous voices to be heard.  This research shows ways in which an outsider can 
form part of a community process of investigation and expression of their cosmovisiones and 
livelihoods.  For me, the process of gaining trust and partnership within Kichwa communities began 
in early 2009, showing that while the process is imperative, it can be a life-long investment in 
relationships that are based on mutual respect and reciprocity.  Decolonial methods and community 
engaged research are fundamentally relational and relationships are not built overnight; they are 
constructed through years of trust built on continual engagement with Indigenous communities as 
they seek to build their own vision of sumak kawsay.  In the beginning, there will undoubtedly be 
missteps on the part of everyone involved, but part of building lasting, reciprocal relationships are 
grace, mercy, and forgiveness and by embodying fundamental values that are paramount to 
relationships, specifically Kichwa relationships of community that are based on three principal values 
of ama sua, ama llulla, and ama quella (don't steal, don't lie, don't be lazy).  In order to know, 
understand, and interact within these values, researchers and policy-makers will need to spend years 
of engagement with and learning from Indigenous communities, which, in the end, will be beneficial 
for everyone involved. 
Finally, an important part of CES and decolonial research is that my collaboration with these 
communities does not end with the presentation of this research.  I continue to work and 





livelihoods and well-being.  The concept of randi randi is not confined to goods, but also represents 
an exchange of knowledge and relationships which extend beyond this research. 
 
Contributions to PES Policy 
It is clear that in order to meet global climate change goals, Indigenous communities must form a 
part of any strategy to achieve these goals.  Having said that, international efforts and goals must 
better understand local contexts.  International and national environmental governance programs 
and policy makers need a better understanding of local social, economic, political, and cultural 
contexts.  While this understanding is not easily achieved and takes times, it is important for policy 
makers to understand local ways of engaging with their surrounding ecosystems in order to 
understand the possible implications of market-based PES programs, or other environmental 
governance initiatives, on Indigenous livelihoods, land use, and resource management practices.  
This study suggest that these programs actively marginalize and erase Indigenous cosmovisiones.   
 
This erasure of Indigenous concepts operates within a local, historical framework of marginalization 
and oppression of Indigenous communities and ways of living, being and understanding.  Therefore, 
while some may applaud the inclusion of Indigenous concepts and cosmovisiones into mainstream, 
Ecuadorian political and social discourse, this inclusion has not contested the “colonial matrix of 
power” that continues to dictate the direction of environmental governance policies and programs.  
One aspect in particular that has been largely ignored by PES policy makers is the spiritual and 
cultural relationships that Indigenous communities have with nature.  In the case of the Kichwa, 
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